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ABSTRACT 
STUCK IN THE MIDDLE: A CASE STUDY OF CONFLICT EXPERIENCES BY 
A FIRST-TIME COMMUNITY COLLEGE PRESIDENT 
by 
Martha Parker-Magagna 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2012 
Leadership models for community college presidents are in a major 
transformation from traditional hierarchical, positional authority to participatory models 
of decision making. As leadership becomes more participatory, and educators 
experiment with more team and collaborative approaches to leadership, increased conflict 
is a likely outcome. Inclusiveness often brings diverse voices into decision making, and 
empowerment of a variety of individuals brings a shift in traditional power dynamics. 
Different interests may create conflict, and leaders will need to find ways to negotiate 
these differences in order to enhance creative adaptation of a community college to its 
changing environment. 
This study explores the experiences and responses to conflict of a community 
college president using a field case study method and grounded theory approach. 
Interviews were conducted with the president over 10 months, triangulated with faculty 
and staff interviews, onsite observations, document analysis and the results of the 
Leadership Development Profile questionnaire which was developed by William Torbert 
to predict a leader's stage of social cognitive development (ego maturity). 
xii 
The results of this study suggest that presidential responses to conflict negatively 
impacted the organization through habitual avoidance of conflict tensions including 
disengagement from important and clarifying discussions with the faculty and staff and 
retreat into bureaucratic routines that kept him separated from faculty interaction. In 
addition, the results of the Leadership Development Profile suggest a relationship 
between the president's experiences of conflict and his suggested stage of ego maturity 
which in turn influenced his choice of conflict responses. 
The implications of this study are that conflict engagement choices of this 
president can best be understood (a) as part of the organizational and environmental 
context and the developmental capacity (ego maturity) of a leader, (b) problem solving 
and decision making through collaboration require leaders to continually learn on the job, 
(c) complex, ambiguous problems may require conflict as a catalyst to surface and 
challenge assumptions that hinder the search for novel solutions. 
xiii 
Anyone who reaches the top will very likely have had to deal with conflict on the way up. 
Understand that as president you must deal with conflict, and that conflict creates tension. 
But tension is not necessarily bad. Often it can be used in positive ways. Resolving 
conflicts and using tension in positive ways can help you deal with suspicion and build 
trust, lessons that presidents should learn early in their careers. 
George B. Vaughan, Chronicle of Higher Education, October 31,2008 
CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Dramatic changes are taking place in community college leadership. Leadership 
models are moving away from traditional hierarchical forms to participatory decision 
making models (Cloud, 2010; Wallin, 2010). Positional power and authority of 
community college presidents is being challenged by calls for power sharing and 
inclusion in decision making from college stakeholders ranging from campus faculty to 
accreditors, trustees, regulators, and the public. New educational challenges are driving 
the changes in leadership models because the older models have been inefficient and at 
times dysfunctional in meeting demands for doing more with less, providing more public 
accountability, and grappling with the pressures of global competition for jobs among 
community college graduates (Cloud, 2010; Kezar, 2004; Wallin, 2010). 
This opens the door for conflict. Conflict occurs when parties who are 
interdependent perceive that their interests are about to be (or have been) frustrated by 
another (Thomas, 1976). For example, presidents of community colleges exist in a web 
of interdependence with different stakeholders (boards of trustees, accreditors, flinders 
such as state and federal governments, and the American public) who push to obtain their 
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interests which, if achieved, may frustrate the interests of a community college president. 
This tension was recently illustrated by calls from the U.S. Department of Education that 
education costs be lowered, while presidents of community colleges feel their interest in 
providing a quality education might be compromised by demands for cost cutting. As 
state and federal governments have increasingly imposed restrictions affecting how 
colleges are managed, presidents find these restrictions frustrate their desire to have 
operational autonomy on their campuses. On their campuses, presidents may push to 
meet external demands to, for example, admit more students, but by doing so frustrate the 
interests of the faculty who feel that they are unfairly burdened with increased workloads 
or feel they have no say in the decision making process (American Association of 
Community Colleges, 2005, Kezar, 1998). 
Community college leaders must deal with intrapersonal conflicts as well. Their 
personal values and interests are often interdependent, where the honoring of one value or 
interest may frustrate or interfere with another deeply held value (Deutsch, 1973). Often 
presidents are called to make choices that may be at odds with their personal values but 
may be in the best interest of the campuses. For example, a president who believes that 
all faculty members should receive health benefits might hire adjunct faculty rather than 
full-time faculty to avoid paying health care costs, but the decision to do so means the 
difference between offering a course or cancelling it. The resulting dissonance between 
the values of the president and the values he must pursue for his constituency is a source 
of conflict. 
The traditional models of community college leadership are being tested and 
strained by the variety of ambiguous and complex problems for which there are no easy 
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or obviously right answers. Conflict, which has not been addressed in community 
college literature except as a symptom of other problems, still remains largely unexplored 
(Bolman & Gallos, 2011; Holton, 1998; Kezar, Carducci, & Contreras-McGavin, 2006). 
Yet community college presidents will increasingly be faced with complexities of 
leadership, some of which will undoubtedly test their ability to deal with conflict as they 
are faced with multiple demands from stakeholders both internal and external to their 
campuses. As they grapple with these roles, the older models of leadership are failing to 
provide guidance on how to successfully engage with conflict (Kezar, 1998). 
Additionally, community college presidents face unique challenges as leaders of 
public rather than private education institutions in higher education. Community 
colleges, as taxpayer funded institutions, must comply with legal requirements for 
transparency and accountability that affect governance, communication, and management 
practices. Presidents of community colleges operate in an academic and political 
environment that is markedly different from private colleges and universities who are not 
subject to public disclosure and transparency requirements in the same way as the 
presidents of private institutions. The public nature of community colleges, not just 
funding but legal accountability and openness laws, affects how they are governed. 
Older Models of Conflict Leadership Insufficient 
Successful management of conflict in a community college has traditionally been 
an important factor for successful presidential leadership. Historically, presidents had 
positional authority which enabled them to exercise unilateral decision making on 
policies and procedures, without the requirement to consult with their faculties if they 
chose not to. Boards of Trustees, functioning on behalf of state legislatures, judged the 
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success of a community college president with metrics of efficiency and campus 
compliance to the status quo. Under this bureaucratic leadership model, community 
college presidents managed conflict through their positional authority. Faculty and staff 
seldom publically took issue with the president's decisions or actions. Community 
college presidents essentially operated as autocrats with their leadership built on U.S. 
public school models, where bureaucratic efficiency and strict authority were key 
leadership assets. Change was slow, and policies and procedures were meant to 
demarcate lines of authority (Cohen & Brawer, 2009) 
However, older models of community college leadership have proven inadequate 
to meet new challenges, necessitating a paradigm shift from autocratic to collaborative 
leadership. According to the American Association of Community Colleges (AACC), 
community college presidents of today must be "change agents who are capable of 
transforming their organizations from bureaucratic, rigid and rule-bound institutions to 
inclusive, collaborative organizations capable of creative problem solving and continuous 
improvement" (2005, p. 17). 
Collaborative and conflict management skills have become key components of 
new community college leadership models. In a master overhaul of presidential 
competencies, the AACC issued the following guidelines for new presidential hires 
entitled "Leadership Competencies for 2020." The competencies include: 
• Creating collaborations and building inclusive coalitions 
• Mediating and negotiating different points of view 
• Willingness to take risks and make difficult decisions 
• Accepting responsibility for decisions 
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• Demonstrating transformational leadership through authenticity, creativity and 
vision 
• Managing a diversity of people while not offending them (AACC, 2005, pp.5-
7). 
Although the ability to handle conflict is essential to the longevity of a college 
president (Vaughan, 2000), many community college presidents perceive conflict as 
negative, and avoid it at all costs (personal correspondence, George Boggs, March 9, 
2011). 
Why Do Community College Presidents Need to be Conflict Competent? 
Organizational leaders play a central role in moving their organizations forward, 
especially in times of change, and this often involves dealing with conflict (Fullan, 2007; 
Heifetz, 1994; Schein, 2004). In a recent survey of organizational human resource 
officers from both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations, researchers found that 99 % 
said that conflict was a normal occurrence in their organizations, and 73 % reported that a 
common source of conflict was poor leadership, which was described as (a) leaders not 
acting as positive role models with regard to conflict, (b) inability or unwillingness to 
address underlying tensions that provoke conflicts, and (c) lack of clarity of what is 
expected in the workplace. While leaders were not only seen as important to resolving 
conflicts, they were also believed to be responsible for causing many of them. Nine out 
of 10 of those surveyed rated conflict competence1—the ability to manage conflict in a 
11 take the term conflict competence from Runde and Flanagan (2010), who have published a series of 
conflict resolution books about conflict competence. Conflict competence is defined by the authors as "the 
ability to develop and use cognitive, emotional and behavioral skills that enhance productive outcomes of 
conflict while reducing the likelihood of escalation or harm" (p. 2). 
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positive way—as a very important or critical a leadership skill (Psychometrics, 2009) 
Conflict Functions and Attitudes 
How a leader chooses to frame conflict is often a matter of which of the multiple 
voices (both internal and external) that the leader chooses to listen to. Practicing positive 
conflict engagement (framing conflicts as a mutual problem to be solved together, rather 
than a contest with a winner and loser) has been found to be beneficial to productivity. 
Productivity gains included better group problem solving and decision making and 
improved working relationships as exemplified by increased trust, more effective 
teamwork, and increased job enjoyment (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000; Pondy, 1967). 
When leaders allow or promote attitudes toward conflict that are competitive 
(one party wins and the other loses), or avoid conflict engagement altogether, 
organizational conflict turns negative. Morale is harmed, which includes erosion of trust 
and willingness to work as a team. Productivity consequently decreases (Deutsch & 
Coleman, 2000; Pondy, 1967). 
Organizational research has supported the notion that conflict has an important 
role in keeping an organization vital. Conflict is an essential stabilizing influence 
(Deutsch, 1973; Weick, 1995). Weick (1995) described conflict as a natural struggle 
between opposite inclinations that exist among organizational members, such as between 
risk-takers and risk-avoiders, or between traditionalists who want to follow existing 
policies and entrepreneurs who want to alter policies. This constant tension between 
opposite organizational forces keeps the organization open to new information. If one 
2 Since framing of conflict as positive or negative plays a big part in how it is addressed (Deutsch, 1973; 
2000), I am adopting the term "framing" for my study. Bolman and Deal (1991 ) suggested that there are 
many ways to label an outlook—a mental model, map, mind-sets, schema, or cognitive lenses (p. 12). 
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type of cognitive framing dominates, then the organization is in danger of losing its 
stability, and information is filtered through the dominant frame. Coser (1956) argued 
that conflict is the vehicle by which organizations refresh or revise their norms so as to 
keep the organization in alignment with the demands of its environment. Conflict, it 
seems, is unavoidable and likely necessary for positive organizational functioning. As 
Morton Deutsch (1973) observed, "Fortunately, no one has to face the prospect of a 
conflict-free existence. Conflict can neither be eliminated nor even suppressed for long" 
(p.10). 
So if conflict is an inevitable part of organizational life, and a leader plays a major 
role in managing the direction of conflict, then what influences the positive or negative 
framing of a situation by a leader? Why do some presidents use organizational tensions 
to build mutual problem-solving capabilities, while others react to those tensions as 
threats to be "gotten rid of'? Why do some presidents thrive in tension-ridden situations, 
while others burn out? 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of my study is to describe the community college leadership 
experience of conflict in a real setting. Studying conflict in context is important because 
it recognizes that local conditions are essential to understanding conflict. This reflects 
the postmodern emphasis on context as critical to understanding a phenomenon. For 
example, what tensions facing the campus have served to bring it together? What 
tensions might be pulling it apart? 
But to study leadership and conflict without including a study of how a leader—as 
a human being—internally experiences conflict would miss an important element. 
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Internal experiences (i.e., how people give meaning or frame these experiences to 
themselves) are important to understanding their actions. These frames serve as the filter 
through which the presidents of their campuses understand their own actions. "The 
meaning people make of their experience affects the way they carry out that 
experience"(Seidman, 2008, p. 10). Specifically, this research studies how a community 
college president experiences and responds to conflict that arises within the context of 
campus change. Change and conflict are reported through the personal reflections of the 
President and interviews with key constituencies. 
My study also seeks to understand how the president might change over time in 
his approaches to conflict by what he has learned on the job. I take a constructivist view, 
as described by Lambert et al. (2002): 
Individuals and organizations bring past experience and beliefs, as well as 
their cultural histories and world views into the process of learning; all of 
these influence how we interact with and interpret our encounters with 
new ideas and events. As our personal perspectives are mediated with the 
world through inquiry, we construct and attribute meaning to these 
encounters building new knowledge in the process. This constructive, 
interpretative work is facilitated and deepened when it is undertaken with 
others and with reflection, (pp. xvi-xvii) 
However, studying the leader even in close detail still provides an incomplete 
picture. Bimbaum (1992) noted that leadership is a social interaction between the leader 
and the led, and that the leadership process cannot be meaningfully studied without 
attention to this mutual influence and to multiple interpretations. For example, Birnbaum 
(1992) cited an example from his multiple-campus case study of presidential leadership 
where a president cut personnel in a budget crisis; his actions were considered 
"courageous" by the trustees and "traitorous capitulation" by the faculty (p. 14). 
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Significance of This Study 
This study addresses several gaps in the academic leadership literature on conflict 
engagement. First, as noted above, academic leadership scholars have called for more 
research on conflict as it occurs in a college setting (Kezar, et al., 2006). As educators 
experiment with more team and collaborative approaches to leadership, increased conflict 
is a likely outcome. For example, inclusiveness brings diverse voices into decision 
making, and empowerment of a variety of individuals brings a shift in traditional power 
dynamics. Different interests may likely be at odds, and leaders will need to find ways to 
negotiate and manage these differences. 
Second, despite the volumes of research on conflict management strategies, 
educational leaders are still left with blueprints for effective practice that are universal, 
one-size-fits-all solutions. This literature, as exemplified by interest-based negotiations 
such as those described by Fisher and Ury (1981), is based on rationalist/instrumental 
reasoning in shaping conflict responses. This reasoning, which is at the core of most 
economic models, suggests that individuals act so as to achieve their desired outcomes, 
so it is assumed that if one can show those in conflicts where their interests lie they will 
opt for those resolutions which will meet their interests or needs. Yet if this approach 
explained conflict, why are educational environments so rife with unresolved and 
unaddressed conflict? (Bolman & Gallos, 2011; Holton, 1998). Since academia attracts 
highly intelligent, cognitively complex individuals, why does a logical-rational approach 
to conflict resolution not seem to work? Perhaps there are other factors that influence 
conflict responses. 
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This conundrum points to another gap in the research literature. Why do training 
programs in conflict leadership fail to bring the anticipated change? That is, why do 
leaders tend to use familiar leadership styles, even when a situation calls for different 
behavior or adaptive learning? (Runde, et al., 2010; Torbert, 1987). 
Altman and Chemers (1984) noted that despite the voluminous research on 
leadership, there remains a gap in studying the leaders and followers as people. There is 
a need to fill this gap by studying both the sensemaking or meaning that a leader brings to 
conflict and the framing (how conflict is interpreted) a leader uses to determine responses 
to conflict. Furthermore, there is a need to study the way those who are affected by the 
leader's actions make sense of them. 
Hence the central questions that this study investigated are: 
• How does the leader (president) of a community college describe his 
experiences of conflict and responses to it? 
• How do members of the community college report their perceptions of the 
president's responses to conflict? 
• What is the relationship between the president's experiences of conflict and 
his stage of leadership development? 
Limitations of the Study 
This study is about one community college leader in a particular culture and 
context, in one time and place. The study, while providing insights into the challenges 
and the responses, feelings, and behaviors toward different varieties of conflict, cannot 
provide any generalizable data because the sample size is small. However, as Yin (2003) 
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pointed out, a case may be generalizable if the findings are similar to other cases which 
have been reported.. It will make its contribution by means of context-specific data. 
Second, as Birnbaum (1992) pointed out in his discussion of leadership roles, the 
relationship between those who seek to lead and those who are willing to follow enjoy a 
unique relationship that is influenced by the culture of the campus. This will vary among 
campuses, but also vary among the conflict-inducing situations. What might be 
considered a conflict-inducing situation in my case study may be viewed quite differently 
on another campus. 
The work is also limited by potential (but unrecognized) biases of the researcher 
herself. For example, although the documentation of data has been attended to with some 
detail, there is still the possibility that the assembly of the data into evidence to support 
conclusions and analysis may in some way be framed through a lens that is not widely 
representative of what another researcher might see. However, precautions have been 
taken, including peer review of data analysis and members' checks of the data. In 
addition, the triangulation of data by using a variety of different sources may also reduce 
the possibility of a widely inaccurate, myopic view. 
Overview of Contents 
In the next chapter, I review pertinent scholarly literature to provide a context for 
my study. The review includes conflict definitions and theories, a discussion of 
organizational leadership theories for this study and adult development constructive 
development theory. 
In Chapter 3 I review the methodology and explain why I chose a case study 
method blended with a grounded theory approach. In Chapter 4,1 review the results of 
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my work, and in Chapter 5,1 provide an analysis of the results, with attention to 
alternative explanations which seemed the most plausible. In Chapter 6,1 summarize and 
conclude my work with attention to areas of further study that are needed. Finally, in the 
Epilogue I update my readers on campus and leadership developments that occurred after 




"The most intense conflicts, if overcome, leave behind a sense of security and calm that 
is not easily disturbed. It is just the intense conflicts and their conflagration which are 
needed to produce valuable and lasting results." Carl Gustav Jung 
Theoretical Foundations for this Study 
In the opening chapter, I provided an overview of the contemporary contexts 
(conditions or circumstances) in which community college presidents are expected to 
lead. I pointed out that the model for effective leadership has changed from one based on 
hierarchical positional authority which maintains the status quo and treats change and 
conflict as both an exception and an aberration-with no change and no conflict as the 
harmonious ideal (Deutsch, 2000a; Pondy, 1967). The new model presented by the 
AACC positions collaboration (mutuality), building coalitions for buy-in to decisions 
among faculty and staff (as opposed to fiat), the willingness to learn on the job by 
learning from mistakes, the ability to juggle a diversity of interests and needs of people 
with a wide variety of viewpoints, and the ability to take risks in making difficult 
decisions as among the top competences for a successful presidency (AACC, 2020, p. 6). 
However, the relationship between the experiences of conflict situations and the choices 
made by presidents in the way they deal with those conflicts has remained largely 
unexplored. I made the claim that how leaders experience conflict influences how they 
frame it (as either a positive opportunity for collaborative learning or as a negative 
threat), and that, if seen in a positive light, conflict has been found to improve working 
relationships, job performance, and organizational solidarity (Deutsch, 2000a; Johnson, 
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Johnson, & Tjosvold, 2000; Tjosvold, 2008); conversely, if seen as a negative, conflict 
can damage working relationships, harm organizational morale, and hurt job 
performance. 
In this literature review, I have drawn together several topics in order to provide a 
theoretical framework to aid in reviewing my research results. The theoretical 
framework is based on leadership concepts collectively known as "cognitive complexity 
leadership theory" (Kezar, et al., 2006). This framework positions academic leadership 
within a context of change, conflict and complexity created in large part due to the 
ambiguity and uncertainty of the problems which face modern community colleges. 
This framework represents a group of leadership theorists and researchers 
including Bolman and Deal (2003); Bolman and Gallos (2011); Heifetz (Heifetz, 1994; 
Heifetz, Grashow, & Linsky, 2009); Wheatley (1999), Lambert (Lambert, et al., 2002); 
Bergquist (1992); Birnbaum (Birnbaum, 1992); Kezar, Carducci and Contreras-McGavin 
(Kezar, et al., 2006), Kegan (1982), Cook-Greuter (2005) and Torbert (Torbert & 
Associates, 2004). This leadership group is by no means complete but rather was 
selected because their work has directly or indirectly addressed the confluence between 
leadership and conflict, and the role of complexity. 
To set the stage, I first offer definitions and theories of conflict, describe theories 
of organizational leadership which I used for this study, and then discuss the implications 
of this theoretical foundation for the case study. 
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Definitions and Theories of Conflict 
Definitions 
Apart from a suggested definition of conflict in authoritative sources such as the 
Oxford English Dictionary, conflict has no commonly agreed-upon definition (See 
Appendix A for a list of frequently used definitions). In chapter one, I used the definition 
that parties must be interdependent and perceive that what they want will be frustrated or 
blocked by someone else (Thomas, 1976). This definition carries three implications: 
perspective is important (conflict is often seen as either positive or negative or a 
combination of both); emotional and/or intellectual involvement has occurred; and the 
subject of the perceived interference is something that matters to people involved. 
Perspective refers to how the conflict is viewed-is it seen as an opportunity to 
"clear the air" and strengthen the relationship? Or is it seen as a threat to the 
relationship?3 The degree of intellectual and emotional involvement also depends on 
perspective. If conflict were viewed on a spectrum, on the benign end might be conflict 
as an annoyance, frustration moving toward the middle, a tension or strain. On the other 
end, conflict might be interpreted as a serious disagreement, dispute or hostilities with a 
perceived threat of physical or emotional harm. In community colleges today, as in much 
of the world, the multiplicity of diversity among people working together is likely to 
produce a range of reactions, or, as Fullan (2001) pointed out, "collaborative diversity 
means conflict" (p. 23). Conflict tensions or strains appeared to be prevalent in this 
study, while overt hostilities were not. The difference, as one faculty member noted, was 
3 To risk belaboring the point, the term "conflict" is often used synonymously with everything that is 
hurtful, bad, harmful, etc. Pondy (1967) made the point that the connotations of the term as harmful have 
prevented us from giving it a fair hearing. Conflict, he pointed out, is not a disruption to the harmony of an 
organization, but rather harmony is a disruption in the natural state of conflict tensions in organizations. 
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that the situation at the college was not good but was not "toxic" for the faculty 
(112.9.16). 
Perspective and involvement also involve positionality-who has the power and 
how much in the conflict situation. Historically, those with more positional power (e.g., 
the power to control such resources as time, money, decision making, etc.) tended to be 
viewed as having fewer stresses and strains of conflict than those without the power to 
control these resources (Deutsch, 2000b). These factors were important in my study, 
because presidents hold positional power, and, as leaders, they have large influence over 
how conflict is viewed-as something healthy or unhealthy. 
Finally, my study examined both interpersonal (between people) and intrapersonal 
(within the self) conflicts of the president. Although conflict between people has been 
habitually (and arbitrarily)4 divided between disputes over problems based on differences 
in ideas, beliefs, values, goals, methods, etc., or emotional disputes involving 
relationships (Deutsch, 2000a; Holton, 1998; Pondy, 1967), in reality, this distinction is 
artificial and in my opinion very unhelpful (see Appendix B for an abbreviated typology 
of conflicts from Deutsch, 1973).5 In this study, intrapersonal and interpersonal tensions 
were intertwined as the president and the college faculty attempted to grapple with 
problems associated with a major reorganization of the governing unit at the state 
community college system level and with the issues of a first-time college presidency. 
4 The distinction between conflict over tasks and between people has been mostly for the convenience of 
researchers (Chen, 2004; Holton, 1998). 
5 Studies of "task" conflicts (e.g., involving goals, methods for achieving an objective) will devolve into 
conflicts of relationships if not handled in a positive manner (Holton, 1998) 
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Conflict Theories 
The relationship between conflicts and problems has been addressed in a number 
of contexts. While not all problems cause conflicts, all conflicts involve some type of 
unsolved problem (Deutsch, Coleman, & Marcus, 2006; Fisher & Shapiro, 2006; Fisher, 
Ury, & Patton, 2011; Fullan, 2001; Runde, et al., 2010; Weitzman & Weitzman, 2000). 
Well-recognized theories of conflict resolution, most notably win-win negotiations 
(parties each walk away from negotiations feeling satisfied with the outcome), have 
offered a process for addressing conflict. The process has included focusing on the 
problem, not the personalities; looking for needs and wants of the parties, not their stated 
positions; respecting differences rather than fearing them, and recognizing that most 
conflicts, at least to some degree involve core concerns including issues of appreciation 
(your thoughts have merit), affiliation (being treated with respect, not as an enemy), 
autonomy (freedom to make your own decision on the matter-not coerced), status (being 
recognized), and role (feeling fulfilled in what you do) (Fisher & Shapiro, 2006; Fisher, 
et al., 2011). This approach has enjoyed considerable success since it was first 
introduced more than 30 years ago and has assumed that everyone can learn to practice 
this form of positive conflict engagement. However it has failed to provide guidance on 
how organizational context, culture and individual approaches to problem-solving might 
affect the conflict resolution process. With this in mind, I turn to the organizational 
leadership theories that address these issues. 
Organizational Leadership Theories: Change. Complexity and Ambiguity 
Important to the context of this study was the presence of change. The campus 
system in my study had begun its transition from a centralized governance system headed 
17 
by a politically appointed commissioner to a decentralized governance system headed by 
a board of trustees (composed of community leaders throughout the state). The 
implications of this change meant the community college presidents were being given 
more authority and autonomy over their campuses to make critical decisions about budget 
allocations, hiring, course offerings, and other resource issues. However, the degree of 
autonomy and authority between the central system and the college presidents was very 
much in flux. As such, campus change was embedded with complex and ambiguous 
problems such as how this campus could fulfill a state system mandate to serve a greater 
number of students while being given no additional state funds. Although the state 
system through the Board of Trustees gave presidents more control over their own 
budgets, which parts of the budget were under presidential responsibility remained 
unclear; for example, control over campus improvements were retained by the system 
office, while maintenance was not. The complexities of the boundary lines required 
presidents to negotiate for increased authority and autonomy. Although the situation 
between community college presidents and their boards varies widely throughout the 
U.S., what is consistent is that most community college presidents are in a situation of 
grappling with change (Cloud, 2010; Cohen & Brawer, 2009; Kezar, 1998; Wallin, 
2010). 
In a special edition of New Directions for Community Colleges, Wallin (2010) 
pointed out that presidents of community colleges were entering an era where change and 
complexity were the norm. Her advice was that, although change was a challenge, 
"change leadership in tomorrow's successful colleges will foster leaders who can 
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anticipate change, analyze the environment, act decisively and collaboratively, and affirm 
the value of positive change" (Wallin, 2010, p. 5). 
Fullan (2001) went one step further when he noted that "the more complex 
society gets, the more sophisticated leadership must become. Complexity means change, 
but specifically it means rapidly occurring, unpredictable, nonlinear change (p. ix). He 
went on the say that "problems are our friends. Problems are inevitable, but the good 
news is that you can't learn or be successful without them ... problems are our friends is 
another way of saying that conflict is essential to any change effort" (Fullan, 2001, p. 25). 
Cognitive Complexity Theory 
The relationship of change and conflict in organizational life has been positioned 
in a number of ways. For example, Bolman and Deal (2003) suggested that conflict 
might be a viewed as a normal occurrence in some situations, while in others conflict 
might be a sign that something was very wrong in the organization and needed to be 
fixed. Organizational leaders need to exercise cognitive complexity (e.g., to see 
situations and interpret their roles from multiple points of view) in order to be effective. 
To use only one or two perspectives or frames is to miss essential contextual clues as to 
what the organizational challenges (problems) are and how best to address them, leaving 
a leader in a state of "cluelessness" (Bolman & Deal, 2003, p.4). Bolman and Deal, after 
an extensive study of leadership of more than 300 organizations, determined that four 
frames might serve as archetypes for the organizational leader. They consolidated major 
schools of organizational thought into four perspectives (called frames): structural, 
human resource, political, and symbolic (2003). 
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The structural frame emphasizes the importance of formal roles and relationships 
in an organization and the accountability obtained through policies and procedures. 
Based on their studies of organizations, Bolman and Deal (2003) concluded that, when 
leaders use a structural frame, they see conflict as a result of roles; policies and 
procedures are not being clearly defined with the solution being to restructure them. 
Colleges under this frame would be metaphorically seen as efficient factories. 
If a leader uses a human resource frame, faculty and staff would be seen as a 
family. A president as leader would focus on personal needs and feelings, as well as 
focus on adjusting organizational roles so that people were matched to their interests and 
skills. Conflict would likely be seen as a misalignment between people and their roles or 
as a lack of attention to the cognitive and emotional needs of employees. 
A leader who uses a political frame would view organizational life through the 
metaphor of arenas in which organizational members negotiate for their interests and 
coalitions are built to support buy-in of ideas. Conflict, in the form of a diversity of 
viewpoints, would be considered a normal part of everyday life. 
Leaders who concentrate on creating shared values and meanings would focus on 
the symbolic nature of cultural values, rituals, stories, heroes, and myths that define the 
organization's personality. Conflicts would be addressed as a need to reenergize the 
organization's symbols and rituals and beliefs and once again create shared meaning 
within the organization (Bolman & Deal, 2003). 
Cultural-Relational Perspective. This fundamental set of frames has been adapted 
by scholars, e.g., (Baldridge, 1971; Bergquist, 1992; Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman & Gallos, 
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2011) to explain how presidents might determine leadership strategies for their colleges. 
For example, community colleges have traditionally valued efficiency and hierarchical 
bureaucratic organization as reflective of a structural approach to leadership. While some 
community colleges have adopted a collegial approach which reflects both a human 
resource expectation of affiliation and also part of the political aspect where autonomy is 
emphasized, ideas are debated and decisions arrived at through creating supporting 
coalitions. The culture of a college—its values, history, beliefs and assumptions which 
the faculty and staff have about themselves as members of the college—reflects the 
symbolic nature embedded in most colleges. Each of these four ways of interpreting an 
organization's needs and a leader's role was important within this case study. 
In addition to these fundamental frames, Bergquist (1992) found an additional 
cultural framework within some colleges and community colleges which he called a 
developmental or learning culture. Bergquist noted that a developmental or learning 
culture was a rarer cultural form than the other four discussed above. This culture 
focuses on cognitive, affective, and social maturation for all its members—faculty, 
students and staff. Personal openness and service to others are combined with systematic 
institutional research and curricular planning. This culture combines a managerial 
concern for evidence-based decision making, accountability, constant assessment, and 
continuous correction for quality improvement. Transparency, accountability, inclusion, 
and empowerment of input into decision making are included among the hallmarks. In 
this culture, as with the collegial and political cultures, conflicts due to a multiplicity of 
ideas are considered a natural part of the culture. 
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Bergquist's cultural snapshot, as with the contextual leadership framework 
reviewed earlier, provides a tangible rather than an abstract gauge to make sense of 
organizational influences on conflict engagement in my case study. These organizational 
models provide concrete examples of values, practices, and symbols that compete among 
the "cacophonous and multivocal" (Tierney, 2008) elements in community colleges. 
They also provide guides for participant observations, interviews, and review of written 
communications, which, as Tierney (2008) advised, are useful to understanding how 
members of an institution interpret the school's culture to themselves and to others. If 
leadership is a mutually created reality between a leader and those who have agreed to be 
led, then these two organizational leadership models provide clues to how to identify this 
reality (Birnbaum, 1992). 
Adaptive Learning Perspective. The context and culture within which leadership 
is practiced provide a solid foundation for studying community college leadership, but 
they lack one quality-they focus on leadership as a person-a role (Bergquist, 1992; 
Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman & Deal, 2003). Other perspectives on the leadership role as 
articulated by Heifetz (1994), Wheatley, (1999), Lambert, et al (2002) and Uhl-Bein 
(Uhl-Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007) suggest that leadership is not leader-centric but a 
process, and the leader is not the center but on the side as a facilitator and teacher to 
nurture leadership in others within the organization. Although the theories as articulated 
by Bolman and Deal(2003) for cognitive complexity, and the cultural-relational 
perspective as represented by Birnbaum (1992) and Bergquist (1992) recognize the joint 
obligation between leader and followers, these perspectives do not position leadership as 
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teaching and learning. Within the adaptive learning perspective, leadership is viewed not 
as a singular role but as a shared responsibility of everyone in the organization (Heifetz, 
1994; Kezar, et al., 2006; Lambert, et al., 2002; Uhl-Bien, et al., 2007; Wheatley, 1999). 
Another distinguishing factor is that conflict is seen not as an outcome of change but 
rather as a catalyst for change (Heifetz, 1994; Uhl-Bien, et al., 2007; Wheatley, 1999). 
This group of theorists embraced conflict as a catalyst because they contend that 
problems today are so complex and ambiguous—and predicted outcomes so uncertain— 
that conflict in the form of a competing, multiplicity of ideas is critical both to diagnosing 
problems and determining how best to solve them (Heifetz, 1994; Kezar, et al., 2006). 
Heifetz (1994) has explained this process as diagnosing the difference between 
complex, routine problems (authoritative solutions have been successfully applied to 
these problems in the past), and novel or adaptive problems (for which the solutions 
come not from authoritative solutions but rather from adaptive changes in the 
organization). These problems are novel, ambiguous, complex and the outcomes of 
action to solve them are uncertain. Heifetz explained that: 
Everyone has a particular capacity for tolerating conflict. Some people are 
comfortable working through conflict, while most avoid it entirely or try to get 
through it as quickly as possible. But surfacing the relevant conflicts is essential 
when an organization is falling short of its aspirations. To do this well requires an 
approach to conflict that teases out the unacknowledged differences in 
perspectives on the work issues that may be preventing the organization from 
reaching its espoused aspiration. It requires acknowledging the many competing 
visions, values, and views that may be alive in the organization even if they are 
not articulated. ... Orchestrating conflict is a discipline. It requires seeing the 
process as a necessary step in the journey toward a better future, tolerating the 
moments your people are not working well together, and believing that working 
through some rough patches will help solidify their collective effort and 
commitment. (1994, p. 149) 
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Heifetz (1994) contended that out of conflict engagement comes a discovery of 
common ground and shared values. The adaptation is not capitulation to the external 
environment but rather a judicious selection from among the values of the cultural DNA 
of the organization to determine what is critical to the organization's values and what is 
not. This approach to leadership is not easy as it may require the organization to 
collectively tolerate some internal organizational hostility for a while-when most people 
simply want to do nothing, avoid the problems, strike back at someone, or look to an 
authority to make the problem go away. 
This approach to leadership was extremely useful in this case study because it 
anticipated a variety of potential responses to conflict and also foreshadowed the mindset 
which I encountered among the faculty regarding what they expected from their 
president. Uhl-Bein et al. (2007) suggested that many leadership models (i.e., leader-
centric) were predicated on the last century of industrial-age, top-down, bureaucratic 
operations.6 These models were based on an economy in which physical production was 
the dominant form of employment. However, in the last few decades, the U.S. and other 
economies have emerged into a knowledge economy, where complex problems are 
encountered not just by leaders but by everyone in the organization. As Bettes and Hitt 
(1995) observed, "This new age is about an economy where knowledge is a core 
commodity and the rapid production of knowledge and innovation is critical to 
organizational survival" (as cited by Uhl-Bien, 2007, p. 299). Complex and ambiguous 
problems are a basic fact of life. The role of community college presidents within this 
paradigm would be to energize the process of group learning in order to work 
6 Bureaucratic models have typically included situational, trait, behavioral, transformational/transactional 
models. See Appendix C for a representative list of major leadership theories, and Appendix D for useful 
definitions of leadership by various leadership scholars. 
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collaboratively to identify and offer potential solutions. In this role, presidents must be 
especially quick to recognize and learn from their mistakes and to create an atmosphere 
where tensions are seen as ways to create "imperatives to act and to elaborate strategy, 
information and adaptability" to new situations (Uhl-Bien, et al., 2007, p. 311). As these 
descriptions of the work of Heifetz, Wheatley and Uhl-Bien reveal, leadership as a role is 
not entirely dead-it has expanded to include leadership responsibilities and empowerment 
to organizational members. 
Empirical Studies 
In searching for real world applications of conflict, two studies of conflict in 
community colleges provided a helpful guide for me. In a study of collegiality in a 
community college with unionized faculty, Hartley (2010) found that, despite the 
sometimes contentious relations between the faculty union and the president, collegial 
relations were maintained due to the president's personal openness to mutual influence, 
willingness to share and explain budget data, and collaborative attitude toward problem-
solving with the faculty. In a second study of community college leadership 
effectiveness and conflict, Pettitt and Ayers (2002) concluded that critical factors 
mitigating campus conflicts were perceptions of communications, collaboration, and 
mutual influence between campus administrative leaders and employees. In both studies, 
the problems were neither simple nor routine but complex and ambiguous. In the case of 
the unionized campus, the president was continually involved working behind the scenes 
to strengthen relationships with faculty, bringing them in as partners in the leadership and 
change process. 
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A search of conflict-related literature within academia—both four-year and 
community colleges—resulted in two additional studies of conflict and one study of 
stage-related leadership. Two dissertations focused on conflict management during 
university strategic planning processes to determine if the conflict was functional or 
dysfunctional to the process. Both studies—self-reports by senior administrators who led 
the process—found that conflict had been introduced and facilitated at key points in the 
process to encourage broader and more inclusive decision making (Socci, 2001; Wallace, 
2010). Both studies concluded that conflict could be useful when tackling novel 
problems. In a review of community college leadership challenges, Amey (2005) 
concluded, while using Kegan's (1994) stage-development theory as her guide, that the 
more perspectives leaders could bring to a problem, the more likely they were to develop 
successful solutions. 
Among numerous case studies of community college leadership related to 
leadership qualities, Birnbaum (1992) found that community college presidents were 
judged as successful leaders by their faculties when they demonstrated multiple framing 
thinking toward their leadership-that is, applying cognitive complexity. Additionally, 
Birnbaum found that presidents who were judged average or as failures in their 
leadership tended to use only one frame or mental model to view a community 
college—the bureaucratic model. This was particularly true of first-time community 
college presidents. The second most frequently applied leadership frame used by first-
time presidents, especially community college presidents, was the political model. 
However, regardless of whether a president used one or two models, organizational 
members could only recall their president approaching leadership issues from a 
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bureaucratic model, which led researchers to conclude that bureaucratic models must be 
used with extreme caution, as it is likely to be perceived by college faculty as dominant 
and to overshadow presidential efforts at collaborative or participatory leadership. 
In a different use of framing, Eddy (2005) studied how college presidents 
communicated or framed their administrative goals. In a range of studies, Eddy found 
that presidents who took into account the culture of their colleges and framed their 
messages to appeal to the values, beliefs and traditions of their colleges were judged to be 
more successful and effective as leaders than presidents who focused on their own 
agenda and failed to recognize the cultural expectations of their campuses. 
These studies point out the importance of context and relationships in framing 
how leadership is judged. Presidents who focus on mutuality with organizational 
members and demonstrate an awareness of organizational cultural values are more likely 
to be seen as successful presidents 
Constructive Developmental Leadership Theory 
In the definitions of leadership explored above, the expectations for leadership 
have required community college leaders to have cognitive complexity (able to take 
multiple perspectives), to value different cultures and nurture relationships within them, 
and to be continual teachers who can utilize tension as a catalyst for learning and 
leadership development. Each of these theories requires not only cognitive complexity 
but also emotional and social maturity, which includes "balancing one's own needs with 
the needs of others" (Loevinger, 1976 as cited in Oja & Reiman, 2007, p.95). 
In order to explore the research question of how the president experiences 
conflict, I turned to the constructive developmental branch of adult lifespan psychology, 
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which explores the growth of the complexity of individuals' judgments, actions, and 
interpretations throughout their lives. Specifically, I am interested in the area of 
constructive developmental research which focuses on ego maturity. This theory brings 
together three developmental dimensions: (a) cognitive maturity, in which knowledge is 
constructed and contextual; (b) integrated identity, in which values are reconstructed over 
time; and (c) mature relationships, an interpersonal dimension through which individuals 
develop respect for both themselves and others—and collaborate to assimilate and 
accommodate multiple viewpoints and needs (Baxter Magolda, 2004 ; Kegan, 1994; Oja 
& Reiman, 2007). 
Constructive developmental theory provides a promising approach for this study 
because conflict engages not only cognitive reasoning, but also emotional capacity 
(intrapersonal) and social cognition (interpersonal), which are determinants of an 
individual's initial conflict response. In particular, positive conflict engagement requires: 
• The willingness or capacity to question underlying assumptions; 
• Recognition and appreciation of interdependence with mutual needs to be 
recognized; favorable attitude toward one's self and others; 
• The ability to draw from and include a diverse range of ideas, which recognizes 
the need to find a solution that responds to the interests of all; 
• Willingness to give and receive honest feedback; 
• Willingness to cooperate in enhancing others' power (through help with 
knowledge, skills, resources, etc.) to help others accomplish their goals; and 
• Definition of a problem as a mutual problem to be solved (Deutsch, 2000a; 
Johnson, et al., 2000). 
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Constructive Developmental Theory Defined. Constructive developmental theory 
is comprised of two central ideas: (a) knowledge is constructed based on past 
experiences, beliefs, personal histories, and our own world views or mindsets; and (b) 
human beings emotionally and cognitively mature over time. Our growth is constructive 
in the sense that a person constructs meaning or interpretations of life's experiences and 
uses these contexts to draw assumptions about life and to build values and beliefs on 
those assumptions. These assumptions are the foundations of an individual's mental 
model. The mental model is composed of both cognitive and emotional reasoning 
patterns (Kegan, 1994; Torbert & Associates, 2004). 
Developmental growth is a tension between assimilation and accommodation to 
new experiences in life. Assimilation occurs when new experience and events such as 
knowledge and skills are brought into an existing mental framework. In other words, we 
make sense of these experiences by relating them to what we already know and believe. 
But when we encounter new experiences that simply can not be explained through our 
current way of thinking and believing, then we have reached a point where we either will 
reject the new experiences or we begin to adjust our mental and emotional framework to 
accommodate these new experiences (Kegan, 1982; Lambert, et al., 2002). This period 
of accommodation is sometimes referred to as being "stuck" between the older ways of 
making sense of things and the emerging new ways of making sense. Once the new 
accommodation has taken place, then we begin the assimilation process again by 
incorporating new experiences into our new mental framework. This is the process of 
adult constructive developmental growth which Robert Kegan explained as a continuous 
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cycle back and forth as we gradually grow toward increasing mental and emotional 
maturity (1994). 
In summary, the basic propositions of constructive developmental theory include: 
1. People build their understanding of the world and of themselves incrementally 
through constructing and interpreting their experiences. 
2. These experiences are built on previous interpretations that are constantly 
readjusted to accommodate new life experiences. 
3. Each person's growth toward ego maturity occurs at a different rate, but there 
are identifiable patterns that define ways of organizing their experiences into 
mental models. 
4. As a person moves through orders of development, earlier ones still remain as 
"perspectives" that can be called upon. 
5. The later stages are not "better" (that is the later stages are not more moral or 
intellectual) but rather are more accommodating to meeting the challenges of 
life. Ego constructs has been found to be empirically different from IQ or 
intelligence (Cook-Greuter, 2004; McCauley, Drath, Palus, O'Connor, & 
Baker, 2006). 
Stages of Leadership Development. William Torbert, organizational 
psychologist, is generally credited with the first application of constructive 
developmental theory to the study of leadership (McCauley, et al., 2006). Torbert 
focused on how cognitive and affective reasoning shapes a leader's judgments and 
behaviors. He termed this "action-logics"—that is, how a leader's cognitive and affective 
logic affects the selection of actions to fit a particular situation. One of the central issues 
30 
he investigated was why smart people (those with high IQs and advanced managerial 
skills) seemed to make "dumb" decisions—decisions that detracted from rather than 
enhanced organizational effectiveness. In order to measure leadership characteristics, 
Torbert worked with Susanne Cook-Greuter to adapt the work of Jane Loevinger, who 
had developed the first measurement system for ego maturity, the Washington University 
Sentence Completion Test. Torbert and Cook-Greuter created the Leadership 
Development Profile. The profile was of interest to me because it seeks to measure 
characteristics of the type of intrapersonal and interpersonal behaviors that would most 
likely be needed to engage in conflict in a positive way (Torbert & Associates, 2004). 
Although Kegan (1994)7 and Torbert (Torbert & Associates, 2004) and later 
researcher/practitioners (Joiner & Josephs, 2007) offer similar descriptions of the stages 
of development, I have chosen Torbert's descriptions because they focused on leadership 
and have been verified through almost 40 years of empirical testing among thousands of 
corporate and not-for-profit senior administrators. Torbert's (2004) seven stages may be 
characterized as the journey from solipsistic to collaborative. In the table below, the 
seven stages are described with a focus on problem solving which is predicted by the 
stage theory. For example, at the Opportunist stage, individuals are highly invested in 
their own way of thinking, treat dissenting opinions as hostile threats, and seek 
confirming feedback. Steve Jobs, in his younger years, for example, was noted for this 
behavior. 
7 Harvard educational psychologist, Robert Kegan, is credited with creating the term constructive 
developmentalism and is one of the founders of this field of inquiry. William Torbert (Torbert & 
Associates, 2004) credits, among others, both Jane Loevinger and Robert Kegan as providing the 
foundation for his work. Both Kegan and Torbert agree that there are strong similarities in their approaches 
and measurement metrics (Kegan, 2009; Torbert, 2004). 
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Table 1: Stages of Leadership Maturity 
Stage Leadership Behavior 
Opportunist Seeks short-term, concrete advantage for self; rejects feedback; externalizes 
blame; manipulates others as either charming or aggressive. 
Diplomat Seeks acceptance by colleagues; observes protocol; avoids conflict to save own 
and others' face. 
Expert Seeks perfect solutions; accepts feedback only from known experts. 
Achiever Seeks results driven by teamwork; welcomes feedback if related to obtaining 
goals, but not open to examining goals themselves. 
Individualist Likely to question underlying assumptions of conversation; seeks out diverse 
viewpoints; may experience inability to make timely decisions because unable to 
weigh or balance viewpoints. 
Strategist Seeks to construct shared vision; uses conflict resolution to transform 
relationships, not just achieve outcomes; seeks feedback for personal 
improvement. 
Alchemist Comfortable with holding conflicting ideas and stakeholder interests (including 
own) in balance without bias toward one over the other; seeks feedback 
continuously for personal improvement; balances long-term and short-term 
needs. 
Note. Adapted from Action Inquiry by Torbert and Associates, 2004, San Francisco, CA. 
Copyright 2004 by Bill Torbert. Adapted with permission. 
Brilliantly single-minded, Jobs led through his visionary passion, but routinely 
pitted one division against another in the belief that competition bred excellence 
(Isaacson, 2011). In the second stage, Diplomat, the opposite action logic occurs. The 
person becomes highly invested in socially expected behavior and group norms, and 
dissenting opinions are seen as threats because the opinions challenge group harmony. In 
the next transition, the Expert becomes less invested in group norms and more in 
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expertise and authority as sources of power. Experts look to those with recognized 
expertise for feedback, while tending to discount feedback from others they do not 
recognize as experts (Torbert & Associates, 2004; Joiner & Josephs, 2007). At the 
Achiever stage, a person relies heavily on linear logic as the means to deliver results. 
Goals achievement is the measure of success. If the means to achieve their goals are not 
successful, then Achievers are willing to reconsider their means, but not their goals. 
Feedback is sought to the extent that it helps in meeting goals, not for revisiting the 
wisdom of the goals. At the Individualist stage, leaders begin to identify themselves not 
only with their professional expertise but also take into account their personal 
development. The Individualists are, for the first time, beginning to seek out different 
opinions, but are sometimes overwhelmed with these different viewpoints and may feel 
stuck when having to make decisions. In earlier stages, leaders tend to seek and accept 
advice from only those they considered experts and those with the power to help them 
achieve their goals. As Individualists they begin to recognize the value of ideas from 
those they might have in an earlier stage considered to be unqualified to give opinions. 
The Strategist stage is the first point of entry into a self-transforming way of life, that is, 
a person begins to feel comfortable in many different and challenging environments. A 
Strategist's decision making is less dependent on others or on circumstances, yet, at the 
same time, the Strategist recognizes that both relationships and circumstances need to be 
taken into account when making decisions. The Strategist sees leadership not as 
positional authority but as a process which is collaborative with many co-leaders, 
depending on the situation. A shared common purpose transcends rules and procedures 
as the guiding action logic. At this stage, negative feedback is welcomed as a source of 
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commitment to improvement. At the latest stage identified by Torbert and others, the 
Alchemist is able to address daily operational issues and long-term transformational 
change with equal ease. For example, an Alchemist leader in education might be found 
facilitating faculty collaborations in school governance, while at the same time working 
to transform maladaptive practices found within the educational system and helping to 
redefine the meaning of education itself (Torbert & Associates, 2004; Joiner & Josephs, 
2007). 
From the intrapersonal perspective, as a leader integrates more perspectives into 
action logics, role conflict becomes less of an issue, because the leader feels comfortable 
with multiple conflicting roles and expectations (Torbert & Associates, 2004). 
Empirical Research Studies. A number of studies provide insight into how 
constructive developmental stages might influence conflict responses, but only one has 
focused on conflict engagement in relationship to stages. In a study of 200 CEOs, Eigel 
and Kuhnert (2005) found that managers who scored at Achiever levels or earlier stages 
habitually responded to workplace problems as challenges to their competency and 
consistently responded with either highly assertive or avoiding conflict behaviors. The 
authors termed this "winning at all costs or avoiding at all costs" (p. 33). At later stages, 
from late Achiever on through Alchemist, leaders tended to use a greater variety of 
responses, utilizing both contingency and collaborative responses. By the Strategist and 
Alchemist stages, leaders were able to consistently decipher the types of problems that 
needed a collaborative approach and to bring group processes into play to achieve results. 
Other empirical studies that offer insight into attributes useful to positive conflict 
engagement include that of Smith (1980), who found that managers in earlier 
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developmental stages preferred to enforce the decisions of others, rather than to make 
their own interpretation of the workplace problem. Managers at later stages of 
development tended to behave just the opposite. They formulated decisions based on 
their own opinions and tended to rely on their own expertise in interpreting company 
rules when tackling ambiguous problems. Weathersby (1993) found similar results and, 
in addition, found that managers at later stages showed greater ability to recognize and 
draw upon recurring patterns in their personal experiences. 
Merron, Fisher and Torbert (1987) in a study of how managers might interpret in-
basket correspondence, observed that managers who were at earlier stages of 
development tended to treat each problem as an isolated event, without questioning the 
framing of the problem or probing into the potential underlying causes. Managers at 
later stages tended to do the opposite: They looked for underlying assumptions in the 
way the problem was defined and perceived the problem as a symptom of an underlying 
problem, and they tended to redefine the problem. 
Fisher and Torbert (1991) examined 17 managers about their on-the-job 
experiences; however, they looked specifically at later stages of development comparing 
Achievers to Strategists. They compared how each related to subordinates and superiors 
and how they proposed and implemented ideas. Achievers tended to influence 
subordinates to accept their assessment of a problem, while Strategists tended to work 
with subordinates to create a synthesis of different viewpoints on the problems. While 
both Achievers and Strategists reported that they worked with peers, subordinates, and 
superiors as equal partners in achieving organizational goals, they varied in their styles. 
Achievers tended to "sell" their view of what the correct course of action should be, while 
35 
Strategists tended to negotiate a common frame for a course of actions. Both saw 
awareness of others' points of view as important, but for different reasons. Achievers 
saw this as important to getting buy-in from others, while Strategists saw it as important 
to a mutual solution that required the ability to question and revise their own goals—and 
not just getting others to revise theirs. 
The research on leadership demonstrates the complexity and the dynamics of the 
phenomenon. While a leader may be able to be identified as an Achiever or a Strategist, 
the relationship with the organization must be understood as well. With the broader 
framework of contemporary organizational leadership theories, work on theories of 
academic leadership has increasingly highlighted the dynamic relationship between 
leaders and their organizations. On the one hand, the more interaction between 
community college presidents and their faculties, the most likely the presidents were to 
be perceived as successful and effective leaders. On the other hand, the more interaction 
between presidents and their faculties, and the more collaborative the work, the more 




The Design Strategy 
"Establishing the how and why of complex human situations is a classic example of the use of 
case studies ..(Yin, 1994) 
My choice of a qualitative grounded theory approach within a case study 
methodology was determined by what I wanted to know. I wanted to identify a set of 
actions (responding to or creating conflict) that a president of a community college might 
employ. I wanted to see how the president described his actions regarding conflict and 
how he described his experiences. In other words, I wanted to know why he chose those 
actions, and how those actions were perceived within the organization (did the 
organizational members perceive the president's actions as he intended them?). What 
might explain these results? These criteria led me to look for a research methodology 
that would allow me to gather data in real-time event (which precluded an historical 
study); I also wanted a method that probed not only how the president personally felt and 
understood organizational conflict (that is, his "lived experiences"), but also took into 
account his responses as seen through the lens of the organizational context at the 
community college. 
Methodologies considered but rejected. In reviewing research methods, I 
considered an ethnographical approach, but since ethnography seeks to describe and 
interpret cultural behaviors with the intention of illuminating what is enduring to the 
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culture, I determined this was not an appropriate method (Schram, 2006). My research, 
unlike ethnography, is not focused on the culture but rather seeks to use the culture as a 
contextual backdrop to gain a greater understanding of how the president decides what 
actions to take on issues he considers conflicted. I also considered narrative studies in 
which I would chronicle the president's current role at a community college within the 
context of his individual experiences and study the meaning of these experiences. 
Although the prospect of telling the president's story within the context of his life was an 
intriguing prospect, I determined that my work needed to expand beyond the viewpoint of 
one person. I wanted to be able to let the story unfold not only from the president's 
perspective, but also the perspective of those who were affected by the president's 
decisions. This led me to a case study methodology in which I used multiple sources of 
data and a grounded theory approach in which I used both a theoretical framing of 
organizational leadership theory to provide the perspective (how a leader experiences and 
responds to conflict), and to enable the data to speak for themselves and to let theories 
rise from within the data. 
Grounded Theory: Method or Approach? One of the benefits or challenges of 
choosing a research methodology is that the methodologies are not as rigidly divided as 
they might have been a decade or so ago. Researchers today have the opportunity to 
combine methods to achieve research goals. Grounded theory as a methodology assumes 
that the researcher, although familiar with the literature surrounding the phenomenon 
under study, has no prior theoretical or conceptual framework going into the project, and 
wants theory to derive from the data. However, I chose to use a guiding theory to focus 
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my work. I used organizational leadership theory which draws upon cognitive complexity 
and adult complexity stage developmental theories as articulated Bolman and 
Deal,(2003), Bolman and Gallos (2011), Heifetz (1994), Kegan (1994), and William 
Torbert (Torbert & Associates, 2004). As such a grounded theory methodology was not 
appropriate (as I had a theoretical framework in mind when I began my research), but I 
also wanted to let the data speak for itself and if additional (or other) theories emerged, I 
wanted to be alert to their existence and not prematurely foreclose on one theory to 
explain my findings. 
A grounded theory approach set within the qualitative research tradition, enabled 
me to document my findings through thick descriptions which would allow my reader to 
form her/his own judgments along with mine-and possibly to disagree with 
interpretations of my evidence. A grounded theory approach is suited for research 
questions that focus on "individual processes, inter-personal relations and the reciprocal 
effects between individuals and larger social processes ... as for example, inter-personal 
cooperation and conflict." (Charmaz, 2004, pp.497-498) 
Case Study Methodology. One of the challenges in selecting a case study 
methodology is that leading scholars do not agree precisely on a definition of a case study 
(Yin, 1994). According to Stake (1995), a case is not defined by how it is studied but 
what is studied. Research methods are not a defining factor. What determines a case 
study is its boundaries (time, place, issue), real-time, field-orientation, and emphasis on 
developing contextual nuances as important to understanding the case. Yin (1994) 
suggests that it is the nature of the research questions-asking why and how-that make a 
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case study a preferred method. This is because the research questions focus on 
operational links that are traced over a time period, rather than looking for frequencies or 
incidents. 
For Yin (1994) the scope of study is a critical component. A case study focuses 
on "contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident," and "covers contextual 
conditions as they might be highly pertinent to your phenomenon of study" (p. 13). And 
finally, Yin notes that case studies have historically focused on an individual or 
individuals as the unit of analysis. In the early case studies in American sociology, life 
histories provided insight into the why and how of people such as juvenile delinquents 
because the methodology allowed the researcher to follow the subjects and use multiple 
approaches to data collection such as interviews and observations. 
Unlike Stake (1995), Yin (1994) further defines a case by data collection and 
analysis strategies of data triangulation and theoretical proposition or purposes. 
Triangulation draws from multiple sources of data which are compared to one another to 
determine overlaps and anomalies. Triangulation of different sources helps to ensure that 
the researcher does not inadvertently attach a particular explanation or theory of "what's 
going on here" because of limited or artificially homogenous data sources. An eclectic 
body of data assumes some anomalies but also provides an opportunity to do a broad-case 
comparison to see if different data sources corroborate each other. This was particularly 
true with regard to the mix of interviews, documents and observations. My interviews 
provided a self-report from my research participant on his experiences and actions, while 
documents provided an organizational "agreed upon" version of the event or issue, while 
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emails provided an historical record of viewpoints at the time of the event, and site 
observations in some cases contradicted what I had hypothesized as a possible 
explanation. 
My research project was suited to a case study approach for the following 
reasons: First, I chose an individual as my unit of analysis. Second, my questions served 
as my purpose and created conceptual boundaries-they defined the area I was interested 
in - and both time and place created "boundaries"-a site of a community college during a 
selected period of time. Third, my work needed to be real-time and field based because 
contextual nuances of time and place were critical to understanding how a president 
responds to conflict. As Yin (1994) suggested, I had no clear boundaries between the 
phenomenon (conflict response by a president) and the context (how context affected his 
responses). 
Fourth, my logic for linking the questions to the data was, as stated previously, to 
gain a greater understanding of how the president's experiences of conflict were reflected 
(or not) in his actions, thus I needed to use multiple types of data. My data sources 
included phenomenologically focused, semi-structured, in-depth interviews with the 
president to gather information on his life's history, details of his experience as president 
with regard to challenges and conflicts he encountered. I used semi-structured interviews 
with others at the college to learn their perspectives on the president's conflict behavior. 
To offer an historical perspective, I consulted written artifacts including emails, 
committee minutes, and school policy documents including a self study to the regional 
accrediting agency. 
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Data triangulation was not just for sources of data, but also enabled a triangulation 
of rival explanations as the information from data was analyzed. Yin (1994) argues that 
theories have a place in case study research because they are the templates with which to 
compare data with theory. 
Case Study Methods with a Grounded Theory Approach. A case study 
methodology and grounded theory approach are compatible. They both focus on people's 
interactions, actions and contextual nuances (Creswell, 1998). The grounded theory 
approach enabled the use of emergent data to develop rival explanations that would not 
have been possible had I used a case study method only, as the case study methodology 
called for previously developed theory to serve as a template (Yin, 1994). Both grounded 
theory and case study methods were compatible in that both use multiple sources of data -
the case study to triangulate with multiple viewpoints and grounded theory to provide a 
wider base of data from which to draw emergent themes. In summary, the combination 
of a case study method with a grounded theory approach allowed the necessary latitude to 
explore in-depth the "how" and "why" questions which were at the core of my research. 
As I discuss in the following sections of this chapter, I followed Yin's (1994) 
three criteria for a research design: (a) the unit of analysis is the center of the research; 
(b) the data collected can be linked to theoretical propositions stated in the case research 
(in this case, the theoretical frameworks), and (c) criteria are stated for interpreting 
findings. 
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Data Collection Strategies 
My data collection strategies were based on three principles (Yin, 1994): (a) use 
multiple sources of data for triangulation, (b) maintain a case study database which 
contains all research information (which I did by establishing a database on my 
computer), and (c) create a trackable chain of evidence (which traces raw data coding 
through to analysis, as discussed in the data analysis section that follows). In addition, I 
selected data instruments that would cover a range of settings, events, and individuals, as 
well as, when appropriate, individuals' relationships to one another, such as affinity 
groups. 
I selected five data collection strategies, including (a) semi-structured interviews 
with the president; (b) semi-structured interviews with faculty, staff, and senior 
administrators; (c) artifacts analysis including reports, emails, committee minutes, school 
brochures, policy manuals, collective bargaining agreement between school and state, 
and presentations; (d) on site observations recorded in field notes; and (e) the Leadership 
Development Profile (LDP). The table below provides an overview of each data 
collection strategy, questions the instrument addressed, importance and potential 
weaknesses of each source of evidence. 
Table 2: Data Collection for Triangulation of Data 





What school issues 
are seen as conflicts, 
if any? What actions 
or outcome result 
from issue conflicts? 
Can be reviewed 
repeatedly 
Not created as a 








Reporting bias of 
author 
Editing for transcripts 
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Table 2: Data Collection for Triangulation of Data (continued) 
Sources of Evidence Question Addressed Importance Weaknesses 
Interviews: 
Self-reports by 
president (key actor) 




Focuses directly on 
research topic. Direct 
perceptions - not 
second hand. 
Bias due to poorly 
constructed 
questions. Response 
bias; poor recall; 
giving interviewer 
what she wants to 
hear 
Interviews: Reports 













Bias due to poorly 
constructed 
questions. Response 
bias; poor recall; 
giving interviewer 









meetings) recorded in 
field notes 
How does the 
president behave? 
What does he say? 
How do others react 




Covers events in real 
time; reduces chance 
of bias due to 
interviewee's moods 
or attitudes. 





due to random 





How does the 
president describe his 
responses/attitudes 
toward conflict? 
What is the 
relationship, if any, 
between president's 
cognitive complexity 
and response to 
conflict? 
High inter-rater 
reliability. This test is 
one of the most 




Might be influenced 
by time and place 
survey is 
administered; 
depends on skill of 
researcher to draw 
correlations from test 
to case study. 
Data from column 4 (weaknesses) from Case study research (p. 80) by R.K. Yin, 1994, Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications. (Yin, 1994). Copyright Sage Publications (1994). Adapted with permission. 
Document review. The documents provided clear historical details of events, 
whereas the president and members of the faculty I interviewed were sometimes 
uncertain about the timing of specific events. For example, when one faculty member 
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spoke of past tensions with former commissioners for the state community colleges, she 
could not recall the dates during which the various commissioners had served. I was able 
to reconstruct the history in a chart by reviewing the course catalogs dating back to early 
1980s. The regional accreditation self study for 2008 was also invaluable for providing a 
chronology of events at Excel community college, but also for detailing the processes, 
procedures and problems which the school was facing. Emails provided a rich source of 
additional information and also served to further triangulate the data I collected through 
extensive interviews (see Appendix E for the documents list). 
Interviews. In reviewing the phenomenological methods as a possible approach, 
Seidman (2008) makes a useful distinction. A researcher might examine institutional and 
personal artifacts such as emails and documents, and conduct observations to understand 
how people behave and express their experiences. However, to understand how people 
make meaning of an experience, then the interview is the proper tool. And as he 
observes, all research is messy, and sometimes multiple methods are needed. 
My research approach drew upon phenomenological techniques for my interviews 
in that I sought to understand how the president experienced conflict from his viewpoint 
and to understand the meaning he attributed to the experience. Although observations 
can add to our understanding, they can also lead to misinterpretation; Seidman (2008) 
uses the example of seeing a man chopping wood in the forest. How does one interpret 
the woodchopper's behavior? Is he supplying a logger, trying to get exercise or 
preparing wood to heat his home? In order to understand behavior, we need to put it in 
context. Interviewing provides that access to context in order to gain a better 
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understanding of the person's behavior. Seidman also suggests that "a basic assumption 
in in-depth interviewing research is that the meaning people make of their experience 
affects the way they carry out that experience (Blumer, 1969, in Seidman, 2008, p. 10). 
This was valuable advice in that I learned through my interviews with my research 
participant how he experienced conflict, and then could trace how he formulated 
strategies in response to that experience. To interview someone in-depth enables the 
researcher to put behavior in context, and this in turn provides access to a greater 
understanding of the actions (Seidman, 2008). 
But that is only part of the story I wanted to explore. I also wanted to understand 
how the president translated, or not, these experiences into effective leadership action 
within his college. Effective leadership action in responding to conflict is best 
determined by those who are members of the college-the faculty and staff (Birnbaum, 
1992). This then requires interviewing faculty and staff, not to learn their meaning-
making system (although that is relevant), but to learn about how they interpret the 
president's actions. 
The interviews were conducted over 10 months. I conducted 28 hours of 
interviews with the president and a total of 17 hours of interviews with supporting 
research participants. In interviewing supporting research participants I used a semi-
structured interview format, but this format was directed not at understanding their inner 
experiences of conflict, but rather to learn their perceptions of the president's behavior 
with conflict-what did he do and under what conditions? Through these interviews I was 
able to draw comparisons between how the president perceives he behaves and how 
others in his organization perceive those same actions (Appendices F for interview 
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protocol; G for letter to research participants/ informed consent form, and H for IRB 
approval). 
Observations. I conducted 11 observations at the school over the period of 10 
months. From these observations I was able to gain a feeling for the daily life at the 
school. To guide my observations, I relied on Lofland and Lofland (1995) Analyzing 
Social Settings. This prepared me to look for scales of behaviors such as small talk in 
groups, episodes including committee meetings, All-College Forums, roles (both formal 
and informal leadership roles), social types (individuals who played the roles from school 
informant to advice givers, quiet observers to outspoken critics). I also developed a 
"feel" for relationships such as the president's relationship with his senior administrators, 
with faculty and with staff such as the maintenance workers. The work also alerted me to 
subcultures which at the school took primarily the form of academic disciplines such as 
medical and liberal arts; career and technology such as business and computer science, 
and support faculty in advising and tutoring. I was also able to observe the inter­
relationships between these groups to determine if the culture matched self-reports by 
those whom I interviewed. For a more detailed guide to qualitative observation and 
analysis see Lofland and Lofland (1995). My observations were recorded in field notes 
and helped to inform my analysis of the interviews when I reached that phase. 
Leadership Development Profile. I used a data instrument known as the 
Leadership Development Profile (LDP) to provide an external assessment of the 
president's preferred "actions logics" (the rationale he uses to determine his stage of 
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leadership maturational development). The Leadership Development Profile is based on 
and adapted from the protocol originally developed by Jane Loevinger, (1966; Loevinger 
& Blasi, 1976), expanded by William Torbert and Susanne Cook-Greuter (Torbert & 
Associates, 2004). Loevinger and Wessler (1970) introduced measurements to 
operationalize theories of ego maturity development through the Washington University 
Sentence Completion Test (WUST). The test measured a framework of meaning making 
that an individual uses to subjectively organize experience (Hauser, 1976). Torbert and 
Cook-Greuter updated and expanded the survey to focus on organizational leadership and 
to capture later stages of ego maturity8 (Torbert & Associates, 2004). 
The Leadership Development Profile consists of 36 sentence completion stems 
which focus on self-perception, interpersonal relationships and social situations, which 
might also be described as a process by which an individual reasons, feels and responds 
(Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007). The WUSCT has been refined and validated over 40 
years of testing (Gilmore & Durkin, 2001) and is considered one of the most accurate and 
widely used measures of human development (Bartunek, Gordon, & Weathersby, 1983; 
Cook-Greuter, 2000). (Appendices I for a history and description of the Leadership 
Development Profile). 
Site Selection and Sampling Decisions 
The aim of my research was to understand how a president of a community 
college handled conflict and how he arrived at those decisions involved in handling 
conflict. 
8 Cook-Greuter developed the later stages of ego development through her dissertation for her Ed.D at the 
Harvard Graduate School of Education 
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Due to travel limitations, I looked for colleges within the northeastern United 
States. After researching eight potential college sites, including interviews with the 
college presidents, I narrowed my selection to one college within my targeted geographic 
area. This college met my criteria because it was in the midst of a major long-term 
restructuring that moved the college from a centralized state-controlled governance 
system to a decentralized system of independent colleges governed by a board of trustees. 
Of particular importance for my work, the president of the college I selected for a 
case study offered me unlimited access to faculty, staff and students. For a period of 10 
months, I was also provided access to school archives, including minutes of committee 
meetings, emails, policy documents such as the school's regional accreditation self-study, 
and school-system documents. I was also given the opportunity to attend school events 
and to wander freely about the school. In order to prepare the college personnel for my 
presence, the president sent out an all-school email explaining my work. 
Sampling Decisions. Although my chief focus was on interviewing and observing 
the president, since he was my unit of analysis, I determined that I needed to understand 
the organizational cultural environment in which he operated and, since this was a case 
study, to learn how his colleagues at the school interpreted his actions. 
Although sampling decisions technically extend to all data used in my study, I 
focus here on sampling decisions for individuals selected for interviews. Sampling 
decisions for other data are described within the data collection section that follows. 
Since the aim for my research was not to produce a statistical generalization from a 
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sample population of interest, I used a purposeful sampling technique to select 
individuals for interviews, following three goals as suggested by Maxwell (2005) 
• Representativeness or typicality of population 
• Heterogeneity of population 
• Extreme cases, that is, individuals who represented extreme differences in 
their outlook about the president's response to conflict 
Based on these criteria, I selected 13 individuals whom I interviewed over a 
period of 10 months. As the chart below shows, my sampling included a range of 
positions from senior administrators and department chairs to faculty, and staff.9 
Table 3: Support Research Participants: Position and Tenure at the College 
Interviews by function* Interviews by years at school * 
Admin 3 More than 20 3 
Faculty 9 5 - 1 0  5 
Staff 1 Less than 3 5 
* Excluding the president. Parker-Magagna, M., 2012. 
I sampled by years at the school, from those with more than 20 years (and who 
could talk about the state-controlled governance system) to those with less than three 
years (who started after the decentralization and after the president started). In addition, I 
selected faculty by academic expertise, which ranged from business, liberal arts, and 
general education, to medical technology, nursing, and physical therapies. Two factors 
were not sampled for: gender and age. I did not sample by gender because the majority 
of senior administrators, faculty, and staff are women. I also noted the age ranges of 
those I interviewed but felt that sampling by age was not useful to my study, as the newer 
91 originally planned to include students but found that students were not familiar with the president. The 
college is a commuter-college and the students appear not to have much interaction with him. 
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faculty were often in the same age range as the tenured faculty. There was not enough of 
a range to make stratification a viable research option. One final note, since this was a 
small school, most of the faculty sat on at least two committees, so there was a great deal 
of interaction among the faculty I interviewed. Finally, some of these interviews resulted 
from recommendations of participants (my field notes document who recommended 
whom), but the majority were interviewed based on purposeful demographic sampling. 
Purposeful Sampling. I used purposeful sampling in selection of all my data 
sources, with the exception of the Leadership Development Profile. For example, I 
attended certain school meetings based on recommendations from those I interviewed. 
Almost everyone I interviewed recommended the All-College Forums because they had 
traditionally been a forum for important school-wide issue discussions (and occasional 
debates) and thereby could provide a flavor of the culture and an overview of the typical 
approaches to contentious issues. 
Selection of documents and artifacts to study was based on initial 
recommendations from my committee (such as accreditation reports), and my own 
detective work as my study progressed. For example, when it became clear that valuable 
insights could be gained by email exchanges between the president and the faculty, I 
requested and was given access to this information. In correspondence I reviewed 
between the president and the regional accreditation committee, I found requests for 
follow-up reports on issues such as shared governance that I thought would be useful. I 
was given access to these as well. 
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Data Analysis Strategies 
As suggested by Yin (1994), case studies, particularly single case studies, benefit 
from a conceptual framework to guide research. There are simply so many data methods 
and so much to study that without some clear analytical direction, the researcher may 
muck about by gathering too much unusable data—wasting the time of research 
participants as well as her own time and effort. I chose for my dominant mode of 
analysis the explanatory mode. My overarching strategy was to compare my data to 
potential explanations derived from my conceptual frameworks. If the data did not fit or 
failed to explain in a compelling way, then I adjusted the explanation, explaining the gaps 
between data and theory. In addition, I chose not to rely on only one explanation for my 
data, but rather developed rival explanations which grew from the grounded theory 
approach and development of data themes and categories. 
Although I have reported data collection strategies separately from data analysis 
strategies, this is an artificial distinction. I began data analysis after my first few 
interviews with the president (whom I interviewed first), and kept a field journal of my 
analysis. 
Process Used for Analysis. The interviews were digitally recorded, then 
transcribed. I reviewed each transcript against the original digital recording, and then 
reviewed the transcripts each a total of six times to ensure that I felt comfortable with the 
material. I then began to build thematic codes by extracting quotes from each document 
and placing them in a grid. I originally planned to use Nvivo-9 to develop the thematic 
codes, but determined after an initial workshop with the software that I preferred to 
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develop my own system. My system enabled me to get "close" to my data by manually 
bringing transcripts into grids of my own design. The quotes were analyzed against my 
research questions until I had a "feeling" for some major themes. I began to explore 
these themes in search of corroborating quotes from interviews. I developed a coding 
retrieval system which cites the line number and interview transcript, so I can return at 
any time to find the quote. In two cases, I elected not to transcribe the tape due to lack of 
relevant interview data, so in those cases, I reviewed the digital recording (which I 
transferred to computer) and logged the interview quotes by a time code. Therefore, 
some of my interviews reflected line numbers, while others reflected time codes for 
location. Also this coding system will allow future researchers to access my data easily, 
if permission is granted my research participants. 
Once I had reviewed the interviews as discussed above, I then combined them 
with artifacts and documents to review all of them according to the system recommended 
by Boyatiz (1998) and Charmaz (2004). First, sentences were reviewed for potential 
relevance to research questions and overall topic. Sentences were coded by descriptors; 
for example, a description of a decision-making process was termed as "slow," so this 
was coded "perceived slow decision-making process." Next I combined descriptors that 
represented themes. In many cases, I had multiple themes for the same group of 
sentences, and I did not attempt to reduce this number until I had been through the 
documents and interviews a number of times. Once I had identified the themes that 
represented key elements of a potential storyline, I then combined themes to see if they 
made sense as a narrative. At this point, I tried to keep an open mind, and not force 
themes or theories together. 
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I followed the research analysis protocol of Boyatiz (1998), because his 
methodology encompasses both inductive analysis (grounded theory approach), where 
themes and theories build out of the data, and deductive analysis, where themes are 
identified out of conceptual frameworks that were brought into the study at the beginning. 
I used the deductive method to code for two conceptual frameworks that formed the focus 
for my study: (a) that the president's experiences and responses to conflict reflected a 
stage of adult development complexity, and (b) that organizational context and culture 
played a part in how a president/leader responded to conflict, as well as influenced how 
organizational members (faculty and staff) perceived his responses. 
I delayed administering the Leadership Development Profile (LDP) until all of my 
interviews with the president were completed. I delayed the LDP to prevent the 
possibility of the results biasing my interviews. 
Researcher Role and Ethics 
In qualitative studies, the researcher takes on a major role because she not only 
analyzes the data collected, but also functions as the instrument by which the data are 
collected. Whether it is the review of documents, the interview of research participants, 
or observations of events, all these pieces of data are filtered through the framework of 
the researcher. Therefore, understanding one's role and ethical responsibilities is critical. 
My stance is focused on four pillars: informed consent, confidentiality, professional 
integrity, and duty to protect against harm of unintended consequences (Gibson & 
Brown, 2009). When I initially spoke to the president about this study, I used the IRB 
document to initiate our discussion of informed consent. I was acutely aware of the risk 
the president took by agreeing to have his presidency studied to learn more about conflict 
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responses. We discussed how this would be a "warts and all" study of his processes. He 
said he agreed to do this study with me because he wanted to help other first-time 
presidents and, at the same time, to learn more about himself as a leader. 
Because my study focused on a small school and this was a sitting president, I 
determined that I needed to make the work confidential, that is, to hide the identity of my 
participants. After discussions with the university's director of IRB, I learned that even 
when study location and participants are masked, confidentiality is not a given and that 
with diligent and clever work, identities can be uncovered. This is why I determined to 
situate the community college within a large geographical region and to carefully assess 
how much I would disclose about the characteristics of the school and the state 
educational system. In the end, I decided that I had to disclose a good deal about this 
college's history and relationship with the state government, as this figured prominently 
into the story. 
Those whom I interviewed (whom I called supporting research participants) were 
uniformly concerned about confidentiality both for themselves and the school. This is 
why I made the determination that I would use pseudonyms for the president, for the 
former vice president of academic affairs (to avoid confusion with the current sitting vice 
president) and for the name of the school. All others are referred to generically as "a 
faculty member, or an individual, or a person," etc. I consulted several case studies and 
noted that when the work was treated as confidential, the researchers used generic terms 
to refer to the quotes from their research participants (Kezar, 2005). The research data 
was collapsed and coded into themes. In addition, I have tried to be sensitive to the use 
of key phrases or idiomatic expressions that would identify an interviewee. 
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Finally, inherent in my work was the ethical requirement to keep confidential all 
conversations. Having spent more than 20 years in professional consulting, I felt 
comfortable with a dual role of researcher and participant. As a researcher, I did not 
discuss my work, except in general terms of current scholarship on the topic of leadership 
and change with my research participants. As a participant, I mingled with school faculty 
and staff when I attended meetings and school events. I was fortunate in that my gender 
and age were quite typical of the school. The majority of students and faculty are 
women, and as a community college, students range from their early 20s to 60s. So I 
tended to blend into the demographic mix. 
Data storage and management, as noted in the IRB letter of consent, was 
protected through a three-tiered system. First, I used audio-digital tape recordings, which 
I had transcribed by a professional firm on the West Coast. These recordings were coded 
for anonymity. The original audio recordings were kept on a separate flash drive, with an 
additional electronic backup. I kept a hardcopy document that contained the real names 
of interviewees and their pseudonyms in a separate location. Only my committee chair 
and adviser, as noted in the IRB, are privy to where these items are stored. 
Validity Issues 
Checks and Measures 
Prolonged engagement. I spent extended periods with my research participant 
and supporting research participants. I interviewed research participants as well as 
observed their work in a group (team effort). I was also assisted by the president and 
others in the schools in obtaining key documents. 
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Triangulation. Methodological triangulation is defined by Denzin and Lincoln 
(1998) as research that involves collection of multiple sources of data. My multiple 
sources were: interviews, documents which included committee meetings notes, regional 
accreditation self-report and follow-up emails, documents from the state community 
college system, the collective bargaining agreement between faculty/staff and the state; 
emails, and field notes. I used a notebook to record observations, preliminary analytic 
notes and methodological field notes, which I then transferred to computer based notes 
and memos. My analytical notes were used later in developing my research results and 
analysis, and my methodological notes were used to monitor my research process 
including sources of my personal bias and improvements to my interviewing. 
Peer and Expert Debriefing. This process allowed me to expose my work to a 
disinterested third party who was knowledgeable in the field but unfamiliar with my work 
and my specific research topic. This allowed me to identify those areas of my research 
that I had overlooked. I consulted with Dr. Sara Ross, development complexity theorist, 
a co-author of Action Inquiry with William Torbert (Torbert & Associates, 2004) and an 
expert in analysis of complex issues, conflict, and decision making. As a peer debriefer, I 
consulted J. Angwerd, a master's student in conflict engagement and a student of 
development complexity theory. 
Member checking: I reviewed my interview findings with each participant. I 
found that this was a crucial step, not only to correct mistakes or misinterpretations and 
potential omissions, but also to establish a greater level of trust. I used numerical code 
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for each research participant, with the exception of the president whose synonym was 
"Cooper" and the school name "Excel." 
The following table provides an overview of the protocol I used to judge the 
validity of my research work. Construct and internal validity were attended to through 
multiple uses of data and the ability to triangulate. My research should not be considered 
as having external validity because my work is of one person, in a specific time and 
place. 
Table 4: Criteria for Quality of Research Design 
Tests Yes/No Case Study Tactic Phase of Research 
In Which Tactic 
Occurs 
Construct validity yes -use of multiple sources of evidence 
-establish chain of evidence 





Internal validity yes -pattern-matching 
-explanation building 
-time-series analysis (data over 7 time) 
Data analysis 
External Validity no -use replication logic to multiple cases Research design 
Reliability yes -use case study protocol (documentation) 
-develop case study data base 
Data collection 
Source: Cosmos Corporation as reproduced from Case study research (p. 33) by R.K. Yin, 1994, Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Copyright Sage Publications (1994). Reprinted with permission 
Limitations of Study 
The primary limitation of my case study was its external generalizablity. In 
discussing the issue of generalizablity, Yin (1994) contended that a case study is no less 
generalizable than a single experiment. An experiment, like a case study, must be 
replicated and studies are often replicated by studying the same phenomenon under 
different conditions. Case studies, like experiments, are "generalizable to theoretical 
propositions, not to populations or universes" (p. 10). In this sense, my case study may 
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have external generalizablity but I would caution that to do so would require a number of 
carefully laid qualifications. For example, this is a study of a first-time community 
college president. The study of a first-time president at a community college has 
usefulness within the field because, as I argued in Chapter 1, in the upcoming years more 
than 60% of the current community college presidents will retire, so there should be a 
fairly large number of first-time community college presidents. 
However, since this case was contingent upon context and conditions, any 
generalizations drawn from my conclusions may be erroneous if applied to another 
college system or campus with its own unique history, culture and values. In other 
words, what I found in this case may be helpful in understanding another situation but 
only if the similarities and differences are carefully noted. 
Conditions of change, as found in this case, will certainly be of interest in the 
future of community college study as the entire community college system nationwide is 
in various stages of change and transition. Some community college state systems are 
evolving to a decentralized model as I found in this case, yet other state systems are 
evolving in the opposite direction-some are moving into more centralized operations. 10 
The implications are particularly important when studying the influence of positional 
power within the community college and its system. Some colleges have strong local 
control by a board of trustees, while others, like the one in this case, still maintained 
strong centralized control at a state level as it implemented its decentralization process. 
This made a critical difference in the power structure at both levels of the college and 
state in my case study. 
10 According to my discussions with staff at the American Association of Community Colleges 
(Washington, DC), this rotation between centralized and decentralized is so continuous that the Association 
has ceased tracking these occurrences (Wayne Horton, AACC, personal communication, March, 2011). 
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In addition, the historical conditions under which the college in my study 
developed over the past 60 years is not typical of development nationally. While most 
community colleges evolved as junior colleges-an extension of high school-the 
community college in the geographic area of my study developed in the tradition of 
vocational career schools. These traditions are very different. 
I would be remiss if I failed to point out that the collective bargaining agreements, 
college personnel policies and articulated policies between the state community college 
system and the individual college also had a large impact on the way that the business of 
running a school is conducted. In my study, the faculty had negotiated a role within the 
governance structure of the college and the state system. This is not the norm, as most 
collective bargaining agreements do not articulate the governance role of the faculty 
(Kater & Levin, 2004). 
A further limitation for generalizablity is the theoretical lens used in this case. I 
drew upon the theoretical foundations of organizational leadership which is currently 
undergoing its own metamorphosis as several strains of research are intersecting at 
various points, as for example, the theories of chaos and complexity, situational context 
and cultural leadership. These strains or perspectives which I have referred to in Chapter 
2 under a general heading of Cognitive Complexity Theory, included two branches of 
theory which I referred to as a cultural-relational perspective and an adult learning 
perspective. As Kezar et al. (2006) pointed out in their extensive review of educational 
leadership theories, there are no clear lines of demarcation where one line of research in 
the area of cognitive theory stops and the other begins. In addition, in extending the work 
of cognitive theory, with its emphasis on mental models which leaders use to decipher 
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their organizational environments, I additionally introduced and drew upon work in 
Constructive Developmental Theory, a branch of adult development psychology which 
focused on the maturational (ego maturity) of the leader (Kegan, 1994; Torbert & 
Associates, 2004). 
The cognitive theories of organization and constructive developmental theories 
may not be generalizable when applied to other studies in the form in which they were 
used in my study. These theories have rich and varied implications which need to be 





This chapter begins by describing the history and culture of the campus, and 
background on the President in order to place my findings within a context for 
discussion. Part One presents themes and evidence to answer the question: How does 
President Cooper experience conflict and describe his responses to it? Part Two shows 
how faculty and staff describe his responses to conflict and discuss not only the manifest 
conflicts but also the latent ones. Part Three addresses the following question: What 
relationship, if any, exists between President Cooper's experience of conflict and his 
stage of leadership development (as measured by the Leadership Development Profile). 
Table 5: Excel Community College: Campus History 
Date Event 
1960s Founded as a vocational school 
mid-1990s Merged with anther state community college to form one 
regional college 
2002 Combined colleges receive first regional accreditation as 
community college 
2005 Reorganization results in separation of regional college, Excel 
returns to independent community college. No permanent 
president for two years. 
2007 State legislation sets up new community college system and 
creates self-governing Board of Trustees 
2007 President Cooper appointed president 
Parker-Magagna, M, (2012). Prepared based on data in Excel regional accreditation self-study, 2008 
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Excel Community College is a small, rural college located in the Northeast, 
founded in the early 1960s as part of a network of technical and career colleges under the 
jurisdiction of the state's Department of Education. In the mid-1990s, Excel Community 
College merged with another technical college in the state to form a regional college with 
two campuses. A few years later the combined campuses received their first regional 
accreditation as a community college, rather than technical colleges. In 2005, the state 
community college network was reorganized again, and Excel Community College was 
decoupled to become an independent community college. Two years later, the state 
legislature reorganized the system once again and moved community colleges out of the 
Department of Education, creating an independent community college system modeled 
on the higher education system for the four-year colleges and universities in the state. 
The Board of Trustees was appointed to create new policies and procedures for self-
governance and the trustees were granted significant operational autonomy and authority. 
The state legislature also called for a new emphasis on transfer pathways to four-year 
degrees while maintaining traditional associate degrees for professional occupations. 
Excel Community College serves a student population of approximately 1,000 
traditional and adult returning students, mostly female. About 30% of the faculty 
members have taught at the school for 20 years or more; within the last two years an 
additional 30% have been hired. The school offers 37 associate degree, diploma, and 
certificate programs which range from liberal arts and general education to teacher and 
early childhood education, and from business and computer technologies to criminal 
justice and human services. However, the school is primarily known for its medical and 
healthcare programs with an especially strong nursing curriculum. 
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A Period of Unsettling Shifts 
From the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s the college's president and vice president 
of academic affairs enjoyed exceptionally long tenures. Their thirty year tenures were 
followed by a brief period of turnover in both positions, followed again by relative 
stability. However, following the decoupling of the colleges in 2005, Excel experienced 
a period of turmoil during which it had a series of four presidents, two vice presidents of 
academic affairs, and several vice presidents of student services. The self-study report to 
the regional accreditation agency characterized these years as "a period of unprecedented 
and often unsettling shifts in both [our] leadership and [our] status as a state agency" 
(Document 14, p. xxx). The self-study prepared by Excel faculty for the regional 
accreditors also described the current president appointed in 2007, J. Franklin Cooper, as 
one "who appreciates and encourages [Excel's] communal aspirations, and who is a 
national leader in the advancement of community colleges" (Document 14, p. xxx). 
Despite a heavily autocratic state governance system which existed until the 
decentralization of the system in 2007, Excel's faculty developed a collegial culture 
which encouraged faculty and staff to participate in policy decision-making discussions. 
This allowed for multiple perspectives and diverse approaches to problem solving and it 
facilitated faculty input into presidential decisions. The school developed a tradition of 
monthly All-College Forums for the discussion of administrative and management issues. 
Another governing body, the President's Council, also provided a medium through which 
faculty and staff could review school-wide issues and make recommendations to the 
president. Several long-time faculty described the school's culture as one which was 
based on assessment of outcomes and quality improvement in both teaching and 
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administration. This development-style culture (Bergquist, 1991) is credited to long-time 
faculty leaders who were active in regional and national accreditation and who sought to 
move the school toward an "evidence-based" assessment and improvement culture 
(150.8.29). 
However, despite the collegial atmosphere on campus, Excel's relationship with 
the state community college education commissioner" and his staff had been contentious. 
For most of the school's history, but especially during the 1990s, Excel's liberal arts 
faculty worked closely with the state community college commissioners to prepare their 
courses for acceptance by four-year colleges. By 2005, national and state trends had 
shifted to focus on college access, larger enrollments, and business-like efficiency. 
Excel's practices—its protection of small class sizes, a faculty publicly critical of a state 
community college mandate that Excel open a new academic center in another part of the 
state and its well-known reluctance to teach online courses—helped create a perception 
of Excel as the nonconforming, rogue college. The college's inability to attract or keep a 
president also added to this reputation. 
A New Governance Structure for the State Schools 
During his presidential candidacy interviews, J. Franklin Cooper was embraced 
by the faculty as a kindred spirit. As one faculty member recalls, "he spoke to us at our 
All-College Forum about his philosophy of leadership. We thought it matched ours" 
(312.8.29). Cooper articulated a broad vision of community service which focused on 
collaboration among the local industries, cities, and towns in Excel's area of service. He 
11 The state commissioner for community colleges was replaced with a Chancellor when the legislature 
delegated responsibility to the Board of Trustees. 
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also articulated his leadership philosophy as "collegial, and committed to shared 
governance as it relates to charting our future." He went on to say that he considered 
himself a "change agent" and "transformative leader who scans the environment for 
unmet needs, opportunities for partnership and collaboration." He finished by saying that 
his management style was to lead by example (Document 15, p.l). 
Despite Cooper's warm reception by the faculty, he was not the first choice of the 
newly formed community college system Board of Trustees. The Trustees' first choice 
accepted the position in the early summer of 2007, but left within two weeks of arriving 
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on campus. The job was then offered to Cooper shortly before the beginning of the fall 
term in 2007 when a new chancellor for the state's community college system was hired. 
From the Trustees' perspective, Cooper's strengths in institutional and workforce 
development were seen as a good fit for the needs of the college, but the system 
administrative staff had expressed serious reservations about Cooper's ability to keep 
Excel Community College faculty inline with system policies and to prevent the faculty 
from publicly challenging system decisions. As President Cooper recalls, in one of his 
first meetings with the community college system administrative staff, the Vice 
Chancellor told Cooper that to run Excel Community College effectively, he needed to 
"put his thumb on the faculty and get them in line" (1247.8.4B). President Cooper vowed 
to himself that he would "heal the school's relationship with the system" and that he 
would make evolutionary—not revolutionary—changes at the school (1500.8.11). For 
12 Little is known about why Cooper's predecessor left after only two weeks on the job. Cooper was told by 
one source that the new president was unaccustomed to working with a strong facuity-stafF union and felt 
that she would have no power to make changes. Another story that Cooper heard was that his predecessor 
realized that the presidents had less autonomy and authority than she had been led to believe during the 
interview process. 
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instance, Cooper set a goal for himself of establishing a working relationship with local 
communities, a priority that seemed to have been neglected for many years. 
Another challenge that President Cooper faced was related to the community 
college system itself. The Board of Trustees had been granted broad authority over the 
new community college system and while the legislation promised self-governance to the 
colleges that included "greater operational flexibility in matters including capital projects, 
and college personnel decisions," (p. xxx) the extent of presidential authority and 
autonomy was still undefined (Document 14). Despite a memorandum outlining in broad 
terms the responsibilities between the Trustees, the Chancellor and the colleges, which 
Cooper helped to draft along with his fellow presidents, the boundary lines between 
presidential authority and system oversight remained murky. At the heart of the shared 
responsibilities document between the trustees and the presidents, the presidents called 
for the right to be responsible for developing their own budgets consistent with strategic 
plans and trustee guidelines—with a specific mention of the control of facilities and 
resources and hiring authority (Document 6). 
Background on President Cooper 
President Cooper considered himself a "working class guy" whose father was a 
janitor and his mother was a self-taught bookkeeper. He recalled that throughout his 
childhood, the middle class was alien to him and his peers; the white collar world was 
frequently referred to as "the man" or "the suits"—slang for impersonal autocrats who 
seemed to have little understanding or concern for the plight of the working class. The 
Man had control and the working class had none. Cooper vowed as he rose through the 
ranks of community college work that he would never become "the man." This attitude 
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plays out in two seminal experiences in his life. The first was when he was in charge of a 
community college cooperative education program that lost its funding. He was notified 
of the funding loss while on vacation so he could be with his wife who was giving birth 
to their first child. Rather than waiting a few days to break the news to his staff, he 
insisted on driving back within hours of the birth, to the college and personally met with 
each affected person. Cooper recalled: "I felt like I was on pins and needles, looking 
them in the face, but I knew I had to do it. Empathy is so important." (7.18). 
Later, when Cooper was the media relations director of a community college, a 
young boy had suffered brain damage while on a college-sponsored outing. The college 
president said to Cooper, "You must protect the president" (7.18. 9). So Cooper faced 
the family and national news media alone to protect the President but also to do what he 
thought was right. Torn between compassion for the family and legal constraints from 
the community college attorneys, Cooper said he "vowed to never walk away or delegate 
messy, emotional and painful work to others. It's a matter of principle" (7.18.11). 
Shortly afterward, he quit his job because he had lost faith in the president. It was almost 
a year before he returned to community college work, this time as a development officer 
at another community college. 
Cooper's working class roots separated him from those he perceived held power; 
a power he would come to hold as the president. This perception of his place within 
bureaucratic organizations combined with the two incidents to establish a deep sense of 
not just holding and wielding power over others, but using that power in a sensitive and 
thoughtful knowing of what it is like to be on the receiving end. He believed that his 
employees deserved to hear from him and as their leader he would not send others out to 
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accept responsibility for him. For Cooper, employees deserved more than a distant, 
possibly uncaring functionary; yet could he maintain that principled stance of accepting 
responsibility and facing those to whom he owed a responsibility when confronted with 
the conflict at Excel? 
Overview of Themes 
The focus of this study is President Cooper. The study is based on self-reports by 
President Cooper; interviews with thirteen faculty and staff; a review of school and 
community college system documents; a review of emails and minutes of Excel 
community college committee meetings; several site observations including attendance at 
two All-College meetings and meetings of the faculty forum, the faculty governing body 
(see Appendix E for a list of research documents). 
The following table outlines the major themes for each question. 
Table 6: Summary of Themes from Grounded Theory Approach 
Question #l:Themes -President's 
self-report about conflict and 
conflict strategies 
Question #2: Themes - Faculty 
perceptions of the president's 
conflict strategies 
Question #3: Themes: 
President's experience of 
conflict and strategies: 
Leadership Development 
Profile 
1. Stuck in the Middle 1. Governance Process Curtailed 1. Mindset Dilemmas 
2. Disconnect over Meaning of 
Shared Governance 
2. Participatory Decision Making 
Perceived as a Threat 
2. Mutuality Struggles 
3. The Demons of Leadership: 3. Risk Avoidance 3.Ambiguity Conundrum 
4. Communications Void 
5. Problems from the Old System 
Linger 
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Part I: President Cooper Talks about Conflict 
Question #1: How does President Cooper describe his experiences with conflict and 
describe his actions to deal with it? 
In this Part, I review President's Cooper's self-reports on his conflicts both 
intrapersonal and interpersonal which tended to be described as bifurcated choices as he 
puzzled through issues of authority and autonomy, shared governance and decision 
making and his emotional responses to the challenges of the job. 
Theme #1: Stuck in the Middle 
One of the major themes to emerge from my interviews with President Cooper 
was the confusion of the system's demands upon the seven college system presidents 
within the state and the contradictions that confusion generated. Cooper recalled that at 
his first meeting with the college system Board of Trustees as the new president of Excel 
Community College, he spoke about his vision for a comprehensive community college 
that would enable transfer to four-year colleges. For more than thirty years, Excel had 
been a leader in this effort but still largely had a reputation as a career and technical 
school. Cooper recalls, "[The Board chair's] words were to tone down my rhetoric on 
academic transfer—and how was I going to fix the school, and what if I didn't? He 
boxed me in a corner and I said, 'Then you have to fire me'" (28.107A). This encounter 
shocked him because the recruitment materials for Excel Community College from the 
trustees had specifically focused on academic transfer and shared governance as two key 
agenda points for the incoming president. Later, one of his colleagues, a fellow president 
at another college within the system, clued him in that the trustees' definition of 
"comprehensive" meant adding another career program such as criminal justice to the 
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college's health care offerings. Cooper explained that this exchange showed that "the 
model for a community college in this state is in direct opposition to the definition, role 
and function of community colleges nationally" (558.8.4A). He realized later that the 
recruitment materials had been prepared by a professional search association, and the 
Trustees had signed off without understanding what it meant. There appeared to be a 
disconnect between the Trustees' and the system presidents' perceptions of their goals. 
Ambiguity from the top forced Cooper into a defensive stance. He entered the job 
of president with a false clarity about the expectations of his role as president. As he 
tried to reconcile his original expectations with the realities of the role especially with 
regard to the fluid boundaries between the authority of the presidents and changing 
expectations of his role, Cooper felt the pressure from above as the tenuous nature of his 
position (and the other presidents') became clear. He and the other presidents served 
without contract, and therefore could be fired at will by the Board of Trustees. He faced 
one of the challenges of leadership and that is how to understand the assumptive world of 
an organization, which in this case, involved the organizational system of the community 
colleges and Excel within that system (Schein, 2004). 
Cooper's next encounter with the Trustees arrived when the Trustees' Finance 
Committee discussed class size requirements in the colleges. Excel was singled out for its 
low class sizes, something that had been a contentious issue between Excel's liberal arts 
faculty and system administrators for many years. Cooper said the Trustees were about 
to take a vote mandating larger class sizes for all community colleges in the state system 
when he reacted dramatically. Cooper assured the Trustees that Excel would raise class 
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sizes if the Trustees agreed not to mandate class size increases for his fellow presidents. 
Cooper recalled: 
I hit my fist on the table and I said, "No, no, you cannot do that." Because I will 
not be responsible for pushing that change on my six peers that are sitting here 
next to me. I'm not going to be the reason why now these six presidents have to 
suffer a trustee mandate and lose that autonomy on their campuses. And I 
thought, well, now, am I going to be kicked out the door? 
You know, at the end of that meeting, you know, I came back here and I did 
increase class sizes but I will tell you something. Two things happened that made 
me just feel a lot better. The Chancellor came out and said, I agree with 
everything you said, he didn't defend me there. He didn't defend me in front of 
everybody and he was like that with me. He would call me and every call he 
would say, I'm with you. And I knew I was doing right by that guy that I reported 
to. 
[Some time later] the Vice-Chancellor of the system thanked me for 
understanding their financial needs and helping to get [Excel] in line with the 
system wishes. [I] suffered a whole lot of pushback, especially from [Zelda 
Thatcher], the vice president for academic affairs at Excel who would lower class 
sizes after I had raised them. (945.10.14) 
For a second time Cooper was in conflict with the Board of Trustees. Although 
the Chancellor did not intervene publically on Cooper's side, he did support him behind 
the scenes-a support system that Cooper would come to rely on. His actions placed 
himself once again in the middle of trying to protect other presidents but also trying not 
to force his college to conform to a broad-based mandate. Upon returning to his college, 
his vice-president pushed back against him. He was left in the middle with no real allies 
on either side and nothing substantial accomplished. He pushed back against "the man" 
and essentially lost and the people he sought to protect could only see that he failed to 
protect them. President Cooper stood stuck in the middle between his system and his 
college. 
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As Cooper attempted to loosen the control of system Trustees and staff over 
presidential authority and autonomy, he became increasingly aware that these boundaries 
were still fixed in a bureaucratic model of tight centralized control at the state level. The 
state system controlled everything, Cooper noted. The college vice presidents, registrars, 
and financial aid officers historically reported directly to their counterparts at the state 
office, not to their college presidents. The role of the community college presidents had 
been to enforce the state policies on their campuses with little authority over their staff. 
Breaking his staffs habit of bypassing him in favor of their counterparts in the state 
office was extremely difficult, Cooper observed: 
There is a great deal of anxiety created, I tell you, that if you give an individual 
responsibilities and not give them authority to perform those responsibilities, you 
set up the situation for maximum anxiety in that person. And I felt very much 
like that here. I remember saying at a system meeting that if they were going to 
treat us like campus deans, then call us campus deans. (555+ 8.4A) 
He recalled that his first experience with the power of the system office staff was when 
I he submitted a request to hire an additional English faculty at the college . 
[The system office] enjoyed an incredible amount of power. It was a rude 
awakening when I asked for an English faculty member and was told by the staff 
(Vice Chancellor and Human Resources Director) that I couldn't have one. I had 
to use the [regional] accreditation review to get one ... .It was a very rude 
awakening. I mean I had heard about this about the system office authority but 
never experienced it before. (928.8.4A) 
The unclear line of authority and autonomy between the colleges and the system was so 
pervasive that, according to Cooper, Excel's regional accreditation hung in the balance. 
The accreditors were not convinced that Excel could become sufficiently independent 
13 Previously the system office made all hiring decisions. Under the new independent structure, the line was 
still murky as to whether a president could hire her/his own faculty or if the system office would determine 
it. 
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from the dictates of a state system office in order to effectively set up its own school 
governance process. Ironically, he noted, the academic standards and performance of the 
college were never in question; rather, it was the administrative dependence of the school 
on the political state system that was the concern. 
Excel was Cooper's first college presidency. He had been among Excel's top 
choices for president, and he felt it was a good fit. He was further encouraged when he 
learned that the new Chancellor and an influential system local trustee agreed that he was 
the person to facilitate some healing in the relationship between the school and the 
system (475.9.1).14 Cooper considered his ability to create and maintain harmonious 
relationships among warring factions to be his strongest point. He observed that 
throughout his life he had been able to make friends of "naysayers" by inviting them in 
and making them part of the fold. He characterized his conflict management style as 
"soft and persistent" (817.8.4). However, Cooper admitted that he had no idea of the 
depth of the anger and resentment of the school toward the system. 
My first clue was reading that first iteration of self-study prior to the accreditation 
coming that first year. I saw how angry the faculty were, very angry at [the 
system] administration. I found so many of my visits to faculty offices at the 
school would result in these outpourings of dissatisfaction and feelings of being 
aggrieved by an autocracy. 
What bothered me was I at first couldn't see a way of addressing them in a 
decisive and forthright kind of way. And even at first when I thought that I could, 
I looked at my budget and I went to see the vice Chancellor and said I wanted 
another liberal arts department faculty member. "Oh, he said, that will never 
happen here" and I realized, "Oh, I can't do this." So I became very careful of 
what I could promise. (600.12.6) 
14 Cooper had been the first choice of the faculty of Excel community college, but not the first choice of 
the system commissioner, system administrators or majority of the trustees. According to Cooper, the 
commissioner, administrators and the trustees were looking for a seasoned president who would exercise 
autocratic control over Excel. When Cooper's predecessor resigned after two weeks, Cooper was hired by 
the newly appointed Chancellor, with the support of an influential trustee who had served as an interim 
president at Excel while a search was being conducted. 
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In addition to the conflicts between the system and Excel, there were many points 
of tension on campus. The vice president for academic affairs at Excel, Zelda Thatcher, 
had been accustomed to running the school with an "iron hand" as one faculty recalled. 
She had held a variety of positions at Excel including chief operating officer of the 
campus during the regionalization period, then interim president briefly, and then vice 
president for academic affairs. Cooper recalled that in his second month, the "gang of 
five" (a term he used to describe a group of tenured, long-time faculty) met with him. 
"They demanded that I fire two people, one of them being Zelda Thatcher. I agreed with 
that recommendation (to fire Thatcher), but I refused to fire the other person. I [thought 
that] I could not have this cabal15 tell me what to do, because, otherwise I would have 
been just a figurehead" (910.8.10). 
Whereas, he faced pressure from the board on class size and the concept of what 
constitutes a comprehensive institution, he also faced internal pressures. He was pushed 
from outside and pulled from inside. Skill was needed to effectively respond to these 
conflicts to avoid being stuck in the middle. 
Zelda Thatcher was described by Cooper and a number of other faculty members 
as a "rule-bound," "check-list driven," and "autocratic" administrator who was known to 
play favorites, but she also knew how to work within the state system very well. Zelda 
Thatcher was accustomed to being in charge. Cooper recalled that when the regional 
accreditation committee visited the school, the chair of the committee pulled him aside 
15 Cabal is the term the state system staffhad used to describe faculty governance at the school at the time 
Cooper was hired. The faculty, according to the system staff stories, governed by a collective rather than 
by presidentially-led bureaucracy. It was also referred to as the "people's college," which seems to have 
had two connotations: some suggested it was run like a socialist commune, while other stories suggested 
that the college faculty behaved more like a small liberal arts college faculty than a state-run community 
college. 
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and asked, "Who's on first, here?" in reference to Thatcher taking control of the 
accreditation discussions at the school. Cooper said, "I didn't come in expecting to clean 
house, but the resistance to change and demands that this person needed to go and the 
accreditation chair—all persuaded me that I had to move this person along." Cooper 
said, "Two years into my presidency I was able to move her along [into retirement]" 
(735. 8.4A). 
Cooper also expressed concern about being caught in the middle when the 
Trustees pushed him to expand Excel's offsite academic center. The school and the 
system had been at loggerheads for several years over the system's mandate that Excel 
Community College establish a new academic center to teach classes in the western 
region of the state, because the Trustees wanted it done without giving the school 
additional financial resources. Many faculty members at Excel were upset and suspected 
that it was the state system's way of punishing a recalcitrant school. Cooper recalled that 
this was a major topic of his job interview at Excel; he said the faculty made it very clear 
that they expected him to challenge the system regarding this center. "I mean it was a 
history of mandated policy without explanation, you know, coming from this external 
entity. [The] system couldn't accept that the people at Excel would even question their 
policy" (142.9.16). The academic center presented a complicated ambiguous problem. 
On the one hand, the western region had no community college representation, and 
therefore many students who might be attending community college were either not 
going to college or going elsewhere. Yet, on the other hand, Excel's faculty members 
were concerned that given the small size of their faculty, the geographical distance from 
this offsite academic center and the lack of additional state resources to fulfill this 
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mandate left Excel without any good options. Cooper believed in the expansion and 
wanted to make it successful but also felt conflicted because he felt that it unfair that the 
school had received no addition funds to execute the project. Cooper recalled, "In my 
previous employment, the community college faculty within the state system had 
negotiated huge salary increases to teach more courses; in this state system, they just 
expected it" (237.8.10). Although Cooper supported the center, he did not mandate that 
the faculty teach there. Instead, he encouraged and thanked faculty who agreed to teach 
there. He saw this as evolutionary change and sought to lead by his example of support. 
Despite the gentle persuasion, Cooper said he took "heat for it" from the school and the 
system. He recalled: 
[The faculty members were asking,] "How do we hold you accountable? You say 
you are going to ensure that the resources of this campus will not be diminished 
by these system mandates to create this presence [at the new academic center]." 
And in juxtaposition, I would be sitting at the Trustees' meeting, in front of all my 
peers, having the chair of the Trustees pounding me just like [Excel's] faculty as 
to how they were going to hold me accountable for ensuring that the academic 
center got full support. (303.9.16) 
Leaders face conflict. Cooper was confronted by the push for adaptation to the external 
environment of the system, and, at the same time, was being pulled to protect the internal 
integration of his college from the system. Cooper stood in the middle and did not 
exhibit strategies designed to move him out of the middle where he would be continually 
buffeted by pressure from both sides. He remained stuck in the middle from which he 
could not extricate himself. 
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Theme #2: Disconnect over Meaning of Shared Governance 
The ongoing debate about what constitutes shared governance between Cooper, 
his senior administrators and the faculty was perhaps the most significant source of 
tension for Cooper. Operationally, the school maintained a framework of academic 
standing committees which have enabled the school to "operate efficiently and 
productively" (p. 45) during turbulent periods of leadership change (Document 14). For 
college-wide issues at Excel (issues affecting multiple divisions in the school such as 
facilities, student affairs, financial aid, etc.), the President's Council had served as an 
advisory body since it was first established in 2002. Its mission was to provide a forum 
for "college personnel in a shared-governance model for decision making" (Document 
14, p.44). In addition, the All-College Forum, a body established during the school's 
founding, had been a gathering point for communications as well as a forum for 
discussion of "policy or procedural changes" (Document 14, p.45). 
When Cooper became president, he kept all the committees intact but gradually 
made some changes in their functions. "I did not add any formal teams to this 
organization. I think what's happened is I've developed some different expectations of 
what those teams would do" (487.8.10). Cooper's driving concern was to establish a 
philosophical understanding of what shared governance at the school would entail. One 
of his first acts was to give a presentation to an All-College Forum about the principles of 
the American Association of University Professors on shared governance, which called 
for faculty to exercise decision-making responsibility for curriculum, subject matter, 
methods of instruction, and faculty status (Document 16)16. He noted: 
16 However, while Cooper recalls this presentation as one of his first acts as president, it remains unclear at 
this writing why this presentation or discussion is not recalled by the faculty or staff of Excel whom I 
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I was really coming from a position that looks at a balance of authorities rather 
than sharing authority in all areas. I was learning what shared governance meant 
to me, what shared governance meant to them. The bottom line here was people 
were looking to get out from under a yoke, really. They were in part looking for 
somebody who would draw a sword and lead a charge against this oppressive 
system. (918.8.24) 
Cooper noted that he held a similar discussion with the system office staff and pointed 
out that the presidential recruitment materials had called for community college 
presidents to "have a commitment to shared governance and a collaborative leadership 
style that emphasizes collegiality" (Document 16, p.2). Cooper recalled that "there was a 
lot of rolling of eyes. You don't want to do that, some of the staff said. But I said ... 
'we're going to move to a higher education model'" (8.4.860). "Nobody except the 
Chancellor had a clue. They were buzz words" (903.8.24). 
Shared governance and decision making at Excel proved to be one of the thorniest 
problems which Cooper faced. In the two subthemes to follow, I explored the 
ramifications of his decision to form a new bureaucratic layer, which he called his 
Executive Team, and also explore his approach to what he believed to be inclusive 
decision making. 
Subtheme: Reaction to the Executive Team Formation. Shared governance has 
not been fully resolved or clarified at Excel as of this writing. It continues as a source of 
tension for both the faculty and President Cooper. Cooper is frustrated by what he 
perceives as criticism from faculty over establishing a new governance body known as 
the president's Executive Team, which is composed of the president and vice presidents 
interviewed. One explanation suggested by President Cooper is that All-College Forums are sporadically 
attended. 
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for academic affairs, student services, the chief financial officer, and the associate vice 
president for academic affairs. The Executive Team, which Cooper called his "cabinet," 
was created in early 2008 when Thatcher, the former vice president for academic affairs, 
had complained that the President's Council was an inappropriate venue in which to have 
some discussions that involved human resource issues. The Team, according to its recent 
description, incorporated a "collaborative approach" (i.e., consensus) to render decisions 
and confirm policy changes made at lower levels (Document 17, p.2). Cooper expressed 
dismay at the questions and criticisms about this new team, surmising that it stemmed 
from the faculty interpreting shared governance as one person, one vote in all matters. 
As the responses in the next section reflect, the faculty had different concerns. Cooper 
said: 
You know it had been such an autocratic environment and to counter that the 
faculty were asking for a well-defined system of roles and responsibilities in 
decision making, which on one level sounds very prescriptive. [What] I am 
saying here is [that] a group of faculty [wanted] an open participatory process, but 
they began approaching it from a very rigid [perspective] and wanting to see their 
voice defined. (8.9.11) 
Subtheme: Inclusion to Exclusion. Except for the tensions over governance, 
Cooper expressed pride in his inclusive decision-making process. During the first two 
years of his administration, he involved the entire school in approving a new mission 
statement. Inclusion was a high priority in developing the strategic plan and Cooper also 
expanded involvement in the budget review process when the school was asked to make 
significant budget cuts. "I wanted things vetted," he noted. "And I wanted people 
including maintenance staff and secretaries and others [to] tell me what they saw that was 
missing" (542.8.10). But he admitted that he was more guarded about the school budget. 
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And there are some areas that I'm solely responsible for and will not share, well 
not completely delegate, you know, and that is budget decisions. So that was hard 
for me to have to look the faculty and staff in the face and say, no, I won't 
delegate budget authority—the budget is something I am held accountable for by 
the Trustees. I can't say to you, you can make these decisions and that I will 
absolutely hold to them. And that's been a hard part you know, I think more than 
any part of leadership. Instead I want to share governance but we have to come to 
terms with what can be shared; my natural inclination is to share, but that is where 
I have to hold authority. (8.4.863) 
At the suggestion of a department chair, he asked for volunteers to form a budget 
committee. Cooper also brought together faculty and staff who were opinion leaders in 
the school. He noted: 
So, laying out the budget completely, getting their idea, I really feel there's a level 
of transparency and shared governance here that has been a big sticking point 
right from the beginning. What the faculty and staff really wanted here in shared 
governance was, you know, a say in everything. (769.7.18) 
He also presented the budget reductions at an All-College Forum, which he admitted 
made him nervous. He was expecting more "push back" than he got. However, 
following the meeting, when he started to get calls and emails from the faculty about the 
budget, he felt they were trying to push him and he took it personally, thinking it was part 
of the school history of "pushing the president." However, after he shared his concerns 
with his vice president for academic affairs, she told him he had misunderstood. 
"Frankly, I did not understand that the urgency, the pushing, was urgency ... related to 
how the department chairs ran their departments ... The All-College Forum budget 
presentation had been very generalized, on a "macro" level, but the department chairs 
needed to know specifics about what they could buy" (845.8.24). 
The budget process, according to Cooper, also brought to light the lack of clarity 
regarding the roles of the vice presidents and the president: 
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Now I am working with our Chancellor in the system office and our local 
politicians to preserve resources for this college. And I get frustrated at the extent 
that it seems like our college [Excel] community is coming to me for the micro-
managing and I'm feeling like this is what vice presidents need to do. And well 
that's an area that hasn't been completely clear and then it was immediately 
exacerbated by this budget issue. (56.8.12) 
Theme #3: Demons of Leadership 
Cooper reported that he had been excited by the challenge of taking on a college 
like Excel which was considered by the college system to be a rogue, nonconforming 
school. Cooper believed his personal qualities of caring and empathy would be able to 
solve the relationship problem between the two schools. His concern for being liked 
seemed to interfere with the demands of the job; his need to be seen as a "doer" was 
frustrated by his relationship with the system. Here I explore four subthemes to 
exemplify his reports: (a) confidence as a healer is challenged, (b) needing to be liked, (c) 
feeling like a gelded dragon, (d) conflict response and the self. 
Subtheme: Confidence as a Healer is Challenged. Throughout his professional 
life, Cooper had great success in bringing people together, including finding common 
ground for conflicting academic factions. As a former development officer at a large 
community college, Cooper had been a tireless producer of grants and other funding for 
faculty projects, and he was the "guy who got it" when it came to understanding the role 
and needs of faculty (620.9.1). He recalled, "I had a history of being a beloved dean and 
a beloved vice president. And at [former community college where he worked] the 
President held less stature than I did" (767.9.1). Cooper said he came to Excel with 
confidence that if anyone could improve the relationship between the school and system, 
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it was he. He knew from experience that relating to others—experiencing empathy—was 
a special skill-set. 
But despite what he considered to be his best efforts, after the first year he felt he 
was still not trusted by the faculty at Excel. He was continually questioned and 
challenged on his actions, particularly the expansion of Excel's academic center, 
expansion of class sizes, and questions of faculty shared governance. Cooper interpreted 
this as evidence that he was perceived as the "new boss [who was the] same as the old 
[autocratic] boss" (1012.9.16). Cooper admitted that he expected to be trusted since he 
had been the choice of the school. He and the faculty shared a respect for academic work 
(he was not a businessman like the former interim president who focused on efficiency 
and the bottom line), and he felt he was willing to "roll up his sleeves" to get the work 
done. So why was he distrusted? "It's also a matter of wanting to be accepted. You want 
to be embraced by your peers and you're not. Emotionally I felt distrusted and I wanted 
to be trusted; I felt [that being] distrusted all the time was my fault" (560.9.16). 
Subtheme: Needing to be Liked. Cooper's success over the years, as he noted, 
had been based on his ability to relate to others and to be persistent until he brought the 
"naysayers" around. At Excel, it seemed to him that the harder he tried to show his 
empathy, the less it seemed to work. He frequently referred to wrestling with his need to 
be liked and his need to not be viewed as autocratic. The following quotes illustrate these 
points: 
You know, over the years I've had to work on not wanting to or not needing to be 
liked as much as I do. (959.8.12) 
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I make a lot of work for myself trying so hard to—to get to "yes" with people. I 
don't have to get to "yes" nearly as much as I do. I could just be more autocratic 
about it and it would not upset the system [office]. (1073.8.12) 
It was really shocking to me, and I get it now, given the history of the relationship 
of the system office with people here, that from day one, people here just couldn't 
see me-the person. (767.9.1) 
I asked him why being seen as autocratic bothered him, and he replied: 
I know what the mentality is among people who feel like they're up against the 
system. I understand how the rank and file distinguishes themselves from the 
suits. I know this from having been a working class kid. At the [manufacturing] 
plant, there are the suits and then there are the people on the line. And, I realized 
at this stage of my life that I just can't go up to somebody and say, oh I'm not 
really a suit. I can only demonstrate that through action over time. Like people 
will say oh, okay. You know he isn't an autocrat or he is thoughtful or he is 
reflective. When I think there was just an expectation that just another autocrat 
was going to walk in the place. And I constantly was tested. (891.8.12; 918.8.12) 
Subtheme : Feeling Like a Gelded Dragon? At the system level, Cooper said he 
had been an outspoken advocate for the authority and autonomy of presidents. Yet with 
regard to his willingness to face uncomfortable situations at Excel, he admitted that he 
has avoided them. For example, over a year ago, he committed to improving the lighting 
in the parking lot at the school because it was a safety issue; the school holds a number of 
night classes and the majority of the students are women. Cooper said that he believed 
that he had the authority to get this done since the presidents control critical maintenance 
expenditures. However, he soon discovered that the money could not be taken from the 
critical maintenance budget but rather had to come out of the capital improvement budget 
controlled by the system office. Despite his efforts to work out a plan, he said "it kept 
being put on the back burner." He explained, "I told them [at the system office] to get the 
damn lights fixed. But nothing has happened. I can't stand in front of the faculty and 
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staff and say to them, 'I don't have the authority to do that. I will look like a gelding" 
(179.8.11). A year later, the lighting project was still on hold. President Cooper admitted 
that he had still not addressed the issue with faculty and staff. 
Cooper also admitted that he doesn't leave his office much when he is at the 
school. He said that when he first became president, he made an effort to walk around, 
talk with the faculty, and listen to their concerns, but in his second year, he stopped. He 
talked about his conflict with himself about his tendency to avoid situations where he 
feels he cannot deliver on promises or feels that he has no power to make a difference to 
get things done. "There was a period [when]... I started secluding myself. I hid away a 
little bit because in my walks into classrooms and into faculty offices, I was met with 
such barrages [against the system office] and for things I couldn't fix" (1336.8.4A). He 
continued with the following observations. 
I wanted to be perceived as an engaged leader who was successful at making 
things better. I wanted it to be better. I very much wanted to be better. Very early 
on, I found myself a little bit between a rock and a hard place. And then you 
know, some felt that because things didn't change real quickly that somehow I 
wasn't advocating strongly enough. I was realizing that to make it work [walking 
around], I couldn't be so close and hands-on. (898.12.6) 
He said that he still maintains his open-door policy, but admitted he wasn't "out seeking 
the grief' (1087 12.6). 
Subtheme: Conflict Response and the Self. Cooper discussed his conflict between 
his two self-images: one as thoughtful and reflective and one as a person who is 
compelled to respond to confrontations (someone who is not a "wimp"): 
Oh, I get very articulate all of a sudden. And it just wells up. It wells up and it's 
just some of my finest moments. You know, I get articulate. Yeah, but I harness 
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it; I intellectualize it a little bit but I get really articulate and yeah, it's a quality 
that I kind of like about myself. I didn't get into fistfights [as a child] but I got 
into confrontations on several occasions with bullies where I just left them 
stunned. (1307.10.14) 
He also spoke about the isolation of the job. Like many first-time presidents, he 
found it hard to find confidantes to help him through the challenges of a new role. He 
said that he had not sought out his fellow community college presidents as a support 
group because he did not want others to know the problems he was having at the school. 
He reported that during the first few years, the presidents were very cautious and 
suspicious of one anther, and he felt they all were competitive in vying for community 
college system resources (which he thought had been encouraged under the former 
centralized system). Under the decentralized system, however, he noted that the 
Chancellor was encouraging the presidents to discuss their mutual challenges and to 
become more collaborative. However, Cooper admitted that he was very cautious about 
discussing his school and seldom did unless it was good news (personal correspondence, 
May 28,2012). 
Although Cooper has found few other peers with whom to discuss problems, he 
recalled two people—a former full-time faculty member (now an adjunct) at Excel 
Community College and the community college system Chancellor—who had helped 
him through some tough early periods. Of the faculty member, Cooper recalled, 
I was feeling, oh God, is this working? There was no validation for a very long 
time, except [faculty member and informal leader of the school] who would come 
in from time to time and talk to me, not to hold my hand, but to talk about issues, 
and she would say, "Don't worry, you're not in trouble, you won't get a no 
confidence vote letter." (1014.12.6) 
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Cooper said he missed [the faculty member], whom he credited with being a rare, 
articulate and fair spokesperson for issues in the school and with the faculty. "She was 
unusually clear, so she served as an important informal counsel to me, even though she 
was my most vocal critic" (1019 .12.6). Of his relationship with the now-retired 
Chancellor, Cooper said that he never discussed specific issues he was facing at Excel 
(particularly his difficulty of being accepted as a collaborative rather than autocratic 
president), but he said that the Chancellor was a constant source of behind-the-scenes 
support. He recalled one instance where the Chancellor had visited Excel's new 
academic center and made pointed remarks about the expectations that Excel would grow 
enrollment there or it would be turned over to another school. This message was sent by 
an administrator at the school in an email that reached Cooper on a Sunday morning. 
Cooper explained: 
I'm sitting at my desk at home you know, doing some emailing, and I was just so 
agitated. I thought I'd call him up. I'd call them at home. It was 10:00 a.m. on a 
Sunday morning. You know, he burst out laughing. I took a deep breath and 
realized, ok, you know, because he was laughing at me, that I was calling him on 
the carpet at 10:00 a.m. on a Sunday morning. But he was actually helping me 
out because he was running interference for me as the Chancellor with my own 
faculty. (756.8.24) 
Part II: Excel Faculty Talk about President Cooper's Conflict Responses 
Question #2: How do the Faculty and Staff of Excel College perceive the actions of 
President Cooper with regard to conflict? 
A president, especially on a small college campus, is seen as the chief strategist 
for college policies and administrative behavior. President Cooper was no exception. 
From the moment he first presented his campus agenda during the presidential interview 
process, Cooper was seen as someone who was going to bring positive change to the 
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campus by fostering participatory decision making and shared governance. In examining 
the faculty and administrations' perceptions of President Cooper's management of 
conflict, five major themes emerged: (a) governance process curtailed, (b) participatory 
decision making as a threat, (c) risk avoidance, (d) communications void, (e) unaddressed 
problems from the old system avoided. 
Theme #1: Governance Process Curtailed 
Many people recalled that when Cooper began his presidency, he made it clear 
that he intended to keep the governance structures and processes in place—he wanted to 
initiate change through evolution, not revolution. However, by the end of his first year, 
Cooper made what many in the school believed to be an unusual and puzzling move, 
especially for a small school. He created a new governance body known as the Executive 
Team. This team, as noted earlier, was comprised of Cooper's senior administrators. 
This team seemed to offer a direct contradiction to the culture that had been accustomed 
to open meetings and direct contact with the president on most policy issues. Cooper's 
own response to criticism was one of puzzlement and then annoyance. He noted that 
executive management teams were quite common throughout community colleges in the 
United States, and he had been a member of an executive team at both of his former 
colleges where he had been employed. Nevertheless, this team created a rift between the 
president and several of the faculty. 
For about a year he denied that the Executive Team was doing anything other than 
just talking about things, but it became clear after a while that they were also 
making some critical decisions. (112.9.6) 
We have over and over and over again tried to address the Executive Team issue 
within the college so we can make it clear what the heck is happening, that's all. 
(36.10.28) 
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These comments speak to the confusion and frustration over the role of the Executive 
Team which changed the pace and rhythm of decision making in a small school because 
it created a new bureaucratic layer. Three subthemes that emerged were: (a) lack of 
Sensemaking, (b) transparency tensions, and (c) accountability changes. 
Subtheme: Lack of Sensemaking. There was a great deal of confusion as old 
decision-making frameworks were dismantled and new ones were still coming into place. 
This confusion created one of the challenges for this new governance body empowered 
with final decision making authority. In this case, people were unclear about the purpose 
and functions of the Executive Team. For the first two years of its existence, there were 
no written protocols or descriptions, and no minutes were issued. This was in direct 
contradiction to all other governance committees, which published meeting minutes for 
the school website and print copies for the library. In the third year, a school-wide 
statement of purpose was created and thereafter, agendas and a few "sketchy notes" 
(52.10.23) were published for each Executive Team meeting. In addition to the Team's 
rapid decision-making ability, Cooper explained that some topics were sensitive human 
resource issues and therefore needed to remain confidential. 
However, if rapid response was one of the goals of the team, the strategic 
planning process, initiated by Cooper in his second year in office, seriously damaged that 
perception. He appointed a school-wide committee to develop a planning process and 
this was used as the basis for a retreat with faculty and staff to map out major strategic 
themes. The process was then turned over to the Executive Team to flesh out the details. 
The Executive Team took more than one year to roll out the plan, but not before dozens 
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of iterations were passed back and forth to the faculty. As one administrator noted, 
faculty expressed frustration, asking "How many times do we need to see this?" and 
saying "Just get it out!" (35.8.1 IB). Another faculty member summarized a common 
concern: "We could have prevented a lot of confusion and a lot of questioning of their 
ability to lead, if they'd made some decisions, even if they were the wrong decisions" 
(478.12.21). 
Opinions about the Executive Team remained remarkably unchanged after more 
than four years. Some comments included: 
Decision making goes into a wasteland and just sits there and that is the 
frustration that people are feeling. (10.28.49) 
It still exists, the confusion, annoyance and frustration. (456.12.21) 
It's a real bugaboo for everyone. (10.28.47) 
Decisions are either very slow in coming, or something that don't get made. 
(1275.9.15) 
Pragmatic views among the faculty were that Cooper's creation of an Executive Team 
created a narrow "funnel" through which decision making functioned and thereby slowed 
things down. 
I don't really want to know all the details of what was being discussed, but I 
would like some things to move forward and I think that's the frustration. So 
regardless of how they choose to manage their own group dynamic is really up to 
them as long as they're getting the job done, and I feel as if they're not always 
getting the job done. (460.12.21) 
The slowness of decisions was exacerbated by Cooper's policy of decision-by-consensus 
for the Executive Team. He intended this process to allow issues to be fully vetted by the 
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administrators, for no decision to be rendered under duress, and to avoid coalition 
building within such a small team. 
Subtheme: Transparency Tensions. Among some faculty, the Executive Team's 
lack of transparency was a major concern. Transparency requirements were not 
documented in school internal governance literature as such, and therefore have been 
subject to different interpretations. However, the interpretation I gathered in my 
interviews is that transparency historically meant three things at the school. First, the 
decision-making process was open; that is, issues were discussed in open meetings. 
Second, the meetings and decisions were documented in committee minutes that were 
posted in the library and online for anyone at the school to examine. Third, decisions 
were explained. "A main feature of this culture was not only documenting for others to 
see, but also explaining the rationale for the decision," one faculty member explained 
(8.28.1254). Even former presidents who were known as autocrats appeared to have been 
consistent in providing transparency about their decisions. 
X [former president], always had some kind of quick administrative get together 
to make decisions; she was visible about what they were—she would tell us what 
she wanted to deal with and ask for input. Then if decisions came out that we 
disagreed with, [at least] we knew the process, there were minutes, and that was 
okay. (49.10.28) 
However, other faculty were less concerned about complete transparency as long as there 
was a climate of trust. 
Transparency to me means it could be opaque. It doesn't have to be absolutely 
clear.... Even if the transparency was opaque, at least, if I had a leader that I 
could trust, I would say, "Okay, I can't see it exactly but at least I can kind of see 
shadows behind the glass. And that's the piece that I think is really the core. We 
all have a different view of what that transparency needs to be. (592.12.21) 
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Subtheme: Accountability Changes. At Excel, accountability was managed 
through the documentation of meetings and important conversations. Minutes for 
governance committees showed a consistent record of action items with persons to be 
responsible and deadlines and one faculty member remarked that "it gave us an easy way 
to remember what we had agreed to do" (100.12.21). However, almost everyone I spoke 
to said that accountability had slipped. An individual who had worked with President 
Cooper observed: 
[President Cooper] has a hard time holding people accountable. He cares about 
people so much that he has a hard time to tell them. He could see that [Zelda 
Thatcher, former academic affairs vice president] was not doing her job so he 
tried to compensate and do her job. But since he doesn't hold people accountable, 
it affects morale. (8.29.time 1:13) 
Theme #2: Participatory Decision Making as a Threat 
For the first two years, Cooper used the main governing bodies for school-wide 
issues as they had always been used. The President's Council (formerly known as the 
Campus Leadership Team) was created by a previous interim president to "involve 
College personnel in the decision-making process" (Document 14, p.44) by providing 
recommendations to the president on key issues (Document 14). Many at the school 
perceived that although Cooper had kept the original structure of the Council, he had 
changed its functions. This observation was substantiated by my examination of Council 
records. In the first two years of Cooper's presidency, the Council's minutes were 
action-driven; that is, each topic discussed was followed by an action step and deadline. 
However, in the third and fourth years, the minutes reflected discussions that have no 
actionable recommendations, and topics and discussions tended to be repetitive 
(Document 11). This change may be due to the ways minutes were taken; however, in 
my discussions with President Cooper, he confirmed that he had purposively altered the 
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role of the Council. He recalled that the Council members had "not confronted [him] 
exactly, but explicitly wanted to know if they were a decision-making body. Cooper said 
no, the Council was "more a body that filled [him] in on things ... because it is broadly 
representative of so many different areas of the college" (134.8.12A). The following 
quote captures the mood: "I need a meeting that has action items and change. President's 
Council feels more like a random act of kindness than a productive forum"( 169.9.9). 
A second area where the governance structure remained in place but the function 
changed was the All-College Forum, which, as the name implies, brought the entire 
school together on a monthly basis to discuss policy or procedural changes (Document 
11). "When [President Cooper] first came to the College Forum, he used the Forum in the 
way it had always been used. And he never said, 'We're changing it to another way.' 
(60.9.2). Another individual noted, 
It's frustrating because it's like a small, mini lecture or update that could be 
executed via e-mail, rather than saying something like, "I want to make a decision 
about this [issue]. I want your input." And while he may say sometimes, "What 
do you think?" there's never that end loop of action that is visible. (254.9.15) 
Many faculty felt a sense of confusion over roles and structures. The functions of the two 
main governing bodies were changed by "fiat," (300.9.7) as one faculty member put it, 
and a new decision-making body with unclear decision-making boundaries was put in 
place. 
As many individuals pointed out, President Cooper had been a strong advocate 
and leader in helping to craft the "shared responsibilities" document between the 
community college presidents and the system Trustees (Document 6). This document 
had attempted to articulate the presidential lines of authority and autonomy in governance 
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their schools—something that had been a source of anxiety for the presidents, as Cooper 
recalled (251.8.9A). Faculty at Excel, although not all I spoke with, expressed a similar 
concern for spelling out accountability for shared governance and participatory decision 
making between the faculty and the president. Cooper characterized the faculty's 
concern as "dissonance": 
They want to codify a system of governance, because they had no say under the 
old system. But they want a well-defined system of roles and responsibilities in 
the decision-making process. I see a contradiction in them wanting an "open 
participatory process" and a very rigid definition—wanting their voice in the 
process clearly defined. (11.8.9A) 
He believed that he had articulated expected decision-making participation in his 
presentation at an All-College Forum [Document 16] on the American Association of 
University Professors governance principles. Cooper defined "shared governance" as 
leaving to the faculty those issues of curriculum content and pedagogy, while issues of 
administrative governance such as the budget and other administrative policies were his 
purview. The importance of codifying the school's principles of governance and 
participatory decision making were articulated in the following quotes by a faculty 
member: 
People are pretty much proceeding on the basis of what they remembered it 
[processes] should be. Some new processes have been refurbished in just this last 
year or so, putting some control back into the processes, but it is still very much 
ad hoc. (165.9.15A) 
An institution that doesn't have any written rules [of governance] is an institution 
that is in danger of losing a great deal of its self-knowledge and its self-
governance. Without such rules, there are no clear lines of responsibility, and 
therefore no assessment of how things worked out, whether they worked out well 
or otherwise. Right now, it's entirely up to the whim of that higher up, because 
there are so few [written] processes. (210.9.15A) 
94 
It's not that we could take away [the president's] ability to decide, but he could 
decide in opposition to a body below him, he would overrule or whatever it is, but 
there would be a formal process that would be documented and understood than 
that to exist in the memory of various people. (203.9.15A) 
One faculty member expressed the opinion that "authority's not a bad thing, but 
you need to know where it comes from and what its limits are and how it is supposed to 
work. This makes a big difference in how people feel included [in] or excluded from the 
process" (843.9.15A). Another point of view was that without responsibility or authority, 
"It makes babies out of people. If they have no actual power, they're then happy to let 
others do all the work" (1161.9.15B). 
The "dissonance," as President Cooper termed it, continues to be a point of 
contention for some of the faculty. For other faculty, primarily those who come from 
disciplines or careers outside of academia, codification of a system of governance seemed 
to be less important. In the medical and business disciplines, for example, lines of 
authority are taken for granted. As one administrator noted, in business, decisions are 
made quickly, sometimes by bringing people together, and other times by forming a task 
force or committee, "But there is no formal system of governance, so to speak, for 
employees" (251.11.9). Another individual said that although the medical profession is 
hierarchical in its decision making, decisions are always open to revision if evidence 
shows that the decision is wrong or inappropriate to the circumstance (254.1.5). 
Theme #3: Risk Avoidance 
It is clear that people view President Cooper's handling of difficult decisions and 
events through very different lenses. Some report that he is not a risk-taker. He seems 
unwilling or unable to make a difficult decision that might lead to failure. Yet others 
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disagree and cite instances where they brought some thorny issues to Cooper and he was 
willing to make a tough decision once they had met with him one-on-one, explained the 
issue, and provided the data to support a recommendation. 
One faculty member commented that a leader should be able to communicate 
information so a common understanding emerges, but "[President Cooper] doesn't 
demonstrate that ability, for fear, in my opinion, of rocking the boat and unsettling 
people" (172.9.9). The faculty member observed, "Part of being a leader is knowing that 
you might fail and owning up that the decision wasn't the best one" (170.9.9). Another 
noted, "He is not a firm decision-maker; he brings in too many people" (400.11.9). 
Faculty who had served on a committee to recommend budget cuts expressed 
disappointment over his reluctance to make decisions. The committee members, 
including a member who was a finance expert, worked over the summer on their own 
time to analyze the budget shortfall and offer recommendations for budget reductions. 
Cooper accepted most of the recommendations and publically praised their work. 
However, once the acute budget crisis had passed, he failed to follow through on his 
promise to reinstate the committee to work on long-term budget and financial planning 
issues. One of the members told me that she had written four emails and had several 
meetings, but that he would not agree to reinstate the committee: "I met with him, and he 
said, 'Well, we don't have much of a budget. We're still sorting it out as an Executive 
Team." She commented that shared decision making means participation and input can 
not be exercised only in times of crisis (165.12.21). 
Generally speaking, Cooper was not seen as someone who felt comfortable 
making decisions because he was "not comfortable with conflicts, good or bad" 
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(160.9.15). Others observed that Cooper was simply reacting to the school environment, 
which was seeing a "challenging situation as negative—especially when it involves a 
difference of opinions" (179.9.9). Others commented on his willingness to work through 
issues and make decisions if pressed to do so. For example, one person stated, "I would 
go in representing the faculty on some real issues, close the door and sit down with him. 
He was always wonderful in working things out. He can do that stuff. But he loses the 
priority of doing it unless somebody forces him to do that" (31.10.28). This perspective 
was also voiced by his senior administrators, one of whom said that "he's not afraid to be 
responsible for hard decisions. On several occasions he told me to make the decision, 
and then to tell them it was his decision" (12.23). 
Although Cooper seemed willing to exercise authority through intermediaries, he 
was less decisive when directly involved in difficult situations. Cooper was known as 
someone "who likes to please" (266.11.3). Many have said that he does not like people 
to be uncomfortable. When a female staff member experienced a personality conflict 
with a male who reported to her, Cooper offered to take on the responsibility for 
supervising the direct report rather than reprimanding him (112.11.19). Cooper was 
called a "kind person," "authentic—in that what you see is what you get," and his staff 
said that he was self-reflective and thoughtful. One of his administrators phrased it this 
way: 
People think that he doesn't like to make the hard decisions and he leaves it to 
others [to make decisions] too much, so that he doesn't act, but my view is that he 
likes to please everybody, so he won't necessarily say no to somebody who comes 
in his office. (19.6.22). 
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Another individual observed: 
Sometimes he takes criticism personally .... I've heard some people say, "I went 
in and told [President Cooper] that he didn't handle something correctly; 
[President Cooper] takes it very personally—he gets flushed. And then he shuts 
down. (55.8.29) 
Theme# 4: Communications Void 
Cooper was described as a poor communicator. In fact, one of the most 
problematic issues for many in the school was his ad hoc and "rambling" 
communications style. Many at the school also reported that they had "no clue" 
(166.11.30) as to his activities, especially external to Excel community college. 
Frequently faculty and staff learned about President Cooper's activities by reading it in 
the local paper or hearing about his activities through their friends. "It makes us feel 
devalued," one individual commented (51.11.21). Another complained, "It's 
embarrassing to be in the community and not know what your own president is doing" 
(62.10.14). In addition, that same "ad hoc" style appeared to be experienced in school 
meetings. Although President Cooper was aware that he "ought to communicate more," 
he had not instituted a systematic process to address the problem. 
As reported earlier, President Cooper was conflicted about his decreased visibility 
on campus. On the one hand, he knew he needed to walk around and talk informally with 
the faculty, but, on the other hand, he justified it as being too busy. His reluctance to 
walk around the school was noted by faculty with a sense of an annoyance and with a 
sense of loss. 
He set a framework when he first came in and he followed through on it for a 
couple of years. And then started to wobble and then he started becoming 
invisible. I don't want an invisible leader; I can tolerate a wobbly leader but not 
an invisible one. (10.28.31) 
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I mean I used to feel I was invading in the last year. Before he had an open door 
that was truly an open door. (31.10.28) 
However, some disagree about what constitutes an appropriate level of access and 
visibility. "An door open is not access, it's not visibility. I know he thinks so because 
he's always saying, 'I'm here for you.' And I'm not sure that in his mind, he is" 
(789.9.15). 
Theme #5: Problems from the Old System Linger 
One of the lingering problems from the old state system was the inability of Excel 
Community College to make long-term plans for the future, not only because of a series 
of interim presidents, but also because the college had been subject to centralized control 
through the state legislature, particularly regarding budgets. During the years of interim 
presidents long-term planning had been postponed. When Cooper came to Excel, many 
in the school saw this as an opportunity to define the school's long-term goals and 
strategies. But all I spoke with said that long-term planning had never been addressed 
during Cooper's tenure. His approach was described as short-term thinking and change 
measured in small increments. Attention to the long-term direction of the school had not 
been addressed. 
One of the most contentious issues that Cooper inherited was how to balance the 
system's demands for expansion of school services despite scarce faculty resources. The 
push for expansion included offering more courses at Excel's offsite academic center, 
increasing class sizes, expanding online learning and expansion in the use of adjunct 
faculty. Cooper has largely supported expansion but considered faculty resources to meet 
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those demands to be "academic issues" and deferred decisions for how to accomplish 
expansion and class size increases to the vice president for academic affairs. 
Part III: Leadership Development Profile Assessment 
Question #3: What relationship, if any, exists between the president's experience of 
conflict and his stage of leadership development? 
In this section, I report the findings from the Leadership Development Profile 
(LDP) on President Cooper. In his LDP, President Cooper was assessed at an 
Individualist stage of leadership maturity. The Individualist stage will be described 
below using three major themes to organize the discussion. The themes are: (a) mindset 
dilemmas, (b) mutuality struggles, and (c) ambiguity conundrum. These themes were 
selected because the LDP predicts that an Individualist will be caught between two 
mindsets, that of the conventional and postconventional thinker. An Individualist, while 
beginning to truly value relationships and mutuality for their own sake, may also be 
confused by too many value choices and unable to choose among them. And finally, an 
Individualist may be confused by the ambiguity of situations which require drawing upon 
not only rational judgment but also upon reasoning informed by emotions. These three 
themes represent new experiences for an Individualist. Prior to reviewing these themes, 
some background on the LDP helps to provide the context in which the results have been 
presented. A review of ego maturity definitions is important to understanding the role of 
the LDP in this study. 
The Leadership Development Profile is based on the original work of Loevinger 
(1976). Loevinger's work measures the human developmental stages toward an 
integrated and mature ego which is defined in this study as "development of a more 
100 
complex, differentiated and integrated understanding of self and others" while moving 
away from "self-protective and exploitive attitudes" and toward "self-respect, mutual 
respect and identity formation" (Oja & Reiman, 2007, p.97). However, as Torbert 
(Torbert & Associates, 2004) points out, the concepts on which the Leadership 
Development Profile is based also share much in common with the concepts of Robert 
Kegan (1994), the developmental psychologist who originated the term "constructive 
developmentalism." Kegan (1994) contends that ego maturity is both a function of 
mature thinking and feeling (intrapersonal behavior) and mature relationships with others 
(interpersonal behavior). The stage of growth toward "mature capacity" (Baxter 
Magolda, 2004, p. 8) governs the mindset we use in defining and analyzing challenges 
we face. 
In the profile to follow, I compare the predicted behaviors of the LDP for an 
Individualist to President Cooper's self-reported experiences and responses to challenges. 
Where appropriate, I also provide data from interviews with Excel faculty as to their 
observations about Cooper's responses to challenges. 
Theme #1. Mindset Dilemmas 
The transition to an Individualist from an earlier stage of Achiever is perhaps one 
of the biggest steps in the complexity stage development journey because it represents a 
transition in thinking from conventional to postconventional. In the conventional 
mindset, reality is objective and discoverable. The systematic framework of society's 
laws and organizational rules are seen as immutable and therefore not questioned. In the 
postconventional stage one's mindset changes to view reality as socially constructed, 
with no single "right" or "true" viewpoint. This is a tremendous leap or transformation in 
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perspective that causes a re-evaluation of how a person interprets the world. As an 
Individualist, Cooper is predicted to recognize multiple viewpoints but sees them all as 
relative, with no viewpoint being better or more correct than another. As an Individualist 
for the first time, Cooper begins to see the complexity and ambiguity of problems, but 
has yet to develop a framework for managing those competing complexities. Within a 
leadership position this may render the leader unable to make a decision in a timely 
fashion-if at all-leaving it to others to make the decisions by default, causing "decision 
paralysis" (Torbert & Associates, 2004, p.68). The LDP suggested that Cooper was 
showing some thinking attributed to an early Strategist stage. In the Strategist stage, 
Cooper would most likely feel the earlier sense of confusion pass and would learn to 
balance competing perspectives by differentiating among them, then integrating them 
into a broader, more unified perspective (Torbert & Associates, 2004). 
Theme #2. Mutuality Struggles 
As an Individualist, Cooper is predicted to have a greater capacity for mutuality 
with others over his previous stage of the Achiever, where self-protection and 
achievement were more important than mutual influence and respect Cooper is learning 
a tolerance for intrapersonal conflict by grappling with a newfound discovery of the value 
of emotions as a source of data (rendering the rational outlook insufficient). However, 
Cooper is also predicted to find interpersonal conflicts (and the complexity of competing 
perspectives) a bit overwhelming for him because he has no way to discriminate and 
differentiate among these perspectives. However, at this stage, as an Individualist, 
Cooper would be accepting responsibility for his decisions, unlike his prior stage of the 
Achiever who would tend to blame others for problems and conflicts emerging from his 
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single-minded pursuit of his goals. Cooper wrote in his LDP assessment that his 
conscience bothered him when on occasion he felt that he had "not owned up" to being 
disingenuous or not taking responsibility for his actions (Harthill, 2012; Torbert & 
Associates, 2004). This feeling would not occur to an Achiever. 
While Individualists generally recognize mutuality, they often avoid it because 
they turn inward, focusing attention on their personal growth, which may appear to others 
as being egocentric (Cook-Greuter, 2005; Torbert & Associates, 2004). As Cooper 
admitted (personal correspondence, April 2, 2012), he, like predicted for an Individualist, 
felt he has become less interested in the daily activities of his organization and admitted 
that he preferred a leadership style which is laissez-faire, leaving others to self-manage 
and not holding community members accountable for their commitments. 
Theme #3. Ambiguity Conundrum 
Although Cooper's responses were overwhelmingly from an Individualist point of 
view, a few prompts in the LDP reflected both a later (Strategist) and an earlier stage 
(Achieverj of leadership development. For example, reflecting the later stage of a 
Strategist, Cooper's responses to the LDP prompts displayed an appreciation and 
understanding of multiple perspectives on complex problems, and an ability to manage 
these complexities. For example, when prompted about the goal of community college 
education he responded that education should be a "universal right" and "intended for 
personal growth as well as social mobility." If that prompt had been answered from an 
Achiever point of view, for example, Cooper would have likely responded that the goal of 
a community college education would be career advancement because Achievers focus on 
goal obtainment. To offer a vantage point on how a leader at the Individualist 
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development stage might think and behave when compared to an earlier and later stage, I 
created the table below to offer a comparison of the three stages. These stages are not 
directly correlated to data on Cooper's behavior, but rather offer a general overview of 
predicted thinking, feeling and actions based on over 40 years of LDP testing. 
Table 7: Comparative Analysis of Three Stages of Leadership Development 








Yes Yes No 
Recognition of ill-
structured questions Yes Limited No 
Reflective work to 
test own and others 
assumptions and 
beliefs 
Yes Limited No 









Yes Very Limited No 
Accepts 
responsibility for 
results of own 
actions 
Yes Yes Limited d 
Created by Parker-Magagna, M. (2012) drawing upon the work of Torbert and Associates (2004); a An 
Achiever understands that people are different and must to negotiate a compromise to achieve goals, but 
does not an understand mutuality. b Individualists are beginning to understand the value of critical 
feedback (double-loop) but are not yet at the stage where they will seek it out on a regular basis. c 
Achievers are usually open to advice (single-loop) to correct their actions needed to achieve their goal. d 
Achievers accept responsibility for their own actions that clearly don't achieve their goals. However, when 
the goals themselves are the source of the problem, Achievers fail to reexamine their goals and instead have 
tendency to blame others for interfering or thwarting their efforts. 
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As the Table 7 indicates, an Individualist has the capacity to empathize with other 
viewpoints, particularly those in conflict with his own, but this position is contradicted by 
a tendency to listen but not act; that is, not doing the reflective work of testing his own or 
others' assumptions and beliefs. As a result, by paying attention to everything the 
Individualist may inadvertently create conflict by his refusal to take a stand or his failure 
to engage conflict in a meaningful way. This characteristic of an Individualist describes 
the reports of Cooper's inability or refusal to take a stand as described by the faculty in 
Part II. Since community colleges must operate within increasingly complex 
environments that entail many demands and rapid change, this complexity means that 
these colleges are facing problems that have moved from well-structured (established and 
concrete routines for solving them) to ill-structured (more ambiguous and contradictory 
processes)17 solutions. The cognitive and emotional capacity of the Individualist may 
still find himself "over his head" (p. 10) with the complexity of the environment (Kegan, 
1994). Cooper's self-reports about his conflicted feelings over the challenges he faced at 
Excel seem to reflect his feelings of "being over his head." 
For some at the Individualist stage, leadership is more difficult than for others. 
For example, some leaders are able to retain the drive and focus of their earlier stages, 
and "add" the new dimensions gained by the Individualist's perspectives. For these 
Individualists, this new stage builds successfully on earlier stages, enabling them to see 
leadership through a larger context of decision making than they did at an earlier stage. 
This, in turn, may lead toward participatory decision making. But the transition to the 
Individualist stage is usually not without personal confusion and less emphasis on goal 
17 Ill-structured problems have many possible definitions and answers, but even experts disagree (Mitroff & 
Emshoff, 1979; Oja & Reiman, 2007) 
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achievement for its own sake. Individualists become more inwardly directed, and develop 
a deeper concern for avoiding hypocrisy within themselves and others. They can seem 
aloof or unpredictable in their management behavior (Harthill, 2012; Cook-Greuter, 
2004; 2005; Torbert & Associates, 2004). In the next chapter, I examine the challenges 
of Cooper when seen through the mindset of an Individualist, but also offer some 
additional perspectives to help unravel the mystery of his behavior. 
Themes Converted Into Findings 
So that the reader can easily review the main themes and findings discussed in 
this chapter, Table 8 includes representative samples from interviews, observations, and 
documents, each with its related theme, research question, finding, and rationale for the 
finding. Following this table is a short narrative summary of the three main findings from 
data analysis discussed in this chapter. 
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Table 8: Thematic Code Conversions into Major Findings 
Example of support for theme Theme Question Finding Rationale for finding 
After system college presidents successfully 
negotiated with trustees for more autonomy over 
campus issues in broad strokes, Cooper failed to 
cease opportunities to test out new authorities. For 
example, when trustees pushed Excel to increase 
class sizes by threatening a system wide mandate, 
Cooper heatedly responded that his fellow 
presidents should not be punished and he raised 
class sizes at Excel. "There is a great deal of 
anxiety created, I tell you, that if you give an 
individual responsibilities and not give them 
authority to perform those responsibilities, you set 
up the situation for maximum anxiety in that 
person." (p.9)* 




Missed the opportunity for advocating 
and inquiring (learning) about how 
trustees saw key issues and to focus on 
systemic issues behind challenges to 
college. Tended to look to others to 
clarify his authority rather than 
recognizing that authority boundaries 
(especially during a system 
transformational change) were fluid and 
needed to be negotiated.. 
Cooper did not question the authority of the 
system administrators. Example: when 
administrators told Cooper that he couldn't hire 
for a vacancy (despite adequate funds in his 
college), he accepted their interpretation, (p. 11) 




Often accepted problems and solutions as 
defined by system administrators rather 
than exploring and challenging their 
assumptions. 
Cooper had promised Excel faculty that expansion 
of classes at their offsite academic center would be 
covered by system budget increases. When that 
did not materialize, Cooper focused on "the heat" 
he was taking from both the system and the school 
- did not recognize the academic challenges of 
stretching the faculty workload or using adjuncts 
without proper supervision, (p. 12-13) 




Saw trustees mandate to expand offsite 
academic center as a non-negotiable 
demand; unable to build alliances to 
balance competing demands from system 
and the school. 
Table 8: Thematic Code Conversion into Major Findings (Continued) 
Example of support for theme Theme Question Finding Rationale for finding 
Created new Executive Team which established 
new layer between Cooper and the faculty -final 
decisions were filtered through the committee, 
(pp. 15-16) Did not pursue dialogue with faculty to 
determine common points of agreement over 
definition of shared governance. (14-17) 
Disconnect over 
meaning of shared 
governance 
#1 Disengagement The creation of the new committee 
created a barrier which cut off informal 
dialogue and testing of potential options 
for solutions. 
Saw budget as a bifurcated problem - either he 
was in charge of decision making or the faculty 
was. Did not seem to recognize collaborative 
opportunities, (p. 16) Equated shared governance 
as faculty expecting a say in all decisions, (p. 17) 
Disconnect over 




Used a bureaucratic framework in 
analyzing various shared governance 
opportunities; Cooper left his 
assumptions untested. 
As new president, Cooper pledged shared 
governance and collaborative leadership based on 
collegiality, yet failed to seek common ground and 
buy-in on decisions such as new Executive Team 
with policymaking authority, (p. 15-16) 
Disconnect over 




Cooper articulated an Individualist's 
mindset in pledging shared governance 
but behaved as an Achiever in protecting 
his positional authority (Joiner & 
Josephs, 2007) 
Cooper made promises to fix the parking lot lights. 
When he was stalled by system administration, 
Cooper withdrew from informal visits because he 
"felt like a gelding." (p. 20) 
Demons of 
leadership 
#1 Disengagement Cooper avoided interaction with the 
faculty by retreating to his office instead 
of engaging in informal conversations 
with faculty. 
Cooper saw himself as healer and when he felt 
distrusted vacillated between blaming others and 





Blame and shame are characteristic of an 
Achiever's self-sealing protection against 
criticism 
Needed major external validation and direction for 





Cooper depended on others to run 
interference for him 
Table 8: Thematic Code Conversion into Major Findings (Continued) 
Example of support for theme Theme Question Finding Rationale for finding 
Cooper empowered new Executive Team to make 
policy decisions but he denied it. (p. 24) Lack of 
accountability for governance decision follow up 






Governance decision-making process 
subverted 
Governance structure creates confusion; 
annoyance and frustration among faculty because 
of Cooper's inability or unwillingness to clarify 
role. (pp. 24-25) Major shift away from decision­
making transparency, (pp. 26-27) 
Governance 
process curtailed 
#2 Disengagement Cooper failed to explain or create buy-in 
for his changes to the existing 
governance structure 
Cooper characterized concerns over lack of shared 
decision making as "dissonance." (p.29) (Cooper 
noted) "I see a contradiction in them wanting an 
"open participatory process" and a very rigid 
definition—wanting their voice in the process 
clearly defined." (p. 30) 
Participatory 
decision making as 
threat 
#2 Disengagement Cooper retreated from engaging in open 
dialogue about shared decision making. 
(Faculty said) without clear written rules 
institution may lose self-knowledge and 
governance, (p. 30) 
Participatory 




Cooper ignored requests to provide 
guidance on governance issues 
Some saw Cooper as unwilling to make tough; 
"doesn't want to rock the boat," not willing to risk 
failure; brings in too many people. (31-33) 
Risk Avoidance #2 Hunkering 
Down 
Cooper avoided risk by avoiding 
decisions or requiring widespread 
approval before deciding 
Table 8: Thematic Code Conversion into Major Findings (Continued) 
Example of support for theme Theme Question Finding Rationale for finding 
Cooper admitted that he likes to please and being 
well-liked is very important to him; has made 
decisions on that basis. Took criticisms of 
decisions personally. (34) Sees "challenging 
situations as negative -especially when it involves 
a difference of opinions." (p.32) 
Risk avoidance #2 Ego 
fluctuations 
Here risk avoidance is to avoid being 
criticized 
Cooper stopped talking informally with faculty; 
seen as "wobbly" and "invisible." (p.34) "An open 
door is not access, it's not visibility, (p.35) Failed 
to keep college members informed of his actions 




#2 Disengagement Cooper stayed in office which formalized 
conversations with faculty - they must 
come to see him, he did not come to see 
them. 
Failed to response to requests for long-term 
planning, addresses in small increments with no 
connection to long term plan (p.35) 
Unaddressed 




Leadership Development Profile 
assessment 
Test instrument (LDP) predicts fluctuation 
between convention and postconventional. 
Conventional represented by failure to question 
problems as defined by others; failure to question 
policies or goals as articulated by authority 
figures. Yet able to see some competing 
complexities but no framework as yet to manage; 
overwhelmed by too many choices, (p. 37) 
Mindset Dilemmas #3 Ego 
Fluctuations 
Leadership Development Profile 
assessment 
Table 8: Thematic Code Conversion into Major Findings (Continued) 
Example of support for theme Theme Question Finding Rationale for finding 
Test instrument (LDP) predicts fluctuation 
Between deflecting conflict by blaming others 
versus recognizing personal responsibility in 
conflicts but still unable to fully differentiate 





Leadership Development Profile 
assessment 
Test instrument (LDP) predicts Cooper's ability to 
indentify multiple perspectives (cognitive 
complexity) and his limited ability to tolerate 
ambiguity and uncertainty, (p.39) Cooper self-
reports anxiety created by uncertainty and 






Leadership Development Profile 
assessment 
— * Page numbers cited here refer to page numbers in this dissertation. Table prepared by Martha Parker-Magagna based on research data 
Three Findings from Data Collection and Analysis 
As noted in this chapter on Results, the following findings are a synthesis of self-
reports by President Cooper, combined with those of the faculty, and triangulated with 
school documents and my onsite observations. As is consistent with a postmodern 
approach to research, my findings are a synthesis of multiple views of reality and as such 
are my explanations. My three findings are: 
• Disengagement. The president disengaged and insulated himself from 
receiving disconfirming feedback from the faculty with regard to how he was 
handling challenges both from those at the school and with the community 
college system. This then closed off opportunities for mutuality and mutual 
openness to influence, cutting off an essential avenue for positive conflict 
engagement. This may be characterized as a form of unproductive coping 
behavior, where he protected himself from the anxiety of communications 
interactions but also prevented himself and others from learning opportunities. 
• Hunkering Down: President Cooper appeared torn between two cultures: one 
represented by the community college Trustees and staff, and a second 
represented by the Excel community college faculty. These cultures exerted 
force and demand on him, external adaptation and internal integration to resist 
the external. He appeared to struggle between the two cultures and although 
he wanted to reconcile them he did not seem to fully recognize the 
complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty (ill-structured nature of this situation), 
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or the ill-structured nature of the problems he and the College faced. He did 
not use the political or the symbolic frames, which work better in this situation 
than structural and human resources. Both cultures disagreed on the definition 
and potential solutions for the problem of their relationship and about the ill-
structured challenges facing the school. Cooper's hunkering down limited his 
cognitive and emotional lens rendering him unable to handle the mental 
complexities. His hunkering down was also unproductive coping behavior. 
• Leadership Development and Ego Fluctuations. President's Cooper's 
leadership strategies and experiences of conflict as predicted by the 
Leadership Development Profile (LDP) provided mixed results. Although the 
LDP predicted that Cooper operated primarily at the level of an Individualist, 
with early signs of a Strategist, my data reflected more frequent activity at the 
stage of an Achiever than suggested by the LDP. This led to the development 
of two alternative explanations. First, President Cooper's strategies reflected 
an Individualist's mindset, as predicted by the LDP. Second, Cooper's 
behavior reflected an Achiever's mindset which was induced by stressful 
circumstances in which he operated, and this second explanation suggested 
that President Cooper experienced a "fallback" (Torbert, 2004, p. 68) into a 
prior stage of leadership development. Fallback behavior is most frequently 
attributed to stressful conditions that exceed one's ability to productively 
cope. 
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In the next chapter, I analyze these three findings, offering data from my 
research to support them. In the final chapter I offer some conclusions, 





This chapter presents the findings from my study which was guided by three research 
questions: 
la. How does the president of a community college which is undergoing many 
changes experience conflict? 
lb. What are the president's strategies for responding to conflict? 
2. How do the faculty and staff of the community college perceive the president's 
strategies in response to conflict? 
3. What relationship, if any, exists between the president's experience of conflict and 
his stage of leadership development? 
In this chapter I summarize relevant portions of leadership and conflict research 
drawn from Chapter 2, then discuss three core findings which emerged from my analysis 
of the research participants' descriptions of conflict within the community college setting. 
Summary of Previous Discussion in Chapter 2 
Prior research in leadership studies took a functionalist view; there was a truth to 
be discovered and leaders were defined by their ability to exercise one-way authority and 
avoid disruption to the status quo. Instead of the traditional universal traits and behaviors 
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as a baseline, scholars in the last decade have turned their attention to leadership as a 
relational and interpretative interaction between an organizational leader and 
organizational members (Kezar, et al., 2006). The interpretation of leadership by 
organizational members has become important to understanding leadership effectiveness, 
and this in turn is impacted by the culture, context and conditions in which leadership is 
practiced (Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman & Gallos, 2011; 2006). 
Vaill (1989) captured the current tenor in leadership studies when he noted that in 
leadership today there appear to be no simple problems or single right or wrong answers 
but rather complex and novel dilemmas which a leader must contend with. He suggests 
that complexity, not simplicity, may have always been the norm but researchers simply 
missed or ignored it. For instance, what Wood (1983) defined as ill-structured problems 
that is, challenges which "cannot be defined with a high degree of completeness" and 
"cannot be solved with a high degree of certainty"(as cited in Oja & Reiman, 2007, p. 92) 
were the hallmarks of Cooper's experiences with the community college system and with 
Excel Community College. 
The role of conflict engagement has only recently begun to receive attention in 
leadership studies because of the need for collaborative teamwork. Conflict is the result 
of difference, and differences can be constructive and creative ways to develop new 
approaches to problems if relationships are grounded in an appreciation of difference, 
rather than only similarities. Conflict is neither positive nor negative in itself, rather, it 
becomes an extension of the intentions of those involved (Deutsch, 2000a; Pondy, 1992). 
Positive conflict engagement is essential to the modern organization, especially within 
academia which is based on the notion of free exchange of diverse ideas and an 
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appreciation of difference (Bolman & Gallos, 2011). Positive conflict engagement, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, depends on an openness to influence from others (mutuality), as 
well as reflective work ("bringing closure to situations that are uncertain by evaluating 
beliefs, assumptions and explanations against existing data and against other plausible 
interpretations of data," (King & Kitchner, 1994, pp. 6-7 as cited in Oja & Reiman, 
2007). The foundation for effective presidencies is the capacity to learn on the job and 
thereby continuing to improve organizational leadership skills and initiatives to 
encourage organizational learning (Birnbaum, 1992). 
In the analysis which follows, the three findings introduced and explicated in the 
previous Chapter: a) disengagement, b) hunkering down, and c) ego fluctuations are 
discussed in relation to the central research questions of this study and their relationship 
as responses to conflict tensions. 
Finding #1: Disengagement 
Introduction 
Answering questions lb and 2, President Cooper's strategies for dealing with 
conflict and latent conflict (tensions) at Excel could be characterized as disengagement 
through physical and psychological insulation or withdrawal (also known as conflict 
avoidance). At the college, he habitually withdrew from arduous conversations or 
avoided them altogether. Conflict avoidance is not a dysfunctional strategy unless it is 
overused or used for the wrong purposes. For example, conflict avoidance may be an 
effective choice when an issue is not pressing or important, if the time is not right 
because tensions have become too high to have a productive conversation or when others 
will be able to resolve the issue more effectively. However, conflict avoidance also has 
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formal settings), but he shut off a prime source for taking the pulse of the school and also 
sent a message that some topics were taboo. 
Stone et al. (2010) suggest that three of the reasons people shy away from open 
dialogues or what they term "difficult conversations" (p. 12) are an unwillingness to test 
assumptions (theirs and others), a fear of loss of emotional self-control and extreme 
reactions to self-doubt. Unwillingness to test assumptions might also be called the "what 
happened" debate because the reality of one person or group faces off against another 
either covertly or overtly. In the first instance, we assume our version of the situation is 
the one true version, rather than accepting that it is simply one version among several. 
When we assume we know the intentions of the other parties in the conflict we are prone 
to misinterpretation because others have mixed intentions or intentions that have gone 
awry. Often, our own surety of having good intentions blocks our need to hold intentions 
(both ours and others) as a "explanation, not a conclusion" (Stone, et al., 2010). For 
example, when his efforts to soothe the contentious feelings between the community 
college system and Excel were not acknowledged by the faculty and the faculty 
continued to complain about their treatment by the system office, Cooper began to 
assume that the faculty held him responsible for not mending the situation and took it as a 
personal criticism (918.8.24). However, as one faculty member reported, faculty at the 
school held much pent-up frustration at the system—but not at Cooper (113.8.29)—and 
had Cooper engaged in open dialogue to test assumptions he might have discovered the 
discrepancy between his assumptions and the assumptions of the faculty. 
In a second example, when Cooper created a new Executive Team and the faculty 
complained that it was replacing their traditional system of governance with an extra 
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bureaucratic layer, Cooper assumed the faculty's intentions were to become equal voting 
partners on all school decisions thereby usurping his authority as president (918.8.24). 
Faculty I spoke with said that Cooper was acting as an autocrat because he refused to 
engage in discussions to clarify the role and responsibilities of this new executive 
governing committee. The faculty members stated that their goal was to understand this 
new committee's role and accountability within the governance system (126.9.15b). 
Once again, if Cooper and the faculty had engaged in open dialogue, assumptions about 
intentions might have been clarified, thereby avoiding the conflict tensions which later 
developed over this issue. 
The second major block to open dialogue is commonly caused by a fear of losing 
control of one's feelings and appearing too emotional rather than rational and logical. To 
leave feelings out of a conversation is "like an opera without music" (Stone, et al., 2010). 
Generally, leaders have been taught to avoid emotions in tough conversations. As Stone, 
et al. (2010) pointed out, feelings are usually at the core of difficult conversations, so if 
feelings are ignored, the latent conflict remains. In addition, feelings have a way of 
"leaking" (p. 87) into conversations because feelings are a reflection of each person's life 
experience ("emotional footprint" p. 93). For some expressing anger is acceptable, while 
admitting shame or failure is not. Conflict will persist where feelings are not addressed 
(Stone, et al., 2010). In Getting Together (Stone, et al., 2010), the authors support the 
concept of integrating emotions into the reasoning process; emotions can inform and 
should not overwhelm. For example, Cooper said he had tried to project the image of a 
president who had the authority and autonomy to make needed changes at the college. 
The college needed improvements to their parking lot lights, and Cooper had assured 
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faculty and staff that this would be done within the year. However, after more than a 
year of delays from the system office, Cooper was told he would have to wait still longer. 
Instead of talking with the faculty, Cooper avoided the issue and the faculty eventually 
assumed he categorized it as a low priority. When I probed him about this issue in an 
interview, Cooper said that he "felt like a gelding" because his self image was of a person 
who could get things accomplished and rather than enduring the shame of not 
accomplishing those things, he preferred to ignore the subject (179.8.1). 
Disengagement from open dialogue also occurs through perceived threats to self-
identity. Few people are immune to an occasional tension-filled conversation which 
temporarily attacks their self-confidence and causes self-questioning about adequacy, 
competence or judgment. However, when taken to extremes, self-doubt can lead to self-
protective denial of criticisms or to excessive self-blame. With denial, we leave no room 
for any other reaction than what is positive about us and there simply is no room for 
negative feedback. For example, in denial, if we base our image of competence as being 
mistake free and if we get feedback that suggests otherwise, we focus instead on why the 
assessment is wrong not on how we might learn from the information. Self-doubt can 
also bring the opposite effect to denial—negative feedback causes an exaggerated feeling 
of total incompetence and a hopeless feeling that we are never going to improve (Stone, 
et al., 2010). 
President Cooper spoke of both types of responses. For example, when Cooper 
was criticized for his laissez-faire management style (particularly his failure to hold some 
faculty and staff accountable for commitments they made), Cooper responded by 
characterizing the organization as "immature." In a mature organization, he surmised, 
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people don't need reminders because they should self-manage. In another case, he spoke 
again about his anxieties caused by faculty and staff complaints about the community 
college system control over their college. Cooper said he felt "overwhelmed" and "like it 
was all his fault." He believed that the faculty and staff "couldn't see him as a person," 
and that they saw him as "the man"—the uncaring administrator (819.8.12). 
Cooper's reactions are common to almost 50% of college presidents. In one of the 
largest longitudinal studies of US college and university presidents (n=762), Birnbaum 
(1992) found that the longer presidents-who were rated as average by their faculty and 
fellow administrators-were in office, the more they tended to distance themselves from 
close interaction with the faculty and the less likely they were to be open to negative 
feedback. By contrast, presidents who were judged exemplary by their faculty had 
frequent informal interactions with faculty and were perceived to be open to faculty and 
staff influence (e.g. faculty and staff opinions were acknowledged during decision 
making, although faculty and staff might not necessarily agree with decisions). These 
presidents were also perceived to be quick to learn from their mistakes (Birnbaum, 1992). 
Sensemaking and Framing 
Sensemaking is the act of making meaning out of conversations and events as 
filtered through our personal interpretations of past experiences, self-identity, continual 
changes in the flow of information and environmental cues and expectations for what 
constitutes a credible action. Through this process people not only interprets but adjusts 
their thinking and understanding of the world (Lambert, et al., 2002). Framing is the act 
of suggesting how events might be interpreted and made sense of (Fairhurst & Sarr, 
1996). It is also the process of interpreting situations and events which enable 
123 
organizational members to make sense of their role in the organization and the world in 
which the organization exists. Presidents must be the framers of institutional reality— 
that is, initiating open discussion about why a decision was made and how it impacts 
people in the organization (Bolman & Gallos, 2011; Eddy, 2005; Eddy, 2010; Heifetz, et 
al., 2009; Kezar, et al., 2006). This does not imply that presidents should become a 
master of propaganda or self-aggrandizement, but rather that they recognize that it is their 
job to offer a focus and point of view for organizational members about activities which 
affect their organization. If this is left unattended, then organizational members are left 
to fill in the blanks using their own frames (Birnbaum, 1992). It is an interactive process 
and presidents need feedback from campus members because they need to be able to 
adjust their understanding of events, and to adjust their choices for communications 
based on this continual feedback. Campus members need the president's input because 
the president is the chief policymaker for the school. Framing and sensemaking require 
continuous readjustments because problems arise which need to be discussed and 
conversations and actions may lead to misinterpretations and latent conflict (Eddy, 2005; 
Eddy, 2010; Kezar & Eckel, 2002). 
Cooper's insulation from informal interaction with the faculty meant that he 
missed valuable opportunities to frame or interpret his actions to the faculty and staff. 
This framing could have been crucial to building faculty support for his decisions and 
would have allowed him to adjust his decisions based on feedback in order to address 
organizational tensions. For example, President Cooper's disengagement from walking 
around the school and ceasing to talk informally with faculty and staff adversely 
impacted his ability to help faculty and staff to make sense of why he created a new 
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senior level decision-making Executive Team. As noted earlier, to most of the faculty the 
move appeared to add an unnecessary bureaucratic layer and to be in direct contradiction 
to the governance decision-making processes already in place. The move created 
confusion, anxiety and uncertainty among faculty and staff. Without Cooper's assistance 
in interpreting this action—other than to respond to comments by saying that it had been 
done in other schools—the faculty was left to make their own interpretations. Cooper's 
lack of effort to explain or otherwise make sense of his actions was considered by the 
faculty to be in direct opposition to his promise of participatory decision making which 
he pledged during his presidential job interviews. Some began to view Cooper as 
behaving more like an autocratic administrator rather than a collegial president. 
If a leader makes significant changes which curtail or change information flows and 
decision-making processes but fails to take advantage of opportunities to frame the 
changes, then confusion, doubt, uncertainty build which then lead to tensions and anxiety 
(Bolman & Gallos, 2011; Kezar, et al., 2006). In order to manage the tensions inherent in 
any change process, organizational members need opportunities to talk about the 
changes. This circles back to the original issue of disengagement. Framing is most 
effective during daily and informal moments, and sensemaking occurs not only at formal 
events such as school-wide forums or leadership meetings (Bolman & Gallos, 2011; 
Eddy, 2010; Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996). Leaders who become disconnected from the day-
to-day life of the school gradually become seen by faculty and staff as "insular, 
unapproachable or authoritarian" (p.32) because the distance between president and 
faculty is already established by hierarchical status differences. Therefore, the president 
needs to work to create a balanced approach to the school culture (Birnbaum, 1992). 
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Cooper perceived persistent faculty questioning about the role of the new 
Executive Team as a "them versus us" problem. Cooper framed the problem as faculty 
"overstepping their bounds" and as "wanting a say in everything" (918.8.24). He also 
interpreted faculty persistence as a challenge to his authority and autonomy as president 
(926.8.24). The faculty began to look at the Executive Team creation as an example of 
Cooper's disregard for faculty voices. As one faculty member commented, the lack of 
inclusion in decision making was "treating] us like babies" (11.6.1). However, if 
Cooper had tested his assumptions with the faculty, Cooper might have discovered that 
his assumption of faculty intentions (desiring one person, one vote) was erroneous and 
that he might have used the debate as a learning opportunity by working out a mutually 
acceptable solution. 
In retrospect, Cooper shut himself off from the disquieting dissonance that is 
characteristically part of difficult conversations. In doing so, he cut himself off from the 
information flow (including feelings) among faculty and staff that he as a leader needed 
in order to successfully negotiate challenges in his organizational environment. Cooper 
missed important opportunities to test assumptions (both his and others) and to help 
organizational members make sense of his actions while encouraging a collaborative 
problem-solving environment. 
These two core competencies for conflict engagement discussed in this finding-
open dialogue and sensemaking/framing-offer one lens on President Cooper's strategies 
for managing conflict. These core competencies fall under the general function of 
communications, which is perhaps one of the most important functions of a president 
(Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman & Gallos, 2011). Communications are not limited to writing 
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and talking but also are represented in behavior (Eddy, 2005). Cooper's disengagement 
from the faculty of Excel affected two key elements for a positive conflict engagement 
process. First, by maintaining open "learning" conversations on a regular basis with 
faculty in order to take the pulse of the school Cooper could have continually tested his 
own and others' assumptions and points of view, thereby exposing errors and 
misinterpretations by matching actions to outcomes (Eddy, 2005). Second, through his 
disengagement, Cooper abdicated his role (Schein, 2004) as the chief interpreter of 
ambiguous and uncertain events, leaving it to organizational members to "make sense" of 
events on their own. 
Finding #2: Hunkering Down 
Introduction 
The next finding explores the relationship of the president's organizational 
behavior to conflict engagement. As a continuation of the previous discussion addressing 
questions lb and 2 (Cooper's self-report about his conflict engagement strategies, and the 
faculty's reports on the same), I argue that Cooper used a narrow cognitive focus in 
attempting to decipher and address the problems facing the school. He misdiagnosed 
important and ambiguous problems due to his cognitive perspective and he failed to take 
into account the critical importance of organizational culture as a medium through which 
leaders work. By limiting his cognitive perspective he misread the conditions of change 
at the community college system level and also lost opportunities to lead and use conflict 
as a learning and problem-solving event. His activities engendered frustration and 
tension at Excel Community College. 
127 
Cognitive Complexity 
Cognitive complexity is the ability to analyze situational choices through a variety 
of perspectives grounded in time and place (Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman & Deal, 2003; 
Kezar, et al., 2006). A cognitive frame not only directs us to what we think is worth 
paying attention to but also acts as a block to other perspectives. Each vantage point is a 
frame of reference or conceptual map for interpreting situations, problems, and potential 
solutions (Bolman & Gallos, 2011). Frames are important for understanding the 
significance of Cooper's choices because they governed both what he did and did not see. 
Four major cognitive frames undergird the academic environment: bureaucratic, 
collegial, political and symbolic (Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman & Deal, 1991 ; Bolman & 
Gallos, 2011). 
Community college presidents who see their roles through a bureaucratic lens 
focus on structure and organization, emphasizing policies, process and established lines 
of authority. Presidents who use a collegial frame are believers in teams, collective 
action, open communication and empowerment. They are likely to see themselves as 
coaches and facilitators for group decision making and often refer to their leadership style 
as leading by example. Presidents who see their role through a political frame focus on 
building coalitions for support and decision making, keeping lines of communications 
open, negotiating compromises and treating conflict as a natural part of the process. 
Presidents who favor the symbolic frame focus on the culture, values and history of their 
colleges. They believe their roles are to foster a shared sense of purpose and beliefs 
among organizational members. As we shall see later, these four frames are also the 
foundations for understanding academic culture, that is, each frame contributes to what 
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the school values, the institutional norms and how faculty and staff interpret effective 
leadership (Bergquist, 1992; Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman & Gallos, 2011). 
Each frame offers a different but important perspective for defining and 
responding to organizational problems. The frames that a president chooses to emphasize 
also send a signal to organizational members as to what to expect of their president 
(Bergquist, 1992; Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman & Gallos, 2011). For example, when 
President Cooper interviewed for his job at Excel Community College, Cooper's 
administrative platform promised all four frames. He spoke of a collegial approach to 
governance (shared decision making, leading by example), a political approach (scanning 
the environment for opportunities, building networks of support), a bureaucratic or 
managerial approach (referencing his experience and degrees, MBA, Ed.D.) and a 
symbolic approach (supporting the college's values of transparency, accountability, 
empowerment and inclusion) (Document 16). 
Given the great promise of his presidency, what happened? Cooper appeared to 
have a good grasp of the context and the culture, yet in less than three years he had 
"hunkered down," relying almost entirely on a bureaucratic approach. He had lost the 
confidence of many of the faculty; he felt anxiety-ridden by the demands from both the 
school and the community college system. I propose that the problems facing the college 
were far more ambiguous, complex and uncertain than Cooper was prepared for and that 
while Cooper had a conceptual grasp of the leadership demands of a college president, as 
a first-time president he had no practical experience and therefore was overwhelmed by 
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the demands of the job.19 This is not to say that a first-time president is incapable of 
managing leadership complexity. But in order to manage complexity, a leader needs a 
multi-frame strategy to effectively manage ill-structured situations and problems. The 
challenge of ill-structured problems is not their complexity but the uncertainty of a good 
solution. A complex, well-defined problem, for example, would be a logistical question 
about the site of a new medical lab for the best environmental advantage, and an expert 
environmental architect or engineer would easily be able to solve the problem. But some 
problems in organizations cannot be solved with technical expertise because the problems 
are both complex and ambiguous, and people cannot agree on how to define the real 
problem nor be certain that their proposed solutions will work. 
Ambiguous Questions 
One of the most contentious issues for Cooper at Excel was his restructuring of 
the governance system along more traditional bureaucratic lines. The faculty saw this as 
a contradiction to his promise of participatory decision making, although Cooper himself 
did not see it that way. Although the previous system was by no stretch of the 
imagination a true shared governance (faculty did not participate in decision making on 
equal footing with the president), but by faculty accounts, the system enabled faculty to 
have input and they felt their voices were heard and respected. As one faculty member 
recalled, their former president had always called a quick administrative meeting when 
decisions needed to be made and the entire faculty were included. The faculty member 
noted that if the former president made decisions with which they disagreed, at least they 
19 In addition, Cooper built his career in academic development and fund-raising and had no faculty 
administrative experience. His wife, however, was a long-time faculty member at another college so he 
had a trusted ally. 
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were briefed by the president about the reasons for the decision and had been given an 
opportunity to provide their input (49.10.28). 
From the beginning of his presidency, Cooper had promised and appeared to 
deliver on his collegial approach. During his first two years, when the college was 
undergoing its first regional accreditation as a community college, Cooper was actively 
involved in working with faculty and staff on governance issues. For example, he 
instituted school-wide committees to revise the school mission statement and to outline 
the college strategic plan. But around the same time, he also began to convene his senior 
administrators in what he called his Executive Team or president's cabinet for what he 
termed informal conversations. This did not appear to circumvent normal governance 
functions until faculty began to see that some critical decisions were being made by the 
Executive Team and these meetings were not documented, unlike other governance 
committee meetings. As faculty leaders pressed Cooper to explain the committee's role 
and function, Cooper denied that it had any function other than to discuss issues. 
Although it was within Cooper's prerogative to create new governance structures, 
the fact that he did not feel obligated to consult the faculty was in direct contradiction to 
his original pledge. He reported that he believed he had instituted shared governance, but 
in a form slightly different than the faculty expected. He felt the Executive Team was 
highly collaborative-decisions were made by consensus among the four top 
administrators. Cooper was only able (or willing) to see the limitations of his bureaucratic 
perspective. 
20 Cooper said that he originally convened the Executive Team in response to pressure from the then senior 
vice president of academic affairs Zelda Thatcher. 
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To the rest of the faculty, however, the Executive Team was neither a 
representation of inclusivity nor fair process. As Birnbaum (2004) pointed out, in 
normative environments, procedural justice—the process of decision making—is what 
gives decisions their legitimacy. Although former presidents of Excel made the 
decisions, they had been highly consultative and faculty felt included in the governance 
process. Under Cooper's new system, faculty were seldom consulted and felt they had no 
input into important decisions. The Executive Team was not codified in writing for 
several years, until a new vice president of academic administration took office and 
prepared the document. In addition, over several years Cooper changed the role of the 
President's Council from a body that made recommendations to the president to one that 
offered informational input with no recommending power. The All-College Forums, 
under Cooper's leadership, moved from policy discussions to informational 
announcements, which as one faculty noted, "could have been sent through email" 
(254.9.5). 
In recent years, shared governance in community colleges has become one of the 
most important ill-structured questions which presidents face. The American Association 
of Community Colleges recently called for collaborative decision making and shared 
governance yet few community college presidents and faculty have had experience in this 
role. Cooper approached this issue with the certitude of a well-defined problem. As the 
faculty began to push for clarification of their role, Cooper dug in and the issue escalated 
into tensions between the faculty and Cooper. Instead of exploring the issue (e.g. 
exploring beliefs and assumptions about shared governance and explaining his beliefs) 
and using it as a learning opportunity to build a closer relationship with the faculty, 
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Cooper interpreted these efforts as pushing for a "rigid system" and wanting "a say in 
everything" as exemplified by the "one person, one vote" governance process (90.8.9A). 
From my interviews with Cooper, I deduced that the committee had become the chief 
decision-making body in slow incremental steps and that its creation was as much a 
protective (hunkering down) move by Cooper as it was a bureaucratic decision (he 
claimed that it streamlined the decision-making process). The new committee sheltered 
him from the anxiety he complained about as discussed in Finding #1. 
Expediency or Pedagogy? 
Ill-structured problems can seldom be tackled successfully alone and from only 
one point of view. Because the boundaries or parameters are unclear and the potential 
solutions equally unclear and uncertain, multiple perspectives are critical (Heifetz, 1994). 
But with multiple perspectives also comes the need to sort through the underlying values, 
beliefs and assumptions of those who are trying to solve the problem. For example, when 
the community college system Trustees mandated that Cooper increase class sizes and 
step up the expansion of classes at Excel's offsite academic center, the problem was 
complex and ambiguous. However, both Cooper and the Trustees appeared to approach 
it as a complex but routine problem (one that has a clear definition and a selection of 
authoritative solutions) by asking the faculty to do more and perhaps hiring adjuncts to 
teach. But problems often begin before they present themselves as problems. For 
example, some faculty questioned why Cooper had not been able to negotiate better 
terms, some were concerned about unfair workload increases, and some saw it as 
punishment for being outspoken critics of the system in previous years. Cooper, by 
contrast, interpreted the problem as compliance with trustee demands. Class size 
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increases and the expansion were non-negotiable mandates in Cooper's eyes. To solve 
this problem, according to Cooper, the school had to stretch its resources. 
However, as several faculty reported, they saw the issue as more than a resource 
issue. They believed the Trustees demands called into question fundamental issues about 
the academic integrity of Excel pedagogy, especially among the liberal arts faculty who 
were to bear most of the burden. Their pedagogy was based on constructed learning, 
where a student learned by doing, especially in their composition classes. This was a 
slower, more labor-intensive method of teaching, but had yielded excellent results in term 
of student preparation for transfer to four-year colleges.21 This pedagogy required small 
class sizes, which was a priority for the faculty. Yet also important to Excel was its 
mission to enable access to all students regardless of their academic preparation. This 
meant accommodating more students, increasing enrollments and offering more and 
larger classes. The conflict between deeply held pedagogical principles of small class 
sizes and the need for expanded course offerings and class sizes required reflective work, 
that is, a discussion among faculty and Trustees about their values, beliefs and 
assumptions in order to reframe the problem so as to include compatible goals from both 
the school and system Trustees. However, the problem remained fractured between 
frames: the Trustees' point of view of selling more college credits to produce more 
income, Cooper's need to comply with the Trustees' demands, and the faculty feeling 
stretched to do more without adequate attention to pedagogical issues. The core 
ambiguous, uncertain and complex problem remained unaddressed, which caused 
21 In several cases, general education and liberal arts studies graduates were able to skip their senior year in 
college and transfer directly into a Master's program. 
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frustration, tensions and feelings among faculty of being abandoned to the whims of the 
system (72.9.1). 
Conflict is often embedded in ill-structured questions not only because ill-
structured questions have no single right answer but also because the questions 
themselves are assumed to be well-structured with known solutions that have worked 
well in the past. If Cooper had been able to tap his wider potential to see these challenges 
from multiple perspectives and had invited open discussions, rather than "hunkering 
down," perhaps he might have been able to report a more positive outcome in his 
relationships with his faculty. 
Organizational Culture 
Culture has been defined in many ways, from Schein's assessment that it is shared 
values, beliefs and assumptions (Schein, 2004) to answers to questions like how are 
things one around here? (Tierney, 2008). From Birnbaum's (1992) study of academic 
presidents, he concluded that providing interpretations and reflections of events and 
administrative decisions both within the school and from the external environment is one 
of the most important roles of a president. When a president fails to perform that 
function, academic cultures suffer because they are built on principles of mutuality 
between the faculty and the president. Was Cooper unusually myopic in failing to 
envision or act upon his multiple roles as a college president? Birnbaum (1992) found 
that most first-time presidents used only a bureaucratic/managerial frame in 
understanding their academic role and Bensimon (1989) found that particularly true 
among first-time community college presidents. As reported in Finding #1, over half of 
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college presidents have estranged themselves and "hunkered down" within five years of 
their presidency (Birnbaum, 1992). 
Finding #3: Ego Maturity Fluctuations 
Introduction 
In this discussion, I address questions la and 3. To gauge Cooper's stage of 
leadership development, I used the Leadership Development Profile instrument. The 
history of its application and validity for measuring leadership were addressed in 
previous chapters. In this finding, I conclude that the Leadership Development Profile 
can only partially explain Cooper's self-reports (see Chapter 4, Results). As discussed in 
the last chapter, President Cooper was profiled at the level of an Individualist, with early 
(emerging) Strategist reasoning patterns. This development stage only partially accounts 
for data drawn from my interviews, emails from Cooper, observations and studies of 
school documents. Cooper, based on my data, appears to also operate at least some of the 
time at a development level of an Achiever, which would represent a "fallback" (Torbert 
& Associates, 2004, p. 68) to the previous reasoning stage. In the following analysis, I 
suggest two alternative explanations for Cooper's experiences and responses to conflict. 
Explanation A: Individualist Confusion 
The following is a brief recap of the Individualist mindset profile as it pertains to 
experiencing conflict. According to the Leadership Development Profile, President 
Cooper has made the transition from conventional to postconventional action logics. This 
is a major transformative perspective shift in that reality and truth are no longer seen as 
objective and waiting to be discovered and are now understood as a social construction 
with each person bringing their own interpretation. For some Individualists, this leads to 
136 
confusion and sense of loss as principles which were once seen as immutable are now 
seen as relative and contingency-based. If all opinions could be right, how does one 
resolve conflict? In some cases "decision paralysis" (Torbert & Associates, 2004, p. 102) 
takes hold. At this stage, some Individualists may become more interested in their self 
development than in their professional work (Torbert & Associates, 2004). 
Individualists have a number of good leadership qualities. An Individualist moves 
away from an emphasis on achievement and professional accomplishments as a major 
determinant of self-esteem and begins to look behind the mirror to see herself in terms of 
the image created and compare it to what the inner person may be. Individualists, unlike 
the earlier Achiever stage, become more comfortable with their faults and this extends to 
a new acceptance of faults in others. Individualists are interested not just in what people 
do but why they do it. An Individualist can now take in multiple perspectives, and unlike 
an earlier stage, the Individualist not only knows that different people have different 
opinions, values, beliefs, but she begins to understand them on a more cognitive and 
emotional level. This can lead to the growth of empathy, the ability to take on the 
emotional perspective of another. Individualists are not frightened or threatened by 
difference, but some may be confused by it. With their new-found lens of social 
constructivism rather than an unquestioning reliance on positivism, an Individualist may 
feel like there are too many ideas to consider and no process in place for how to manage 
or prioritize those ideas (Cook-Greuter, 2005; Joiner & Josephs, 2007; Torbert, 1987; 
Torbert & Associates, 2004). 
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Each stage has a potential for blind spots. Some of the blind spots which were 
predicted by Cooper's responses, as an Individualist, to prompts in the Leadership 
Development Profile included a tendency not to synthesize disparate pieces of 
information or ideas, but rather to treat them as separate and distinct variables. Cooper 
also demonstrated an Individualist's propensity to be confused or overwhelmed by 
ambiguous problems which had no (or too many) authoritative answers from which to 
choose. He also admitted to not holding people accountable for their commitments and 
did not actively seek out alternative opinions to test out his own assumptions or the 
assumptions of others about problems facing the school. The following analysis 
compares the results of his predicted behavior based on the Leadership Development 
Profile to actual self-reports of his experiences. 
One Variable at a Time. If Cooper is operating at the stage of an Individualist, 
Cooper is likely to identify causes of problems, but only in sections, like pieces of an 
unassembled puzzle (Harthill LDP, 2012). The ability to hold two diametrically opposed 
ideas and to see their connectedness is new to someone at the Individualist stage. An 
example of how this exemplifies Cooper's idea of management is his response to faculty 
requests to develop a process for shared governance. Cooper recalled that the faculty 
wanted an "open participatory process, but they began approaching it from a very rigid 
[perspective] wanting to see their voice defined" (8.9.11). Cooper did not appear to 
connect the idea of creating a process with the content of having some sort of a voice in 
decision making. Cooper repeatedly interpreted the faculty's request for a process and 
clarification of their role as their expectation that they "would have a say in everything" 
(769.7.18.11). He did not understand the faculty's purpose in wanting assurance of 
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inclusion in participatory decision making because he was solely focused on what he 
assumed the form of that inclusion to be (i.e. a formal process of checks and balances). 
Individualists tend to limit the variables (i.e. pieces of information they can't understand 
*)*) 
or coordinate by missing the point). 
This is rather ironic given that Cooper was involved in the same struggle for 
clarification of his own autonomy and authority with the Board of Trustees. On several 
occasions he spoke about his anxiety in his role as a president in not having a clearly 
articulated agreement with the Trustees as to his rights and responsibilities. "There is a 
great deal of anxiety created, I tell you, that if you give an individual responsibilities and 
not give them authority to perform those responsibilities, you set up the situation for 
maximum anxiety in that person"(555.8.4A). Cooper interpreted his personal dilemma 
from both a cognitive and emotional perspective, but he seemed unable to have empathy 
(emotional perspective taking) for the faculty. Complex and ambiguous ideas are 
recognized by Cooper but processed as separate and unconnected elements. One might 
argue that he was still using a linear reasoning process 
Decisions under Ambiguity and Uncertainty. Characteristic of some leaders at the 
Individualist stage, decision making is made more difficult because the old sureties, 
based in a belief of objective reality, are no longer relevant. The Individualist looks at 
reality as a social construction but has yet to develop a full set of operating principles to 
handle the influx of new perspectives. Relativity overtakes objectivity and may lead to 
emotional and cognitive confusion (Cook-Greuter, 2005; Torbert & Associates, 2004). 
The change is particularly difficult for leaders who are asked to make complex decisions 
22 Although as I will discuss in the next segment, the Achiever does this habitually. 
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under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty, as Cooper was asked to do. As president 
he tried to mediate the contentious relationship between the school and the system—with 
both sides taking the stand that they were right and the other side was wrong. Cooper, in 
this Individualist stage, was stuck in the middle; he could see the merit in both sides, but 
had yet to question the underlying assumptions of both sides, and to explore the values, 
beliefs and assumptions of each that would be critical to turn the "them vs. us" into a 
mutual problem to be solved. 
For example, Cooper supported the expansion of the offsite academic center and 
had promised the faculty that the center would not take resources away from Excel's 
main campus. He recalled that the faculty kept pushing him to clarify how he would 
ensure that resources were not diminished, and, at the same time, the Trustees were 
demanding that he ensure that the academic center got full support. He felt caught in the 
middle. He could see the merits of both sides, but he did not attempt to sort out the 
underlying assumptions behind each position. As a result, Cooper encouraged the faculty 
to volunteer to teach at the new center but did not require it, and reported (with pride) that 
he publically thanked each faculty member who had volunteered (303.9.16). This 
strategy led to tensions in the school because some felt that he had reneged on his 
promises. Others saw it as being "wishy-washy" and that Cooper needed to be stronger 
in declaring a position (2.11.9.11). 
However, Cooper was not universally seen as a decision avoider. A faculty 
member who almost unanimously was considered to be the informal leader of the school 
reported that she found he was not afraid to make the difficult decisions. She described 
several occasions when she met with him and she said, "Once I laid out the issues and 
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explained them, he was always very good about making a decision" (31.10.38). A 
possible explanation is that the faculty member may have organized, prioritized and 
explained the implications of the issues so that Cooper felt confident making a decision. 
This would be consistent with the behavior of an Individualist who is aware of complex 
issues but has not yet figured out how to sort competing positions to make a decision 
(Torbert & Associates, 2004). 
Accountability Issues. In reviewing the description of an Individualist which I 
supplied to him, (Harthill Consulting Ltd, 2012), Cooper wrote to me that some of the 
statements resonated with him. For example, he admitted that he was reluctant to judge 
others, even when behaviors might seem border line unethical to others, because he 
believed that there were many different valid opinions to be tolerated. He characterized 
himself as someone better prepared to run a mature organization, which he defined as 
organizational members who are willing and able to direct themselves with only 
occasional coaching from the president (Cooper, personal correspondence, 3.2.12). This 
is typically described as a "laissez-faire" leadership style (Goethals, Sorenson, & Burns, 
2004). This style has led to several tensions in the school. For example, Excel's culture 
was reflected in the principles of faculty accountability. The faculty was required to file 
minutes of governance meetings in a timely manner for access online and through printed 
copies in the library. This policy was the linchpin for tracking decisions and measuring 
outcomes. Otherwise, as one faculty told me, "we won't remember who was responsible 
for what and things wouldn't get done. This is an easy reminder system" (26.3.10.12). 
Traditionally the president, as the final authority, would intervene if a committee lagged 
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too far behind. However, Cooper never exerted any pressure on anyone to file reports, 
which led to a belief that Cooper was not concerned with accountability (113.8.29). This 
perceived lack of accountability carried over to other issues with his performance, 
according to some faculty. For example, in response to the successful work of a faculty-
staff led budget committee which provided ideas and strategies for needed budget 
reductions, Cooper had promised to reconvene the committee as a long-term financial 
planning advisory body. However, despite emails and meetings from the faculty to show 
their interest and urge action, Cooper continually postponed making a decision, citing a 
variety of reasons including that the Executive Team was still sorting things out. 
Although these excuses were accepted for a period of time, as one faculty explained, it 
became clear that he had no intention of continuing the budget committee, but he failed to 
follow up or explain why (115.9.15). 
Tug Between Unilateral and Collaborative Thinking. Although wxlndividualist 
seeks to move towards collaboration in decision making and team efforts, collaboration is 
often not clearly defined in the Individualist's own mind. For some, it is tapping creative 
potential to tackle tough problems as a team, listening to a variety of diverse viewpoints 
and trying to orchestrate a group decision by consensus (also known as the cooperative 
model of problem-solving).23 When an Individualist is feeling confident, he may try on 
different ideas and enjoy the new sense of importance as a leader in problem-solving, 
rather than a being an independent problem-solver (relying only on his internal voice for 
2 3 1  m a k e  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  c o l l a b o r a t i v e  a n d  c o o p e r a t i v e  t o  m a k e  t h e  p o i n t  t h a t  c o o p e r a t i v e  p r o b l e m -
solving does not try to address underlying differences, i.e. conflicts among parties, but agrees to put them 
aside in favor of solving a problem. Collaborative uses differences to stimulate getting problems on the 
table for discussion and works to find a solution that meets the interests of all parties (Wilkinson, 2002). 
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decision making). For other Individualists, the new awareness many spark the feeling of 
futility in trying to focus and direct problem-solving because many solutions could do 
just as well because nothing is certain (Cook-Greuter, 2005; Joiner & Josephs, 2007; 
Torbert & Associates, 2004). In these circumstances, problem-solving tends to "just 
happen" or evolves from a cooperative process but rarely a collaborative one (Wilkinson, 
2006). 
Individualists may also be self-authoring, that is, they have a tendency to consult 
themselves as the final authority (rather than including the views of others). Consulting 
with others seems more of a double check but not a reexamination of their definition of 
the problem or proposed solutions for the problem (Joiner & Josephs, 2007). They are 
generally not team players. This reflects the unilateral thinking of Individualists, which 
is more apparent in the earlier stage of Achievers, which I will address in the next section. 
Cooper seemed to reflect this tug-of-war between the unilateral and the 
collaborative. On the one hand, during Cooper's first year and a half he actively 
encouraged participation by the entire school in the development of an updated mission 
statement and strategic plan. He was also actively involved in department chair 
meetings, as well as the President's Council and All-College Forums. Yet he became less 
collaborative, or so it seemed, when he created the Executive Team as the highest 
oversight committee in the school. Although he was aware of the faculty's concerns 
about the Executive Team, he dismissed the concerns without initiating an open dialogue 
with them. As a result, the faculty saw Cooper as not only uncollaborative but also 
autocratic in having made the decision and implementing it without any discussion with 
the faculty. In addition, Cooper's reconfiguration of governance processes—leaving the 
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structure in place but changing bit by bit the functions, for example, when he changed the 
President's Council from a decision making/recommending body to an informational 
discussion group—was in direct contradiction to his stated philosophy of creating a 
participatory, collaborative decision-making process at Excel (Document, 16; interview 
8.10.11). From Cooper's perspective, however, the Executive Team was participatory, 
but on a different scale. He cut the number of participants to four chief administrators, 
and his meeting style with them was built on cooperation and consensus. In my 
conversations with Cooper, he said he could not understand why the faculty objected to 
the Executive Team. 
Explanation B: Achiever "Fallback" 
Introduction. In this section, I explore another explanation based on adult 
complexity theory which suggests that a "fallback" (Torbert & Associates, 2004, p. 68) 
may have occurred with President Cooper. The previous explanation examined President 
Cooper's experience and strategies toward conflict through the lens of an Individualist. 
The Individualist mindset provided insight into his accountability issues, his swings from 
unilateral to collaborative-type behavior, his difficulty with sorting out complex and 
ambiguous ideas and connecting these ideas into a coherent whole. However, there are 
certain experiences and strategies that Cooper and/or the faculty described that do not fit 
the profile of an Individualist. Cooper's self-reports appear to reflect the developmental 
profile of an earlier leadership stage, and in the case of his insulation or disengagement 
from interaction with the faculty, his actions may reflect a retreat to one or two stages 
earlier. Fallback is the state of a person literally retreating into an earlier form of 
thinking and behavior. The fallback is temporary (Torbert & Associates, 2004) and 
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usually occurs when a person is in a very stressful environment, feels overwhelmed and 
reverts (Torbert & Associates, 2004).24 
President Cooper often expressed his anxiety about the Excel environment during 
our interviews. He used terms such as "highly stressful, "much more than I had 
bargained for," "have developed a thick skin," (102-125.7.15). Based on these 
conversations, and the results as reported in Chapter 4,1 determined that it would be 
appropriate to develop a second explanation to explore President Cooper's conflict 
experiences. Unless otherwise indicated, I am exploring President Cooper's behavior as 
a fallback to the earlier developmental stage of an Achiever. 
Blame and Shame. In reviewing the data, President Cooper on several occasions 
made reference to situations which could best be described as blame and shame. For 
example, when referring to faculty and staff questions about his role with the system 
office, he called it "constant testing" (100.8.12). He equated it to being blamed (lumped 
in) with former presidents of the school who were seen as autocrats (109.8.12). Cooper 
could not conceptually separate his role as president from his role as a person. He 
recalled, "It was really shocking to me ... that people here just couldn't see me- the 
person" (890.8.12). This conceptual pattern is reflective of an Achiever mental 
framework. An Achiever can not separate himself from his role. This is because an 
Achiever is still at the conventional logic stage where one's identity (intrapersonal self) is 
24 Another approach to fallback might be better termed "intentional fallback" which is when a person 
chooses to operate at an earlier stage because he thinks the situation calls for it (J. Amgwerd, personal notes 
from Torbert lecture, 2012, Anaheim, California). I chose not to explore the intentional fallback because 
based on my conversations with President Cooper I saw no evidence of this. Also, the literature does not 
provide a sense of the duration of "temporary." 
145 
still embedded in external, rather than internal, self-approval. Conventional logic creates 
a self-sealing system for the Achiever. The Achiever does not realize that he is the 
architect of his own system but rather thinks of himself as a player within a master 
system of which he is a part. As an Achiever, the focus is still very much on the self 
rather than others, and the definition of self is in terms of achievement of goals and ideals 
(Cook-Greuter, 2000; 2005; Joiner & Josephs, 2007; Torbert, 1987). 
The focus on achievements also has implications for why Cooper chose to 
disengage from informal walks around the school when he felt that he was blamed for not 
fixing the problems between the school and the community college system. "I wanted to 
be perceived as an engaged leader who was successful at making things better" 
(898.12.16). An Achiever feels shame or guilt for not fulfilling their ideals and goals. 
This may help to explain why Cooper said that when things with the system were not 
improving he felt he was being blamed for not "advocating strongly enough" (880.12.16) 
and that it was "all [his] fault" (900.12.16). When he promised to improve the parking 
lot lights at the school and was delayed by system bureaucracy, Cooper recalled that he 
could not face telling faculty and staff about yet another delay because he said that if he 
told them that he didn't have the authority (and autonomy) to improve the lighting, he 
would "look like a gelding" (179.8.11). If Cooper's experiences and behavior are 
considered through the lens of an Achiever, then it would make sense that he would feel 
deep shame and guilt because he could not distinguish between failing to deliver on 
certain goals and failing as a person and professional. This might explain why he said 
that he began avoiding situations where he thought he might be asked about things he had 
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no power to change. At an Achiever stage the ego is still too fragile to separate out one's 
perception of self worth from one's actions (Torbert, 1987). 
This is not to say that as a leader develops maturity in the role that these feelings 
go away. But the difference is that an Achiever's need to produce visible achievements 
so outweighs other cognitive and emotional processes that an Achiever can become his 
own worst critic and obstacle to success. Yet what keeps an Achiever from changing 
(and protects him from change) is his strong ability to deflect critical feedback that 
disagrees with his self-image (Torbert & Associates, 2004). An Achiever is good at 
"single-loop learning" (Argyris, 1977), that is, a willingness to change behavior in the 
service of obtaining his goals. Cooper's disengagement from the faculty and avoidance 
of potentially embarrassing situations may be explained by an Achiever's approach. 
Stuck in Own Assumptions. Another consistent characteristic that surfaced in my 
interviews with President Cooper was his propensity not to question assumptions, 
whether they belonged to him or others. For example, Cooper admitted that he never 
pursued in-depth conversations with the faculty to uncover why they saw shared 
governance so differently, or if they saw it so differently. According to faculty 
interviews, it seems that their views of shared governance were far less rigid than Cooper 
imagined. The faculty wanted to participate, but they were not expecting a "one person, 
one vote" (122.8.9) on all administrative matters nor were they attempting to override the 
president. As one faculty leader told me, the faculty wanted to codify a system that 
would clarify their participatory role regardless of who served as president. The faculty 
wanted to be able to weigh in on matters that affected them through a process of faculty 
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recommendations made to the president. "That way," one faculty member said, "if the 
president vetoes the recommendation, it is on the record. There is no confusion as to who 
did what" (200.9.15A). Although Cooper never indicated that he intended to dominate 
administrative decision making, his comments throughout our interviews indicated that 
he was concerned about being dominated by the faculty. In one of our first interviews, he 
said that the previous president had stayed less than two weeks before resigning,25 and 
another president had narrowly escaped a no-confidence vote by the faculty. Cooper 
described the faculty as having the "habit of pushing the president," (255.1.5). When 
recalling his meeting with the tenured faculty and what he recalls as "demands" for some 
people to be fired, he noted, "I couldn't have this cabal telling me what to do otherwise I 
would be a figurehead" (910.8.10). The decision was based on a reaction to protect his 
positional authority rather than an examination of the merits. Cooper, if seeing the 
situation through an Achiever's mindset, would have likely seen the issue as an either/or 
situation, that is, confrontation or avoidance or accomodation—and he chose avoidance 
(Torbert, 1987). 
If Cooper operated in the mindset of an Achiever, then he may have already made 
up his mind and drawn the boundaries between himself and the faculty over the 
governance issue. An Achiever, as part of his cognitive/emotional protection, will deflect 
information that doesn't fit their understanding of reality. Achievers are wedded to their 
positions as the right position and view other positions simply as wrong. However, they 
are pragmatic and will negotiate their position to accomplish their goals but they do not 
25 The popular rumor, Cooper told me, was that the president left because she was afraid of the power of the 
faculty, as well as the restrictions of the collective bargaining agreement. 
26 A no-confidence vote would have no legal impact, but would have been publically embarrassing to the 
president. 
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negotiate to examine the potential subjective flaws underlying their own assumptions 
because they don't see that they have any assumptions (Cook-Greuter, 2005; Joiner & 
Josephs, 2007; Torbert, 1987). 
Also, if operating as an Achiever, Cooper may have seen the faculty emphasis on 
shared governance and decision making as egotistical on their part. "Achievers think they 
are above egotism which they define [egotists] as anyone who is not helping them to 
achieve organizational goals. Achievers think they are without ego because their entire 
framework is built on what they perceive to be selfless service to their goals and ideals 
(Torbert, 1987). 
Unilateral vs. Collaborative Attitude. As discussed earlier, an Individualist has 
moved closer to a positive approach toward conflict in that they are curious about what 
others think, are open to new information and like to have lots of options. However, the 
Individualist's curiosity is still in a precarious balance with the need for autonomy, 
defined as a freedom from control by others. For an Individualist to enter into 
collaborative problem solving is very difficult because in true collaborative work 
interdependence is essential (Deutsch, 2000a; Torbert & Associates, 2004). 
Being adjacent stages, the Achiever and the Individualist share some of their 
approaches and concerns about power and control (Sara Ross, personal correspondence, 
May 5, 2012). In numerous studies of leadership based on adult development theory, 
researchers found that Achievers use a "mystery-mastery" interpersonal style (Torbert, 
1987) in which they focus on goals at the expense of process (mystery) and focus on 
mastery of their own objectives through unilateral control (or attempt to use unilateral 
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control) of their situations (Torbert, 1987; Torbert & Associates, 2004). They habitually 
minimize negative feelings even as situations become polarized because they interpret 
other's responses as a cue to modify their tactics but not their assumptions because 
assumptions are seen as fact (Torbert, 1987). In conflict negotiations an Achiever will 
resist what they perceive is another person's attempt at unilateral control. An Achiever is 
neither inclined nor competent to question the validity of the framework itself, or to 
reframe his approach to it (Torbert, 1987). If Cooper's response to conflict tensions such 
as shared governance or the expansion of the academic center were to be analyzed from 
an Achiever's point of view, then it would make sense that Cooper did not question his 
own assumptions. Achievers are not so much power-hungry as they are protective about 
infringement on their authority and control by others, which may sometimes manifest as 
what appears as authority and control over others (Torbert, 1987). 
Concluding Remarks for the Three Findings: 
In finding #1, Cooper's disengagement from interaction with the faculty cut off a 
communications flow essential for effective leadership. One of the most important 
functions of a leader, if not the most important function, is to communicate openly with 
organizational members and to help organizational members make sense of 
administrative actions within the larger context of their organization and their external 
environment. Making sense requires the leader to frame the actions to give meaning and 
purpose, rather than to let them languish as random acts of decision making. 
In Finding #2, Cooper's hunkering down (narrowing his cognitive interpretation 
of challenges facing the school and the community college system) had a chilling effect 
on the ability of the faculty and staff to work productively with Cooper to address the 
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complex and ambiguous problems facing the school. By eschewing the social and 
cultural dynamics of the school, including values of inclusion, transparency and 
empowerment, Cooper exacerbated tensions rather than eased them. Cooper's 
predilection for avoiding tough decisions may have been a result of his lack of experience 
with ill-structured problems, particularly his tendency to apply formulaic, routine 
solutions in situations calling for reflective work and cognitive complexity. Additionally, 
productive conflict engagement requires a sense of legitimacy that processes are fair for 
resolving difficult issues and problems, and Cooper's alteration of governance was not 
considered in keeping with fairness standards in the Excel culture. His behavior 
contradicted his espoused values and this called into his question his credibility. 
In finding #3, President Cooper's strategic choices for conflict engagement 
reflected two different mindsets—an Individualist and an Achiever. From the Individualist 
perspective, Cooper articulated in his interviews a philosophy of leadership which had 
moved away from professional achievement as his measure of his self-worth to a focus 
on his journey inward. But the journey inward, as he acknowledged, made him less 
interested in the day-to-day issues facing the school and made him somewhat aloof and 
uninvolved. At the Achiever level, again from interviews, Cooper appeared to wrestle 
with the need to hold power and control as a hedge against losing his cherished 
autonomy, and to insulate himself against outside opinions which might contradict his 
self-image and identity. 
President Cooper appeared torn between two worlds—the world of conventional 
reasoning which viewed reality as objective and a postconventional world in which 
reality was seen as socially constructed, and therefore relative, not fixed or certain. If he 
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were operating through the Achiever framework, he would have most likely treated 
problems and conflicts as bifurcated choices (as for example, his fear about faculty 
controlling important policy decisions, rather than viewing faculty concerns as an 
opportunity for collaboration). If operating through the Individualist's framework, 
Cooper would have most likely seen many different options for resolving conflicts, but 
been unable to make a choice because everything seemed relative, with one choice being 
as good as another. As an Achiever, Cooper exhibited some of the mystery/mastery 
(Torbert, 1987) documented in research studies of managers who were at the Achiever 
stage, where Achievers may articulate goals for their organizations, but consistently fail 
to share strategies, thereby leaving colleagues in the dark. As an Individualist, Cooper 
exhibited some of the idiosyncratic behavior (changing his decisions without notice) and 
lack of holding self or others accountable for follow-through (Joiner & Josephs, 2007; 
Torbert & Associates, 2004). 
In the next chapter, I review implications and conclusions for theory and practice 
in educational leadership, conflict engagement and for leadership training and education I 
then discuss the limitations of the study and recommendations for future research. 
152 
CHAPTER VI 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this final chapter, I explore the implications and conclusions of my three 
findings for the theory and practice of conflict engagement leadership within the setting 
of a community college. Each finding is then applied to the scholarly conversations in 
community college leadership theory and practice. Finally, I offer recommendations for 
applications of my findings to leadership practice and professional training programs for 
community college leaders, and some concluding remarks. 
Finding One. Disengagement 
The finding of Disengagement has several implications for the field of conflict 
and leadership. For example, community college presidents are increasingly facing novel 
challenges in working with a variety of external stakeholders such as the Board of 
Trustees, state legislatures, and community college system administrators. These 
challenges may create tensions for presidents particularly for ambiguous and complex 
issues which require balancing the needs of the system with those of the community 
college. However, when leaders retreat and keep silent, choosing to grapple with these 
problems on their own and attempting to make unilateral decisions rather than engaging 
in conversations with their faculty, leaders run the risk of appearing aloof, not respecting 
mutuality and creating conflict tensions. By avoiding open dialogue (clarifying and frank 
discussions) with faculty, leaders may fail to gather important feedback on problems 
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facing the school but also fail to gather critical information necessary to understand how 
best to communicate with organizational members. 
Disengagement can result in a real or perceived failure to exercise responsibility 
as an organizational leader which is to help members make sense of administrative 
actions and of their roles within the larger context of their external environment 
(Birnbaum, 1992). By choosing to disengage from open dialogue and sensemaking 
activities, a leader may close off opportunities for mutuality (openness to mutual 
influence between the faculty and himself), which, in turn, cut off an essential avenue for 
positive conflict engagement. 
A leader's choices in responding to conflict tensions may create a domino effect. 
By being cloistered away from the faculty, a leader may have fewer opportunities to keep 
faculty informed about his actions or to discuss the ramifications of those actions. This, 
in turn, may create the impression that the leader does not value transparency and the 
leaders does not feel accountable to anyone other than the higher authority of the Board 
of Trustees. Since transparency and personal accountability are core cultural values of 
academia, by failing to acknowledge these values, a leader may send a message that the 
organizational culture and the meaning that members derive from that culture are 
unimportant to president (Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman & Deal, 2003). Disengagement can 
be interpreted by one's faculty and staff as a rejection of the interdependence of their 
relationship-that is, by failing to demonstrate respect for the importance of mutuality 
between an organizational leader and organizational members, a leader may eschew the 
social dynamics within the school environment. This creates, rather than abates, conflict 
tensions. 
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Disengagement also has implications for the credibility of a leader. For example, 
if a presidential candidate espouses the values of collaboration, as Cooper did when he 
interviewed for the job, then disengages and fails to discuss the reasons for this change of 
behavior, this sends a signal that the president can not be depended upon to follow 
through on promises. This in turn creates confusion and uncertainty which can fuel 
conflict tensions about whether a leader can be trusted. The point here is that leadership 
is not a solitary, unilateral act. As Birnbaum (1992) points out leadership is a relational, 
contextual act, and therefore decisions need to be negotiated with organizational 
members. 
Disengagement also suggests implications for the importance of context on 
leadership. Leaders, like Cooper, might indeed act in a collaborative way when they feel 
they are in an emotionally safe environment. Yet in community college leadership 
practice, presidents seldom have the luxury of tightly controlling their communications or 
contextual environments. As Birnbaum (1992), Bolman and Gallos (2011), Heifetz 
(1994), Bolman and Deal (2003), and others point out, successful presidents must be able 
to operate in dynamic, chaotic environments in which conflicting interests both internal 
and external to the college must be juggled into order to protect and advance the interests 
of the organization. 
Although I explore the psychological implications of community college 
leadership behavior in more detail in the other findings, I think it is worth noting that 
leaders like Cooper may demonstrate coping behavior which might be considered as an 
attempt to control the context in which they practice leadership. Coping behavior may in 
some circumstances be a healthy response to overwhelming feelings caused by 
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uncertainty and complexity (interpersonal or intrapersonal), and provide the needed 
psychological space to regain composure (Bion, 1984; McCallum, 2008). However, 
when coping results in habitual retreat back into an emotional comfort zone, the response 
reflects a pattern of conflict avoidance which shuts off the psychological dissonance 
essential for ego maturity growth (Kegan, 1994; Torbert & Associates, 2004). This in 
turn cuts off learning on the job which is essential to successful leadership (Amey, 2005; 
Lambert, et al., 2002) 
Sanctuary and refuge are not the places from which a leader can exercise 
leadership. Disengagement in this case study did not resolve conflict; it exacerbated 
conflict. The problems that existed outside the president's office could only be solved by 
the president stepping outside his office to engage, learn, reflect with significant others 
and peers and mutually plan responses. 
Fit with the scholarly literature. In conflict theory literature, Deutsch's (1949) 
theory of positive conflict engagement posits that, in order for conflict to be productive, 
three conditions are necessary: effective communications based on mutual influence; a 
willingness to work together to solve the problem; and the willingness and capacity to 
define a conflict as a mutual problem to be solved, not a problem of them versus us. 
When President Cooper spoke about the issues of shared governance at Excel College, he 
framed it as a "them vs. us" problem. My findings contribute to this theory by 
reinforcing that active and open engagement in communications, as Deutsch predicted, is 
critically importance in productive conflict engagement. Cooper disengaged from 
communications, distancing himself from open conversations which were essential to 
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defining the problems facing the school such as teaching loads, class sizes, and shared 
governance. Although there are thousands of case studies on conflict theory and practice, 
my study is the first to focus on the issue through the perspective of a leader in a 
community college and triangulated through interviews with faculty and supporting 
documents. 
My research also contributes to the literature on community college leadership, 
especially the work of Eddy (2003, 2005) who has conducted extensive research on the 
role of communications framing and sensemaking as critical components for successful 
community college presidencies. In her 2003 study, Eddy found that informal 
conversations with faculty were keys to community college presidents being able to make 
sense of potentially tense situations and, in turn, to their ability to interpret and suggest 
meanings to campus members. Eddy concluded, as I did, that the dynamic environment 
of community colleges requires presidents to learn on the job and to make adjustments. 
Critical feedback is essential to presidents in order to identify mismatches between their 
framing and campus members' sensemaking, so adjustments could be made (Eddy, 
2003). In her 2010 study of nine college presidents, Eddy found that framing performed 
an essential governing function in that presidents framed a vision of the future (e.g., 
helping college faculty and staff to make sense of administrative changes), provided 
immediate feedback on actions to achieve institutional goals, and served as a bridge to 
encourage two-way communication through dialogue and learning conversations between 
the president and campus members. This in turn, helped to create a collegial atmosphere 
important to good faculty-president relations. My research results point out that, when 
the all-important communication tools are ignored by a community college president, the 
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organization lacks a cohesiveness because meaning making is left to faculty to figure out 
on their own (Eddy, 2010). 
My findings about the importance of Sensemaking/meaning making extends the 
work of Kezar and Eckel (2002) who studied the effects of presidential change leadership 
across six college campuses over two years. They concluded that Sensemaking, led by 
the president, was one of the most critical skills in academic change, particularly deep 
transformational change. They also found as an unexpected outcome of their research 
that, when changes were not understood by campus members, the opportunity to engage 
in open, frank dialogue (i.e., questioning the purpose and function, beliefs, assumptions 
of the changes) proved an effective strategy for turning negative resistance into positive 
conflict engagement. 
In regard to my finding about the effects of President Cooper's insulation from 
conflict (disengagement) by denying its existence, this supports Birnbaum's (1992) 
research (n=762) that presidents who self-seal against disconfirming evidence will also 
seal themselves off from being able to learn what they need to do to exercise effective 
leadership. It also confirms Birnbaum's (1992) theory that creating an emotional 
distance from the faculty decreases faculty perceptions of presidential effectiveness while 
increasing tensions between the two. Open dialogue is a key component to successful 
conflict resolution. Without it, decision making by the president is seen as exclusive 
rather than inclusive and devoid of reciprocal influence between the president and the 
faculty-essential for a good working relationship. 
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Finding Two. Hunkering Down 
As the results of this case study suggest, when a leader hunkers down he uses a 
narrow cognitive focus when assessing the problems facing a school. A narrow focus as 
Birnbaum (1992) pointed out, is almost always the use of a traditional bureaucratic 
perspective. This perspective, in turn, frames potential solutions only in terms of 
managerial solutions which focus on replacing people, changing policies and altering 
reporting functions. Hunkering down creates a myopic frame for leadership. 
Another implication of this study is that hunkering down comes into play when a 
leader, as in Cooper's case, appeared unable to make leadership decisions which involved 
risk or uncertainty. Reluctance to make decisions where the outcomes are not clearly 
known and success is not assured may lead some presidents to depend excessively on 
external validation from those in authority (e.g. a chancellor or a board of trustees). 
The context under which hunkering down may take place has interesting 
implications for leadership. For example, Cooper faced problems which had no generally 
accepted "right" or "good" solutions. When Excel faculty expanded offerings at the off-
site academic center in order to meet the educational needs of students in that geographic 
area, the faculty did so by increasing their workload and at the risk of overstraining their 
available resources. When Excel was asked to increase class sizes, the faculty faced 
challenges to their pedagogy which had emphasized small class sizes. These were 
ambiguous and complex problems with no easy or one right solution. These challenges 
reflected many of the same challenges which contemporary community college 
presidents face today. Problems are new and ambiguous, decisions are risky. Yet as 
Heifetz (1994) has pointed out, ambiguous, complex problems are often not recognized 
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as such and instead are diagnosed as complex but routine-that is the leader assumes that a 
solution exists somewhere which has worked successfully in the past. Fullan (1982) has 
termed this as "false clarity" where a leader identifies a problem and solution which turns 
out to be the wrong problem, the wrong definition of the problem, or an ill-suited 
solution. The problem-solving process for ambiguous, complex problems requires input 
from multiple perspectives and a willingness to uncover and challenge assumptions about 
the problem in order to enable novel ideas to be matched to the problem. 
Intertwined with a leader's approach to complex, ambiguous problems may be the 
leader's lack of previous experience and practical training for the role of a community 
college president. Again, as an example, Cooper was a first time president, with no direct 
experience with academic matters. His career was built on an expertise in fund raising 
and development and he had not taught nor participated in the academic decision-making 
process. Although he was highly educated (MBA and Ed.D), Cooper lacked the on-the-
job experience in an academic post. Most of what he knew about academic leadership he 
learned as a member of the president's Executive Team in his previous position at a small 
community college. Increasingly, with the impending retirement of more than half of the 
current community college presidents in the United States within the next few years, a 
new generation of presidents will enter into the crucible of leadership for the first time. 
Given that most first time presidents will face increasingly complex, ambiguous 
problems, the potential frequency of hunkering down as a leadership response may be on 
the rise. The implications of this finding are that when presidents feel overwhelmed and 
unprepared for the challenges, hunkering down may become a more common response. 
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As Heifetz (1994) has pointed out, leadership requires the ability to learn from 
criticism that comes with the position of leading. With a note of humor he observed that 
the Indo-European root for leader was the title given to the person who carried the flag 
into battle and subsequently usually the first person to get killed. 
Kegan (1994) referred to situations similar to those that Cooper and first-time 
presidents encounter as the " hidden graduate curriculum of life" (p. 287). He contended 
that for most of us contemporary responsibilities are "over our heads" for the emotional 
and cognitive judgments that are required on a daily basis. He also suggested that much 
of the leadership training for educators is just that-skills training but not leadership 
education for development. 
These observations which link Cooper's conflict avoidance to his lack of previous 
academic or presidential experience is not to suggest that only seasoned presidents should 
be hired or that only those who have been academics can do the job successiully. Rather 
these observations are to suggest that when a person is entering a highly complicated 
environment and with a minimum amount of practical experience for that environment, 
the qualities of leadership maturational level become critically important. The ability to 
open oneself to disconfirming feedback and willingness to withstand the inevitable blows 
to one's ego are important for any leader but particularly so for those who are venturing 
in for the first time. 
Fit with the scholarly literature. My findings provide in-the-field evidence to support the 
theory that a limited cognitive frame may damage the relationship between a president 
and his/her campus members and create conflict rather than productively engage in 
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conflict. Birnbaum (1992) found that presidents who were rated by their faculties as 
either failed or average presidents had disengaged from disconfirming feedback (my 
Finding #1); in addition, they were also judged to have used only one or two cognitive 
approaches to analyzing the needs of the campus, causing tensions between faculty and 
president, and causing the president to lose the trust and confidence of the faculty 
(Birnbaum, 1992). Most first-time presidents were seen as adopting a positional authority 
approach consistent with a bureaucratic cognitive frame. 
My work also supports the work of Bolman and Gallos (2011) who contended 
that leaders in higher education need to use multiple perspectives or frames to provide 
effective leadership because the complexity and ambiguity of problems facing a college 
campus could not be adequately addressed without multiple ways of interpreting 
problems and exploring solutions. In addition, my analysis and conclusion that Cooper 
lacked the capacity to engage ambiguous and complex problems because he used a 
limited cognitive lens to identify conflict problems and potential solutions is supported by 
the work of Mitroff and Emshoff (1979) in their examination of ill-structured problems. 
Mitroff and Emshoff argued that "conflict, assumption surfacing and assumption 
challenging are central to solving ill-structured problems" (1979, p. 3). They contended 
that conflict is an essential catalyst for surfacing multiple perspectives which, in turn, 
challenge assumptions that might lead to ineffective solutions. Multiple perspectives act 
as challenges to routine, formulaic problem assessments and solutions. Multiple 
perspectives help to dispel complacency where people assume that what has been done in 
the past seems to work well enough (Schein, 1982). 
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At Excel Community College, for example, trustee demands for an increase in 
class sizes and concurrently for an expansion of course offerings to an offsite academic 
center reflected a complex and ambiguous problem. Neither Cooper, nor the faculty, nor 
the system Board of Trustees could clearly agree on the definition of the problem or 
agree on a proposed strategy for a solution. 
Finding Three. Ego Maturity Fluctuations 
The Leadership Development Profile (LDP) is an instrument used to measure the 
degree of mature capacity, the cognitive and emotional complexity which incorporates 
both an integrated and a differentiated understanding of one's own needs and the needs of 
others. Stages of emotional and cognitive complexity or action logics, the reasoning 
pattern people use to make choices about their actions ( Torbert & Associates, 2004) may 
explain significant portions of the emotional struggles which leaders face at certain stage 
of complexity stage development. 
For example, reflective of an Individualist stage of leadership development, a 
community college president who has entered this stage may experience a disorienting 
realization which accompanies the transition from conventional to postconventional 
reasoning. In this major shift, reality and truth are no longer seen as objective-out there 
to be discovered-but rather as a co-construction with others. As leaders at Individualist 
stage have self-reported, they can see many sides of an issue, so it may become very 
difficult for them to make choices and decide on one course of action. Yet if a leader 
also reports tendencies reflective of an earlier stage of an Achiever (who accepts without 
question the goals set by superiors), leaders may find themselves adjusting their 
behaviors but never questioning the overall goals-even when they need to. This may 
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lead to blindly following a course of action that leads to unpleasant or disastrous 
unintended consequences. 
The implications of ego fluctuations as a finding of this case may suggest that 
leaders, as seen from the perspective of adult development, may, like Cooper, be 
struggling with shifts in mindsets that come with leadership learning and growth. If for 
example, a leader struggled with the confusion of an Individualist, the leader might 
flounder about, appearing indecisive, because there would appear many possible right 
answers to complex ambiguous problems. Yet at this stage, a leader may not have 
developed the capacity to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty because there 
are simply too many choices, all of which appeared equally plausible. 
Another implication of ego fluctuation points to the possibility that leaders, like 
Cooper, may experience emotionally induced "fallback" to an earlier stage of action 
logics of an Achiever. As an Achiever, a leader reverts to using a mindset which sees 
problems having very clear boundaries-with the boundaries defined by others. An 
Achiever's action logic stage is still embedded in external approval rather than in internal 
self-approval. Consider a president who, on the one hand, is experiencing the shift to 
postconventional thinking-realizing the validity of many points of view-yet finds himself 
also reacting to challenges by retreating back to conventional thinking and its narrow 
frame of references. Ego fluctuations may help to explain emotional stresses that leaders 
face as they grapple with different competing mindsets. Stage complexity theory helps to 
explain what may appear to be leadership inconsistencies, and by offering another 
viewpoint, this is the value of the theory. 
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Fit with the scholarly literature. With the exception of Amey (2005), little 
attention has been paid to the connection between community college presidents and their 
leadership maturational levels. Amey argued that presidents must learn on the job and 
that learning as leaders develops through three stages. In the first stage, a president will 
rely on top down communications and resolve conflict by relying on positional authority. 
In stage two, the president becomes more facilitative, but still retains positional power for 
most decision making and takes a mediator position for resolving conflict-choosing 
among alternatives. At the third level, the president is highly collaborative and sees the 
role as co-creating solutions to problems with others, continually learning and growing 
on the job. Applied to conflict resolution, at the third level, presidents do not attempt to 
"resolve" conflicts as much as they might guide learning conversations in which the 
members themselves develop their own solutions to problems. My work adds to this 
scholarly conversation in two ways. First, Amey's work was theoretical, drawing from 
earlier work by Kuhnert and Lewis (1989) on maturational levels of corporate leaders and 
their use of transformational and transactional approaches. My work is case based and, 
as a field study, provides data to support Amey's theory. The data from my study support 
Amey's prediction that the more mature capacity (ego maturity) demonstrated by the 
leader, the less directive and more collaborative the leader's engagement of conflict 
issues. My findings suggest that conflict avoidance is an important variable to be 
considered and, to date, has not been studied within the three stages of leadership 
development as conceived by Amey (2005). 
Eigel and Kuhnert (2005), in their study of 21 senior officers in multi-billon dollar 
public companies, found discernable differences in conflict management methods 
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between those at the Achiever/Individualist developmental level and those at the 
97 Strategist level. Achievers/Individualists focused on the importance of controlling 
conflict rather than engaging with it, while Strategists, by comparison, reported that they 
saw conflict as a positive and desirable element in organizational culture and said their 
aim was to learn from conflict, and, as such, they tried to create environments where 
disagreements could be aired without risk to those involved. Joiner and Josephs (2007) 
reported that leaders at the ego maturity level of Achievers or earlier tended toward 
extreme reactions to conflict-either being habitually assertive or accommodating. They 
contended that, with maturity, leaders' responses to conflict are more measured, 
considered, and balanced. President Cooper, as a habitual conflict avoider on his campus 
and a conflict accommodator with the system office and trustees, reflected an Achiever's 
see-saw approach to conflict response. 
In addition, my research answers Eigel and Kuhnert's (2005) call for further 
research that would study developmental levels of the "leader-in-the-environment" 
because their work had, to date, been conducted only through self-reports and interviews 
of "leader and the environment" (p. 380). In addition, my data support their prediction 
that leaders below the Strategist stage are more likely to be influenced by the context or 
environment of their work-either positively or negatively-while Strategists would be 
able to perform at a high level regardless of the context. Cooper self-reported that the 
environment of both Excel Community College and the larger external environment of 
the college system had a very "stressful" impact on him (pp. 9, 13). 
27 Eigel and Kuhnert used the terminology developed by Kegan and Lahey (2009). To remain consistent, I 
have interpolated their stage 4 as Achiever, a 4(5) as an Individualist and their stage 5 as Strategist based 
on Torbert 2004. The correlation between Kegan's stage 5 and strategist are generally agreed upon by 
researchers in both traditions, but Kegan differentiates stages by numbers, so an Achiever might be not 
quite a Stage 4, while an Individualist might be just beyond a Stage 4. 
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One of the most interesting findings to emerge from my work was the tendency of 
Cooper to treat conflict problems not as systemic or interconnected but as isolated 
episodic events. My research findings confirmed and supported the findings of Merron, 
Fisher and Torbert, (1987) who found that leaders in stages earlier than the Individualist 
stage viewed problems as isolated events, accepted the problem as defined by others 
(rather than attempt to question the given definition of the problem), and failed to 
investigate the underlying causes. At a later stage (presumably at the Strategist stage), 
leaders were more likely to question the definition of the problem, the underlying 
assumptions and treat the problem as symptomatic of other problematic issues. 
My work also supported the work of and Rooke and Torbert (2005) and Torbert 
(Torbert & Associates, 2004) who found that, at the Achiever and Individualist stages, 
leaders tended to focus on rational, linear problem solving. They were willing to alter 
their behaviors to achieve their goals, but were unwilling to question or alter their goals 
(single loop learning), whereas Strategists practiced "double-loop" learning in that they 
were willing to not only alter their behavior to fit achievement of their goals, but also 
willing, if evidence indicated, to change or adjust their goals as well (Argyris & Schon, 
1974). 
The scholarly literature on "fallback", which is retreating to an earlier stage of 
thinking and actions, is not well developed. For example, Torbert (2004) referred to 
"fallback" but identified it as a temporary state, but did not define the duration of the 
state as to whether that meant a short or prolonged period of retreating to an earlier stage. 
President Cooper acknowledged his tendency to "fallback" to a stance of trying to please 
people and to avoid conflict when he felt stressed, but it was unclear whether this was a 
167 
temporary or a habitual pattern in the particular context of the school. In the results 
reported from interviews with faculty and staff, Cooper, for almost five years, 
demonstrated a consistent pattern of delegating difficult, potentially conflict-laden school 
issues to his vice president for academic affairs or to his Executive Team or simply 
avoiding them through his absence from the school. 
In one of the few studies to explore "fallback", McCallum (2008), in a study of 
developmental behavior of 18 adults attending a group relations conference, found that 
all reported experiences of "fallback", and described it in various terms from lacking a 
genuine approach to a novel situation or temporarily forgetting their coping skills. 
However, the more advanced the developmental stage, the sooner this "fallback" was 
noticed and corrected. McCallum found that context and contingency-especially stress 
and anxiety-could trigger the regression. My findings may reinforce McCallum's 
conclusions about "fallback" and stress. If my second explanation is correct, then 
Cooper's self-reports of high anxiety and reports by the faculty of Cooper's habitual 
avoidance of risk and conflict may be useful data for future study. 
Perhaps more importantly for the study of ego maturity in organizational 
leadership, like McCallum, I came to the conclusion that stages of leadership 
maturational development may be less fixed (more fluid) and longer lasting than 
previously predicted (Torbert & Associates, 2004). Torbert (Torbert & Associates, 2004) 
also made the distinction between unintended "fallback" and the purposeful selection of 
earlier development behavioral levels (e.g., choosing to act as an expert or a diplomat 
rather than feeling compelled to act that way). He contended that one might temporarily 
"fallback" into earlier behavior when stressed (J. Amgwerd, personal communication, 
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February 26,2012). However, I found, as did McCallum, that the boundaries between 
different stages are perhaps more fluid than previously suggested by other researchers 
(Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007; Kegan, 1982, 1994; Torbert & Associates, 2004). 
Perhaps stage boundary spanning is more frequent than has been previously thought. 
Finally, in applying my findings to scholarly literature which examines the 
relationship of ego maturity to conflict engagement, I found two interesting lines of 
research. The first is by McGuigan and Popp (2007) and the second by Mitroff and 
Emshoff (1979). One contribution of my research is to provide a field study which 
extends the theoretical work of these authors. McGuigan and Popp (2007) hypothesized 
that a person's stage of ego maturity determines his or her conflict engagement approach. 
They built their explanation by interpolating data from more than 20 years of stage 
complexity theory interviews with adult subjects across multiple sectors. However, to 
date, there has been no field research to link these two together (McGuigan & Popp, 
2007). 
Mitroff and Emshoff s (1979) work on ill-structured problems hypothesized that 
ill-structured questions required a mature mindset (i.e., ego maturity) to engage in both 
definition and problem-solution explorations. Mitroff and Emshoff made the case that, 
since underlying assumptions must be uncovered and challenged in order to develop 
effective solutions, mature egos are essential to be able to withstand the interpersonal 
dynamics in which one's personal assumptions are challenged. They noted that personal 




Leadership Practice in Community Colleges 
My findings have several applications to leadership practices in community 
colleges. First, community college leaders would benefit from creating processes in their 
schools in which open dialogue is a regular and planned activity. The open dialogue 
process as practiced in the art of deliberation, for example, would enable faculty, staff, 
administrators, and students to gather together on a regular basis to discuss important 
issues aided by facilitators (Holman, Devane, & Cady, 2007; Schuman, 2006). However, 
unlike some facilitated discussions, deliberations are values-based discussions and not 
simply agenda-based. In addition, deliberative discussions focus on actionable steps 
rather than allowing the fruits of the conversation to languish. The benefit of such an 
approach is that the president would be out in front of conflict issues, not following them 
and operating in a crisis or semi-crisis management mode. Excel Community College, 
prior to Cooper's presidency, had a similar process through their All-College Forums, 
which were moderated, action step-focused, and provided both transparency and 
accountability. 
Second, my research data speak to the need for open dialogue between the 
president and the faculty through the art of walking around and talking with faculty and 
staff. This requires a commitment on the part of the president to respectfully accept not 
only reaffirming feedback (supporting the president's decisions), but also searching out 
discontinuing feedback. The disconfirming feedback provides the critical data necessary 
to the president in order to evaluate decision making and to make course corrections as 
needed. 
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Walking around and talking informally with faculty and staff, as Birnbaum (1992) 
noted, signifies to organizational members that the president is open to mutual 
persuasion, that is, the faculty and staff feel like their voices are heard by the president. 
When presidents walk around they are not only collecting valuable data to use in decision 
making but also creating opportunities to make sense of information affecting the college 
as well as to interpret events and actions to faculty and staff. This framing opportunity is 
a continuous process, and meaning needs to be constantly renegotiated given that each 
person in the organization brings his or her own interpretation and mindset to each event 
and decision. 
Although not the focus of this study, my work points to diversity in 
developmental maturity among faculty, staff, students, trustees, etc. (Drago-Severson, 
2004, 2008; Drago-Severson et al., 2001). Given that each person interprets events 
through a different mindset-each with her own developmental framework-presidents of 
community colleges would be wise to take this into account when strategizing about how 
best to communicate to constituencies both inside and external to the college. 
Educating Leaders for Community Colleges 
The collected findings support the need to educate community college leaders on 
how to engage in specific forms of communication and the creation of effective, mutual 
relationships with faculty and other governance groups. To date, leadership programs for 
community college presidents focus on how the president should deal with the Board of 
Trustees and other external issues. The internal issues, especially the communication 
function within a school between the president and her faculty, need more detailed 
attention. In particular, more attention needs to be paid to the role of communications as 
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a reflection of the cognitive and emotional developmental outlook or mindset of the 
president. 
One of the major challenges for leadership coaches and trainers is to prepare 
leaders for the stresses of the job. Drawing on my work, I would recommend that 
programs include testing for ego maturity (keeping the results confidential between the 
trainer and the participant will protect privacy), and creating developmental supports to 
help the participant grow into an increased awareness of self and others in stressful 
situations. 
Role playing combined with reflection will enable community college leaders to 
experience learning in the moment and to develop self-awareness of habits such as 
withdrawing or disengaging for self-protection in embarrassing or stressful moments 
which block learning opportunities. Role plays are, in my estimation, one of the most 
valuable tools for leadership because, if designed correctly, the leadership student will 
experience stressful situations at a visceral level and so will be able to learn how to 
operate effectively by staying aware of the situation, especially when feeling emotionally 
overwhelmed when faced with personal vulnerability. 
I recommend that leadership preparation and training programs such as those 
conducted by the American Association of Community Colleges and the Association of 
Community College Trustees integrate leadership ego maturational study and discussions 
into their curricula. For example, when leadership training programs focus on issues 
such as faculty collaborative relationships, governance, fundraising, strategic planning 
and the many functions and roles of a college president, these discussions could be 
framed within the context of how one's mindset influences the choices a president makes. 
172 
As Eddy (2003) pointed out, a president is continually making a set of choices of "one set 
of meaning(s) over another" (p. 453). Leadership educators could orchestrate group 
discussions in which each president might share their personal experiences of choices 
they made and explore the meanings they attributed to those choices. This one 
adjustment to the curricula-without any major overhaul to entire leadership education 
program-could create new opportunities for presidents to create a learning community 
among themselves in which they might share their concerns and challenges, as well as 
reflect on previous leadership failures within a supportive, non-judgmental environment. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Limitations 
The chief limitation of my study is that it is based on a single case, focused on the 
study of one leader during a specific period of time. As such, my case may be atypical of 
presidential behaviors and experiences of conflict, especially among first-time presidents. 
President Cooper's experience and his conflict responses are closely tied to his previous 
academic managerial experiences; therefore, other first-time presidents with a different 
background may behave differently. This may be particularly relevant since Cooper 
represented a purposeful sample rather than randomly selected from among community 
college presidents nationally. 
Another limitation is the methodology I selected, which was a modified grounded 
theory approach. I used methods drawn from phenomenological interviewing and 
ethnographic field work. As such, I entered into the research with some guiding concepts 
which would not have been the case in a traditional grounded theory method where the 
theories emerge from data without any prior guiding theories. The foci of my work 
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included attention to contextual or relational leadership theory (leadership is best 
understood within the context that it takes place) and adult complexity theory based on 
the work of Torbert and Associates (2004) who contended that, as leaders develop ego 
maturity, they become more open to intrapersonal and interpersonal complexity and more 
tolerant of complex, ill-structured situations. Since I was guided by these conceptual 
principles, my research limits the scope of inquiry. 
My research is also limited with regard to my findings on ego fluctuations 
(Finding #3), in that I did not specifically design my interview probes to include 
investigation of "fallback" phenomena as predicted by complexity stage scholars (Kegan, 
1994; Torbert & Associates, 2004). The data which emerged on this subject were 
primarily derived from the discrepancy between Cooper's Leadership Development 
Profile (LDP) and interviews. While his LDP indicated that he used the mental model 
frame of an Individualist, his interviews and those from the faculty indicated behavior 
more in keeping with an Achiever. This finding is presented as a explanation and should 
be considered tentative. Other phenomena may have intervened to produce the 
appearance of fallback. For example, Cooper may have made the choice to behave at an 
earlier developmental level and simply chose not to disclose it to me. 
My work may be limited in its probe of the cultural environment as a source of 
stress and a learning inhibitor for Cooper. My interviews with faculty and staff, 
observations of meetings, and review of documents helped me understand the 
organizational culture and environmental context in which the president operated and this 
informed by interpretations. However, my research provides a specific snapshot in a 
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specific time and place and therefore may be missing certain sources of cultural and 
contextual stress which influenced Cooper. 
Future Research 
The research raises three foci for future research, which might extend and deepen 
these findings. Each potential future agenda is discussed below. 
Conflict and Shared Governance. This is an exciting time to be studying 
community college leadership and conflict. As we move into the 21st century, 
community college leadership is transitioning from a K-12 operational model to a higher 
education model exemplified by participatory decision making between administrators 
and faculty. With this transition toward greater collaboration comes the messiness, 
complexity, and ambiguity of governance issues. As Tierney (2008) and Birnbaum 
(2004) have suggested, shared governance is one of the most important issues in any 
academic institution and is one of the greatest challenges to community college 
presidents as there are few guides to help them. I recommend that future research further 
explore this issue by designing qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods studies which 
will (a) create a taxonomy of conflict issues in leadership and governance with the 
objective of identifying areas of frequent tensions for additional study; and (b) produce a 
database of case studies of presidential leaders who are or have grappled with shared 
governance in their colleges to learn more about how differences among presidential 
experience, context and conditions of leadership (including whether the community 
college is within a decentralized or centralized state system) and campus culture affect 
governance processes. This information will be especially valuable to the new generation 
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of presidents, as over 60% are expected to retire within the next five years (American 
Association of Community Colleges, 2005 ) 
Conflict and Ill-Structured Problems. My research results suggest that the nature 
of the problems which community college presidents face will continue to be messy, 
ambiguous, and complex because presidents are operating in environments which 
increasingly produce problems for which there are many potential "right" answers but no 
one certain right answer. Ill-structured questions require a different leadership process 
than required for well-structured or well-defined questions (Mitroff & Emshoff, 1979). 
To understand ill-structured questions, leaders need to be able to confidently draw upon 
divergent, conflicting, and multiple viewpoints in order to uncover, challenge, and 
understand underlying assumptions to the problems and to lead productive open 
dialogues about potential solutions. This requires not only a tolerance for conflict but 
also the ability to use conflict as a discussion tool. As Amey and Barnett (2006) have 
argued, the new context of community college leadership requires a new emphasis on 
recruiting and developing leaders who are socially and emotionally mature, rather than on 
the traditional focus on managerial skill sets. Therefore, I recommend future research 
which tests the results of my work by conducting replication studies focused on ego 
maturity issues. I would recommend using the Leadership Development Profile as at 
least one instrument in a study of ego maturity and to compare the results of the Profile, 
as I did, with the president's experience of conflict and strategies for response to it. Of 
particular interest will be to see if other presidents who are at the Individualist stage 
approach ill-structured problems as isolated and unconnected to each other (as Cooper 
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did) or are able to reframe the problems into a larger construct in which these problems 
are seen as interconnected. 
However, other instruments would also be valuable to employ either separately or 
in tandem with the LDP. The Subject-Object interview (SOI) (Lahey, Souvaine, Kegan, 
Goodman, & Felix, 1988), for example, uses a semi-structured interview process to probe 
for the construct (not content) of how a person makes sense of his or her experiences and 
problems. Kegan and Lahey (Kegan & Lahey, 2009) and Torbert (Torbert & Associates, 
2004) suggested that both the LDP and the SOI are highly correlated. Others have 
suggested that these two instruments may produce slightly different outcomes (Popp, 
June 12, 2011, personal correspondence). 
Another line of fruitful research moves away from the "whole person approach" 
(Kegan, 1982; Popp, 2001; Torbert & Associates, 2004) which contends that emotional 
and social maturity govern an individual's behavior regardless of the task or situation. 
Other theorists (Ross, 2008; Wolfsont, Ross, Miller, Lamport Commons, & Chernoff, 
2008) have suggested that domain complexity theory is a more accurate measure of 
individual cognitive and social maturity. The theory posits that an individual has more 
evolved (or less evolved) skills in different domains. So, for example, if President 
Cooper had been assessed by this instrument in the domain of external relations and fund 
raising (which is the domain of his expertise), he might have reflected (hypothetically) a 
later stage of leadership complexity development. 
Constructive developmental theory (theory of ego maturity) is but one lens 
through which to study conflict engagement. In order to understand the interplay 
between constructive developmental theory with other important factors such as 
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personality, I recommend that instruments such as the Meyers-Briggs Type Indictor Test 
(Jung, Baynes, & Hull, 1991; Myers & Myers, 1980) and the Leadership Developmental 
Profile (LDP) (Torbert & Associates, 2004) be used to see if there are any correlations. 
Social intelligence may also be a factor in how a person might interpret and respond to 
conflict. Again, using an established social intelligence measurement instrument such as 
the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Mayer, 
Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, Sep, 2001) would also be useful in tandem with 
measuring ego maturity. 
Conflict Leadership, Stress and Organizational Culture. A particularly useful line 
of research would be to study the relationship of organizational culture to leadership 
learning and conditions of stress. Stress has been suggested by several researchers 
(Kegan, 1994; Kegan & Lahey, 2009; Torbert & Associates, 2004) as being responsible 
for fallback behavior. This is particularly relevant given the increasing reluctance of 
senior administrators at community colleges to move into a presidential role due to 
stresses of the job (Wallin, 2010). Organizational culture has been linked to stress, and 
organizational culture may be best understood as a "holding environment" (Bolman & 
Gallos, 2011; Heifetz, 1994; Heifetz, et al., 2009; Kegan, 1994; Kegan & Lahey, 2009). 
Kegan and Lahey (2009) contended that the holding environment needs to combine both 
support and challenge, which they term "optimal conflicts" (p. 54). These optimal 
conflicts stimulate mental complexity (reasoning which brings together both thinking and 
feeling) and, as noted in Chapter 2, brings together three factors: the persistence of some 
life dilemma in an area of our life that we care about, feeling the limits of our current way 
of understanding it, and access to sufficient supports to neither be overcome by it or able 
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to escape or diffuse it (Kegan & Lahey, 2009). A particularly useful line of research 
would be to study how organizational environments influence the experiences of conflict 
tensions and stress. If Eigel and Kuhnert (2005) are correct, then presidents in an earlier 
stage of leadership maturation would be more susceptible to organizational 
environmental stresses than those at a later stage of leadership maturation. 
Concluding Thoughts 
My findings provide a cautionary tale for conflict engagement by highlighting 
three key findings. First, disengagement from potentially stressful conflict situations 
tends to exacerbate the conflicts, not mitigate them. Second, hunkering down, that is, to 
use a limited cognitive perspective in analyzing conflict tensions by using unilateral 
rather than multilateral perspectives creates a serious risk of circularity in thinking. If 
only one theory (one cognitive perspective) is used to analyze the data needed to solve a 
problem, often the data will appear to reinforce the theory used to uncover it in the first 
place. Third, ego maturity fluctuations may account for what may seem as erratic 
leadership decisions; however, it would be a mistake to assume that constructive 
developmental theory is able or should be used to explain leadership behavior. 
Constructive developmental theory is only one tool. 
My three central messages drawn from this research are, first, that conflict 
engagement skills can best be understood as part of the organizational and environmental 
context and the developmental capacity (ego maturity) of the college president. Second, 
leadership through conflict can best be understood as an act of problem solving and 
problem solving as an act of collaborative learning. This requires leaders to be action 
learners (Torbert & Associates, 2004) and to able to learn on the job, in the moment 
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(Mitroff & Emshoff, 1979). Third, ill-structured problems require a different set of 
problem-solving skills than is needed for well-structured problems. Well-structured 
problems with agreed-upon definitions and available solutions require expertise in the 
problem domain under consideration. By contrast, ill-structured problems require 
surfacing and challenging assumptions as central to solving ill-structured problems, and 
when assumptions are challenged, conflict often arises (Mitroff & Emshoff, 1979). 
Conflict is the catalyst for surfacing multiple perspectives, and multiple perspectives in 
turn challenge assumptions that might lead to ineffective solutions. 
If leadership in community colleges is to pursue collaborative shared decision 
making, conflict situations must been viewed as an opportunity to learn and build strong 
relationships. Positive conflict engagement is a learning tool and as such it is critical 
within the academic profession to stop avoiding its existence (as if avoiding it will make 
it disappear) and to embrace it, and use it as a learning tool not only for academic 
leadership but also as a learning tool for the students we are in this profession to guide. 
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EPILOGUE 
When I began this study I entered with the assumption that conflict could be 
managed. I had not, to be candid, accepted that conflict was a good thing or a positive 
occurrence because in my previous experiences conflict had been anxiety causing and not 
a source of learning. I was, like President Cooper, fine at "handling" conflict when I was 
not personally touched. But when I was personally involved, I found it very difficult to 
follow the prescribed steps in win-win negotiations. It is always easier on the side-lines 
than in the game, but many times not as satisfying. 
I also entered this study without full understanding of the range of conflict as 
articulated by Pondy (1967), that conflict is always present at some stage or another. As 
creatures of organizations, we are constantly either creating or experiencing tensions or 
conflicts with others. As such, none of us is without some responsibility for the state of 
our organizations. I leave this study with a much greater awareness of my own 
vulnerabilities and hopefully more attuned or "mindful" (Langer, 1989) of how my 
actions affect others for better or worse. I also feel the sting of awareness about my ego 
maturity "developmental limitations," but also feel new hope and aspirations for applying 
what I learned to my relationships both professional and personal. 
As we continue our rapid expansion into a globalized world, expectations for 
what it is to be a good leader need to change. Although advice books are replete with 
instructions on how to become a more collaborative and less hierarchical leader, the 
change on the ground comes about very slowly. The majority of organizations, including 
those in academia, still rely on leadership based on hierarchical power. But the obstacle 
it seems is not so much the leaders themselves than what we expect of them-we (those 
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who follow) continue to expect them to be smarter, stronger, more heroic than the rest of 
us, and to have the answers and solve the organization's problems. As Heifetz (1994) 
points out, before leaders can harness opportunity for change, we need to change our 
expectations. To realize that real leadership is not having-the plan, the vision or the 
answers-but rather leadership is finding the courage to dispel the myths and to teach 
others to take on responsibilities for their part. But as others take on their part, they will 
increasingly express their opinions-have different values and beliefs based on a variety of 
assumptions. Leadership in the post-heroic mode (Torbert, 2004; Joiner & Josephs, 
2007) will be tougher than ever because deference may give way to defiance. Leaders 
will need to exercise skills of conflict engagement while maintaining respect for others 
and honesty in their role as teachers. 
In changing our ideas of leadership we also need to change our ideas about 
conflict. Kegan (1994) argues that conflict has earned a bad reputation because we see 
conflict as a failure not an opportunity. We see it as evidence that somehow we didn't do 
our job by making ourselves clear, our positions known. But if we turn the tables and 
look at conflict, as Kegan (1994) suggests, as a wonderful example of interdependence 
and an equally wonderful opportunity to learn about others as well as ourselves, then 
conflict engagement may become the most essential leadership tool. We should welcome 
a continuous stream of small tensions or conflict, because without these tensions or petite 
conflicts we are unlikely to become aware of our blind spots-the limitations of our 
thinking, feeling and behavior -which need to be uncovered and explored in order to 
continue our journey of development and discovery, 
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If this study has contributed in some small way to a greater understanding of 
conflict as a leadership tool - in all its permutations - as not only part of life but a source 
of energy in life, then I will feel I did my job as a researcher of leadership. 
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Conflict Definitions: Representative Sample 
Source Definition Key words 
Coser 1956 Social conflict is a struggle between opponents over values 






Conflicts that are strategic are essentially bargaining 
situations in which the ability of one participant to gain his 
ends is dependent on the choices or decisions that the other 






Conflict exists whenever incompatible activities occur... 
one party is interfering, disrupting, obstructing, or in some 




Wall 1985 Conflict is a process in which two or more parties attempt to 
frustrate the other's goal attainment... the factors 
underlying conflict are threefold: interdependence, 






Conflict means perceived divergence of interest, or a belief 





Conrad 1990 Conflicts are communicative interactions among people who 
are interdependent and who perceive that their interests are 






van de Vliert 
1994 
Conflict—incompatible activities— occurs within cooperative 
as well as competitive contexts .. . conflict parties' can hold 







Conflict is the interaction of interdependent people who 
perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other 






Conflict is a continuous cycle moving from latent to 
perceptual to emotional to overt to resolution to latent 
Conflict as a 
continuous cycle 
Hanson, 2003 Conflict arises where never perceived or real interests 
collide. It can be a result of a divergence in organizational 
goals, personal ambitions, group loyalties, departmental 
budget demands on scarce resources, ethnic expectations and 
demands, and so forth. Conflict therefore comes from a 







Primer on decision making. Multiple actors "political"-not 
because it involves government or because it involves 
emotional outbursts - but because decision-makers sustain 




Adapted from chart prepared for COMM440/540 - Theories of Conflict and Conflict 
Management, Gregg Walker, Professor Speech, Oregon State University. Original downloaded 
from http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/comm440-540/triangle.htm 2.10.12 
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APPENDIX B 
Typology of Conflicts 
Typology Description 
Veridical: This is conflict perceived accurately as a "true" 
conflict, as when you and I both want to teach 
in the same classroom at the same time, and no 
others are available. Either you or I will have to 
change. 
Contingent This conflict can be solved by rearranging 
circumstances, but neither you nor I are aware 
of this. As for example, you and I need to teach 
at the same time, but we find out that one of us 
can move to another classroom in a different 
building. This requires some accommodation, 
but it is possible to resolve it. 
Displaced 
Conflict of this type involves disagreements 
over a surrogate issue because we are unable or 
unwilling to discuss the real issue. I pick an 
argument with you over taking the last notepad 
in our office, when in fact I am angry about 
you getting a larger office. 
Misattributed This is a disagreement between the wrong 
parties, usually over the wrong issue. For 
example, an unfilled faculty position is 
attributed to a lack of qualified candidates. 
Latent: This is when a conflict should be occurring but 
it is not. The conflict is not consciously 
recognized by the parties because it has been 
repressed, misattributed, or simply not yet part 
of one's psychological awareness system. For 
example, some women in the 1950s believed it 
was "natural" for men to have better paying 
jobs and legal rights. 
False: This is an occurrence of conflict for which 
there is no basis in fact, such as a 
misperception or misunderstanding. For 
example, I change the class schedule and you 
tell me that it is past the deadline. We call the 
appropriate person in change and she confirms 
that class schedules can still be changed. 
Parker-Magagna, M. (2012) based on Deutsch (1973). 
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APPENDIX C 
Contemporary Leadership Theories 
Contemporary Leadership 
Theories reviewed 
Definition/Contribution to Theory 
Trait 
Individual traits associated with successful leaders that 
distinguish them from followers. Believe universal, objective 
traits of leaders exist. Leader-centric. 
Behavioral Behaviors of effective leaders -leader centric. Use a 
combination of task and relationship to guide interactions with 
subordinates. Leadership can be learned. 
Power and Influence -
transaction and 
Transformational 
Social exchange process by acquisition and demonstration of 
power (transactional and transformational). Leaders use power 
to influence followers Or reciprocal relationship between two. 
Transformational and Transactional considered as "bridging" 
theory to new form of leadership that is "non-centric." 
Situational Situational variables influence leadership behaviors (followers' 
attitudes and task aptitudes. Different leadership behaviors 
called for in different situations. Situations determine who is 
leader. Predictive models of leadership by match of style to 
situation. Expands to include context - not just leader-centric. 
Updated theories in last 15 years focus on socially constructed 
contexts and the dynamic notions of leadership - not static or 
fixed like before. Known as leader process theory. 
Cognitive Leadership and follower cognitive processes influence 
perceptions of leaders and effective leadership. Possibility of 
socially constructed leadership rather than objective 
phenomenon. Recognizes cognitive bias in how leadership is 
seen. Learning and mental models have been added in last 15 
years, Bolman & Deal's 4 frames epitomize cognitive 
complexity and ambiguity model. Systems thinking rather than 
individual perspective. 
Cultural/Symbolic Functions of leadership seen as social construct that differs in 
cultural contexts. Individuals foster shared meanings and norms 
through interactions. Value and beliefs are important to 
understanding leadership. 
Complexity/Chaos (linked to 
cognitive complexity theories) 
Organizations seen as complex and chaotic, not neat, orderly 
like Newtonian universe. Recognizes influence of external 
environment to organization, speed of 21st decisions, 
globalization, and demands for equality that render old version 
of leader-centric power less useful. Focuses on cognitive 
complexity (multidimensional frames), flexibility, adaptability, 




Definition/Contribution to Theory 
Leadership as process - not person. Based on worldview social 
constructivism and post-modernism.* Systems thinking rather 
than individual perspective of leader. 
Organizational Learning Focuses on role of individual and organizational change through 
learning and development. Increase in cognitive and 
epistemological complexity, learning from mistakes, fostering 
collaboration. Leaders are constantly growing and changing, as 
are their followers/participants. 
Team Leadership is conceived as team-based, necessary in fast moving 
world of change. Also known as distributed leadership, 
pervasive leadership. World too complex and uncertain to 
depend on only one person to lead. 
Parker-Magagna, M. (2012). Kezar & Contreras-McGavin (2006); Bolman & Deal (2003); Wheatley 




Author Definition of Leadership and Practices 
Bergquist Leaders should be a good fit with the organizational culture 
Birnhaum Leaders should fit with the culture 
Burns (1988;2003) Doing the right things vs. doing things right (leadership vs. management. 
The master discipline that illuminates the toughest problems of human 
needs and social change; sees it as an integration of both "traits" and 
"theories" Relationship of power based "... on the creative, dynamic 
interplay of wants and needs, motives, values and capacities of both 
would-be leaders and their potential followers." (p. 16? 
Bolman & Deal 
(1991) 
Architect, catalyst, advocate, prophet and poet (451). Key concepts: 
leadership is relationship and contextual. (421). Requires walking a 
tightrope between rigidity and spinelessness; in permanent "white water" 
(as quoted in Vaill, 1989 in Bolman & Deal (1991, p. 446). Tension to 
balance core values with elastic strategies (p. 447). Three core 
competencies: vision setting, creating standards for performance and 
focusing organizational effort. In addition, need ability to communicate 
visions, show commitment, passions, inspire trust and build relationships. 
(411-412) 
Kegan (2006) Key words: adaptive, helps group create shared knowledge; necessary for 
team building but not to create an army to carry out orders, but to "rebuild 
the plane while it is flying." Leader helps participants to uncover their 
hidden assumptions that prevent them from making necessary changes. 
Leadership is about change. (209-212) 
Heifetz (2009) Leadership with or without authority: 
Mobilizing people to address adaptive challenge from a position of 
authority - role brings resources and constraints. Without authority: taking 
action beyond the formal and informal expectations that define scope of 
power - lacking authority brings its own challenges. 
Hemphel & Coons 
(cited in Yukl 1994) 




Working with and through individuals and groups to accomplish 
organizational goals (power=leaders influence potential) 




Use of structure - (a) policy formation (b) interpolation of structure (c) use 
of structure to keep the organization in motion and effective operation 
Kezar (2009) A process, not an individual; culture and context dependent; collaborative 
and collective; mutual power and influence -change agent and 
participants; learning, empowerment and change environment, (p. 6) 
Fullan (2007) Setting direction for shared vision, goals, performance. Developing people 
while redesigning organizations (drawn from Marzano, Waters & 
McNulty (2005) as cited in Fullan p. 166). Also cites Leithwood et al 
(2004) for meta study which empirically supports these core leadership 
practices. 
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Author Definition of Leadership and Practices 
Also citing from Johnson (1996), Fullan lists three core responsibilities to 
be educational (learning and pedagogy); political (securing resources and 
building coalitions); and managerial (creating and using structures, for 
participation, support, supervision and planning) leaders. P. 420). 
Kanter (1983) People with power to mobilize others, to set constraints and make 
participation work, (p.249). Keep everyone's mind on the shared vision 
(and prevent "drift); but be explicit about what is NOT negotiable. Reward 
and give feedback. Hold tension between grassroots innovation and 
periodic strategic decisions by leaders; use plans as symbols of change, 
advertisements for supporters, games to test seriousness of people about 
their programs, (p, 275-76; 294) 
Parker, Magagna, M. (2012). 
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APPENDIX E 
List of Key Documents 
Excel Community College Documents 
1 Budget Committee Report 5.15.11 
2 Strategic Plan 2008 -2011 
3 State/Excel Leadership timeline 
4 Mission Statement 
5 Regional Accreditation Approval letter 
6 Memo of Understanding: Trustees, Chancellor, Presidents 
7 Standing Committee "teams" at RVCC: mission, purpose, accountabilities, 
composition, success indictors 
8 Emails between Pres. Cooper and Parker-Magagna 
9 Faculty Forum, Department Chairs: selected minutes 2000-2011 
10 All-College Forum: selected minutes 2000 -2011 
11 President's Council: selected minutes 1990 -2011 
12 President's Executive Team: mission statement, selected minutes 
13 Collective Bargaining Agreement Update: 11.22.11 
14 Regional Accreditation Self-Study Report 
15 Presidential interview pledge by Cooper to Excel College 
16 Cooper presentation on AAUP principles to Excel College 
17 Collective Bargaining Agreement for Faculty/Staff State union 
18 College catalogs: 1989 - 2011 
19 State legislation creating state community college system: July 2007 
20 RVCC faculty handbook of policies and procedures 
21 State system - community college faculty agreement regarding participation in 
college campus governance issues 
22 Personnel list for Excel Community College 
23 Early history of Excel Community College 1945 - 1977 
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APPENDIX F 
FOR THE PRIMARY RESEARCH PARTCIPANT -THE PRESIDENT 
The Seidman (2008) Protocol 
Three part interviews: 
The purpose of conducting three interviews with both the president and the key actors in 
this curriculum change is to establish a rapport and a history of their relationship to the 
phenomena (curriculum change and its conflict). 
Seidman (2003) cautions that one interview with participants (rather than a series of 
three) risks getting only a small part of the participants' perspective and in most cases 
also risks failing to establish a trusted rapport with the researcher. 
The president (my primary research participant) is aware that I am studying conflict 
within the context of institutional change, so I will use the term "conflict" in my 
interview. 
The first interview: establishing life history which led to their work at the community 
college and probing for experiences of conflict. This may be helpful in understanding 
how pervious experiences with conflict on the job may be influencing their current 
attitudes. 
Sample questions: 
• Tell me your first recollections of experiencing conflict. 
• How did you respond? 
• What did the conflict experience mean to you? 
• Tell me about some other experiences prior to this current role as president when 
you experienced conflict? 
• In what ways did you feel that you influenced the conflict resolution for positive 
or negative results? 
• Tell me about a time when you took a strong stand as a leader and why. How did 
it cause conflict? Or did it? 
The second interview: This interview speaks to the "here and now" of the curriculum 
work at the community college. It avoids discussion of attitude and opinions about the 
work or their role, but rather seeks a factual account of "what the participant does." 
• Tell me about your work as president. What is a typical day like? Or to put it 
another way, what do you do in the course of a week or month that provides an 
overview. 
• Tell me about a time in your role as president that you experienced conflict as a 
leader. 
• How do you approach conflict experienced in your job in general 
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Appendix F (continued) 
The third interview: This interview asks participants to reflect back on the two pervious 
interviews, prompts may be provided, and to discuss what the experience of curriculum 
revision work at the community college means to them. But using the word "experience" 
I hope to elicit a broader range of meaning responses to include the experience of 
conflicts and how they are engaged. 
• How do you think you approach conflict in general? What are the triggers that 
might influence how you approach conflict? 
• How do you know when you have been successful in responding to conflict? 
• In what way do you think you influenced the conflict you are describing to me 
now? 
• How has conflict engagement over the years influenced you, if at all? 
SUPPORT RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS (these participants will provide perspective on 
the president's response to conflict, the culture influencing how conflict is seen, and other 
factors or nuances that will help me understand conflict engagement). For these 
participants I am likely to use the words "challenging problem solving or decision 
making" or "problematic decision making." (My committee agrees that to use the word 
"conflict" with supporting research participants may take the interviews in direction not 
useful to my study. The participants should begin to discuss these issues of their own 
accord without hard probing. I plan to introduce the word "conflict" as a descriptor at the 
approach time. This process (and results) will be recorded in my field notes. 
Some sample questions: 
• Tell me about your experiences with this institutional change process as part of 
the president's advisory (cabinet) committee? 
• What stands out as the most problematic issues you have faced? 
• In general, how does your team (group) approach the problematic issues you have 
described? 
• How has the team responded to these problematic issues? 
(At this point I need to probe for the best way to get at those situations where discord 
or conflict was part of the process and to encourage them to describe it without too 
much opinion at this point). 
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APPENDIX G 
LETTER TO RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS AND INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Dear Research Participant 
I am conducting a research project to learn about how leadership in a community college 
responds to decision making and problem-solving challenges associated with major 
institutional change. 
I am writing to invite you to participate in this project. I plan to work with you 
primarily, but I also plan to work with approximately five to seven additional participants 
in this study to understand more about this process and their perceptions of your role. 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to commit to approximately 6-
10 hours of interviews with me over the period six months, and an additional leadership 
development profile survey (which you and I have discussed). I plan to use audio 
recordings which will allow me to keep accurate notes on our conversations. These 
recordings will be coded for confidentiality before transcription. The electronic version of 
these transcriptions will remain in my possession and the original audio recordings will 
be destroyed unless you request to receive these recordings or ask that I keep them for 
later use by you, me or other researchers. 
The data will be reported using pseudonyms. This will include not only all interviews but 
also the location and identity of your college. This data will be used for my dissertation in 
partial fulfillment of requirements for a Ph.D. degree in Educational Policy and 
Leadership, Department of Education, University of New Hampshire. 
With this letter, I would also like to request your permission to use the information in 
academic publications and presentations, if appropriate opportunities should arise. I will 
contact you prior to pursuing any opportunities. Information from this study would be 
reported in publications and presentations using pseudonyms as noted in the paragraph 
above. 
You will not receive any compensation to participate in this project. 
The potential risks of participating in this study are anticipated to be minimal. Although 
you are not anticipated to receive any direct benefits from participating in this study, the 
benefits of the knowledge gained are expected to contribute to the empirical literature on 
community college institutional change processes, provide a greater understanding of the 
context of leadership in relationship to community college culture, and to provide insight 
into the intrapersonal and interpersonal challenges which a community college president 
faces when leading difficult problem solving and decision making processes. 
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Participation is strictly voluntary; refusal to participate will involve no prejudice, penalty, 
or loss of benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled. If you agree to participate 
and then change your mind, you may withdraw at any time during the study without 
penalty 
I seek to maintain the confidentiality of all data and records associated with your 
participation in this research. You should understand, however, there are rare instances 
when I am required to share personally-identifiable information (e.g., according to policy, 
contract, and regulation). For example, in response to a complaint about my research, 
officials at the University of New Hampshire and my faculty dissertation advisor must 
have access to my research data. 
Audio and electronic data will be stored in my home office for the duration of the study. 
Audio recordings, as noted above, will be destroyed unless you request it to be kept. I 
will keep electronic transcriptions, coded by pseudonym, in my home office. The 
identities represented by these codes will be kept in a separate secure location in my 
office and no one except my advisor and me will have access. 
The work will be conducted by me alone. 
If you have any questions about this research project or would like more information 
before, during, or after the study, you may contact: Professor Sharon (Nodie) Oja (my 
dissertation chair) or Professor Todd DeMitchell,(my faculty advisor and a dissertation 
committee member) at the following address: University of New Hampshire, Department 
of Education, 107 Morrill Hall, Durham, NH. 03824. Or at the following email addresses: 
nodie.oia@unh.edu or todd.demitchell@unh.edu 
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact Dr. Julie 
Simpson in UNH Research Integrity Services at 603-862-2003 or Julie.simpson@unh.edu 
to discuss them. 
I have enclosed two copies of this letter. Please sign one indicating your choice and 
return in the enclosed envelope. The other copy is for your records. Thank you for your 
consideration. 




No ,  I , _  
project. 
do not consent/agree to participate in this research 




University of New Hampshire 
Research Integrity Services, Service Building 




Education, Morrill Hall 
POB1400,8 Ash lane 
Grantham, NH 03753 
IRB#: 5191 
Study: How a community college president responds to conflict in the context of institutional 
change 
Approval Date: 02-Jun-2011 
The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research (IRB) has 
reviewed and approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in TWe 45, Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 46, Subsection 101(b). Approval Is granted to conduct your 
study as described In your protocol. 
Researchers who conduct studies Involving human subjects have responsibilities as outlined in 
the attache^  document, Responsibilities of Directors of Research Studies Invoking Human 
Subjects. (This document Is also available at http://unh.edu/research/ltfa-aoDlication-
resouroes.) Please read this document carefully before commencing your work involving human 
subjects. 
Upon completion of your study, please complete the enclosed Exempt Study Final Report form 
and return It to this office along with a report of your findings. 
If you have questions or concerns about your study or this approval, piease feel free to contact 
me at 603-862-2003 or Julle.sifnDSonPunh.edu. Piease refer to the IRB # above in ail 
correspondence related to this study. The IRB wishes you success with your research. 
For the IRB, 





APPENDIX H (Continued) 
jit. UNIVERSITY of NEW HAMPSHIRE 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTORS OF RESEARCH STUDIES INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 
University of Naw Hampshire (UNH) tenure-track fiacuty, lecturers, senior lecturers, visiting faculty with rank, research 
faoulty wNh rank, cSnical faculty w*h rank, and permanent staff may serve as dkectors of research studies (researcher) 
Involving human subjects. Adjunct faculty, courtesy faculty (affltate, aflMate research, and affiBata cflnical), and 
graduate and undergraduate students must be sponsored by an Individual who qualifies to serve as a project director. 
A. Researchers are rasponsfcie for complying with 
I. UNt-fs Pofcy on the Uae of Human Subjects in Reeaarch (htto://usnhotom.unh.odu/UNH/II.Acad/E.html. 
II. UNKs FederaMde Assurance (FWA) and 
III. Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 46: Protection of Human Subjects (45 CFR 46) 
B. Ftaeeatclieri are rasponsiile far gaining famlaritywHh, and adhering to, fie ethical principles stated In 77» 
flafcwanf Report (htfr;/frww.hha.QOv/ohm/humansublecta/auidanoa/balmonthtnil. 
C. Researchers must submit si proposed research activities involving human subjects to the UNH Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) for review before commencing. Researchers must not Involve humsn subjects In research 
acflvWaa untl the researchsr has received written, uncondltonal approval from tie IRB for the study. 
D. Raeeareftara are reaponstote far protecting the rights and wslfsre of human subjects in their research studies. 
<K. 
E. Raeearchars are raeponsfcte for keeping co-researchers and al research staff Informed about the nature and 
goalsof the stwy. and the need to adhere to ethical and raaponafela practices. 
F. Researchers are raaponstoto far adhartng to the IRB-approwsd protocol and consent process, Including providing a 
oopy of lha IRB-apprcvsd and signed Informed consent document to each subject at the flma of con—nt. unless 
the IRB has spacMcsNy waived this requiramant The researcher must retain all signed consent documents for at 
least 3 yaars sftsr the and of toe study. 
G. Rasaarchsrs must request IRB approval far propoaad changes In pravloualy approved human subject reeaarch 
activities before Initiating them, except where necessary to eRmlnate apparent immadtete hazards to tie subjects. 
H. Raeearchars are rseponsfcte far reporting progress of approved raaearch to the IRB as often as, and In the 
msrmer, prescribed by the approving IRB on the basis of riaka to subjects. For studies approved at the Expedited 
and Full Board review levels, this must be no lees than once a year (385 days) from the last review date. 
I. Researchers must report to the IRB any Injuries or unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects and others 
wHWn one working day of occurrence. 
J. Roasarchers wM not sesk to obtain research credit for, or use data from, patient Interventions that constitute the 
provision of emergency medal care without prior IRB approval. A physician may provide emergency medical care 
to a patient without prior IRB review and approval, to lha extent permitted by law. However, such activities will not 
be considered research nor may the data be used In support of research. 
K. Resserthers who coiaborate writh coleagues at other InsatuBonsMHes have additional responstoBWes. 
Reaea^ iaiiwBadvteathe IRB, IheOfflca of Sponsored Raaeareh, and appropriate officiate of ottwr institutions of 
tire Intent to engage human subjects in research studies far which the UNH FWA or any related Inter-Institutional 
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Sentence Completion Test. This test is one of the most widely used and validity-tested 
instructions in psychometrics (Loevinger 1985; Loevinger and Wessler 1970 as cited in 
Rooke & Torbert, 2005). 
The scoring manual contains virtually every possible action-logic response to 
each sentence stem. The test has a strong internal reliability because each single item is 
scored separately-not in sequence-to avoid a "halo effect" of early scores influencing 
later scores by the evaluating reader. The scores are eventually added together to create 
an overall statistical score and scores within a certain range are categorized as along a 
range showing the dominance of each stage. For example, a person scoring 20 answers at 
an Expert level overall may also exhibit other developmental levels, such as eight 
Diplomat responses, five Achiever, one Individualist, two Opportunist. 
LDP as compared to the Kegan Subject-Object Interview 
This type of reporting differs from the Kegan Subject-Object Interview reporting 
in that the SOI only reports overall score and not the appearance of other developmental 
levels that may be available in weaker versions. 
Strengths and Empirical Support for LDP 
The WUSCT has both high inter-rater reliability (Cox 1974; Hoppe 1972 as cited 




Executive Program Leadership for Change at Boston College, and founding member of 
the international society for Organizational Learning, co-founded by Prof. Peter Senge, 
MIT. He is the author of numerous books and peer reviewed articles including his 
seminal book Action Inquiry (Torbert & Associates, 2004). 
He received a BA in political science and economics, and a PhD in administrative 
sciences from Yale University. He has taught at several universities including Harvard, 
Yale and Southern Methodist University. 
Susanne Cook-Greuter. Cook-Greuter holds a doctorate from Harvard University 
in psychology and human development. The Leadership Development Profile is the 
result of a 20-year research into assessing worldwide views of adults and is an update to 
the original Jane Loevinger WUSCT. The LDP is designed to focus on adult thinking 
and actions as they pertain to the workplace and leadership skills, and is also designed to 
detect developmental stages at levels beyond the original WUSCT. 
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